

An Overview of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program

Summary¹

The DPRK has deployed 600-800 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges varying from 300 km (about 185 miles) to 700 km (about 435 miles).² These include the Scud missile variants such as the Scud-B and Scud-C. It has also deployed 150-200 Nodong-1 missiles, with a range of 1000-1500 km (about 620-930 miles);³ these could potentially reach Japan, but are considered to have low accuracy.

The DPRK may have deployed as many as 50 KN-02, a SRBM with a range of 100-120 km (62-75 miles).⁴ It may have deployed an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Musadan (also known as the Nodong-B), with a range of 2,500-3,000 km (about 1,555-1,865 miles). Some sources say that the DPRK may have deployed 10 Taepodong-1, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1,500-2,500 km (930-1,555 miles)⁵ while others think the Taepodong-1 is not operational.⁶ It has twice tested the Taepodong-2, its longest-range inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), with a range of up to 10,500 km (about 6,525 miles). It is not known if the Taepodong-2 is operational. On January 11 2011 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said that the U.S. government has assessed that the DPRK will be able to strike the continental United States with an ICBM within five years.⁷ In November 2011, Congressional officials were briefed on intelligence that North Korea is developing road-mobile ICBMs.⁸

The DPRK is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In September 1999 the DPRK began a self-imposed long-range missile test moratorium. The DPRK announced its withdrawal from its moratorium in March 2005. It tested a long-range missile in July 2006. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that member states prohibit the procurement of "missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology" to or from the DPRK. After the DPRK tested a nuclear device in October 2006, the UN adopted UNSCR 1718, which demanded that the DPRK not "conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile" and called for the DPRK to end its missile program. The DPRK's April 2009 satellite launch used a Taep'o-dong 2 rocket. The DPRK maintains that its 2009 launch was a component of its space program and therefore its sovereign right.

However, the UN condemned the launch as a violation of UNSCR 1718. There are reports of continued trade in missiles in violation of the UN resolutions.

DPRK Missile Tests, The 1999 Missile Test Moratorium and UN Resolutions

The DPRK, long accused by the US government of being “the single biggest proliferator of missile technology,”⁹ rose to prominence in the global arms market during the 1980’s.¹⁰ As with other nations, North Korea initial missile development was based on technology and hardware from other nations, including the Soviet Union between 1969 and 1970, and China in the late 1970s.¹¹ The DPRK acquired its first advanced missile system, the Soviet Scud B, from Egypt in the 1970s.¹² Since then the DPRK has developed several advanced missile systems and has an extensive list of customers. The DPRK is a key participant in the scud missile trade, a network of countries which reproduce Soviet Scud technology and also develop and sell their own indigenous versions.¹³

Currently, there is no legally binding international framework for prohibiting or restricting the sale of ballistic missiles or the related technology. In the absence of such a legal framework, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multinational association formed in 1987 to control the proliferation of ballistic missile systems, establishes and coordinates export control guidelines and national export licenses on ballistic missile and other technologies.¹⁴ Thirty-four countries have joined this voluntary regime. As of 2011, the DPRK is not a member; similar to other prominent non-members such as China and Pakistan, it is significantly involved in the weapons industry.

The United States and North Korea held their first round of missile negotiations in April 1996. The United States urged the DPRK to adhere to the rules of the MTCR; North Korea allegedly refused to do so unless the United States provided compensation for lost revenue. In the following month, the United States initiated sanctions on North Korea for transfers related to missile sales. However, pre-existing sanctions rendered the new sanctions largely symbolic.¹⁵

Without prior notice to its neighboring countries, North Korea conducted its first launch of the Taepodong-1 in August 1998. The launch was an attempt to place a small satellite, the Kwangmyŏngsŏng, into low earth orbit, but the third stage failed. The launch evoked swift criticism especially since the missile passed over Japan. The United States, South Korea and Japan issued a joint statement condemning the launch, but reaffirmed support for the 1994 Agreed Framework.¹⁶

On October 1, 1998, the United States re-opened missile talks with the DPRK. In September 1999, the DPRK agreed¹⁷ to a moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing as long as diplomatic talks continued.¹⁸ The United States reciprocated nine months later by partially lifting economic sanctions in 2000.¹⁹ The self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile tests did not include a provision to prohibit missile sales, and North Korea's missile sales remained robust during this period.

In October 2000 Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, First Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, visited the United States. In the Joint Communiqué released at the close of that visit, the DPRK reaffirmed its moratorium and "informed the U.S. that it will not launch long-range missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue."²⁰ Both sides declared that resolution of the missile issue would "make an essential contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region." Missile talks continued through November 2000, but were inconclusive by the end of the Clinton administration.²¹

The new Bush administration signaled that it wasn't sure if the Agreed Framework was effective,²² and in response the North Korean government warned that it would be difficult for it to maintain the unilateral testing moratorium "indefinitely."²³ Questioning whether a missile agreement could be "adequately verified,"²⁴ the administration delayed resumption of missile talks while it undertook a comprehensive policy review. However, the DPRK agreed to extend the moratorium at least through 2003 during Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's September 2002 visit to Pyongyang.²⁵ North Korea's short-range cruise missile tests in February and March 2003 were not considered violations of the moratorium.²⁶

On March 2, 2005, North Korea conditioned its return to nuclear negotiations on a U.S. apology for calling it part of an "axis of evil" and one of the "outposts of tyranny"; the following day it announced that it had ended its self-imposed missile test moratorium.²⁷ On July 5, 2006, the DPRK flight-tested an array of ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-2. Ten days later the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that member states prohibit the procurement to or from the DPRK of "missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology."²⁸ It also included a prohibition on the transfer of "financial resources in relation to the DPRK's missile or WMD programmes."²⁹

After the DPRK tested a nuclear device in October 2006, the UN adopted UNSCR 1718, which, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 41, "Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile. . . Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching. . . [and] Decides also that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction

and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”³⁰

On March 11 2009 the DPRK informed the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization of its plan to launch a satellite launch vehicle between April 4-8.³¹ The following day KCNA reported that the DPRK had joined the International Space Treaty and Convention.³² On April 5, 2009 the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency issued a statement saying that the DPRK had sent a communications satellite, the Kwangmyongsong-2, into orbit using the carrier rocket Unha-2.³³ The DPRK maintained that it was "a legitimate right of a sovereign state. . . to use space for peaceful purposes," and called the launch "a just work for the prosperity of the country and the nation and progress of humankind."³⁴ Initially Russia and China backed this interpretation of the launch. However, on April 13, 2009 the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement regarding the DPRK's Rocket Launch. The statement condemned the launch, calling it a "contravention" of UNSCR 1718 (2006) and the UN Security Council agreed to "adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of entities and goods."³⁵ Trade with three named entities was proscribed by the UNSC on April 24, 2009.³⁶

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper has said that progress on the Taepodong 2 shows the DPRK's "determination to achieve long-range ballistic missile and space-launch capabilities."³⁷ General Walter L. Sharp testified that "if left unchecked North Korea will likely develop" an ICBM capable of threatening the continental United States.³⁸ According to the U.S. government, missiles sales continue. For example, on March 1, 2011 at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell called North Korea "a determined proliferator" and said that the U.S. government believes that North Korea has provided small arms and missile components to Burma "in strict and clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions."³⁹

Profiles of Key Missiles

KN-02 (*Tested, Possibly Deployed*)

The KN-02 is a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with a range initially estimated to be 100 to 120 km (about 62-75 miles), making South Korea the likely target.⁴⁰ A June 2007 test may have indicated that its range has been expanded to 140 or even 160 km (about 87-99 miles), perhaps by reducing the payload.⁴¹ It is a mobile, accurate, truck-mounted missile capable of carrying a variety of warheads, including sub-munitions and chemical warheads, and eventually tactical nuclear warheads.⁴² It is believed to be the most accurate of North Korea's missile arsenal,⁴³ with "airfields, command posts, bridges, storage facilities and troops concentrations" in South Korea likely targets.⁴⁴ According to one source, North Korea has deployed fifty KN-02s.⁴⁵ Another analyst hypothesizes that the KN-02 would be a lower-risk purchase for a country that

wants a SRBM but wants to avoid the international censure that would result from buying a slightly longer-range SCUD missile.⁴⁶

Scud Missiles

North Korea's line of scud ballistic missiles is believed to top the list of its missile exports. The U.S. government has estimated that the DPRK has an "inventory of over 500 Scud missiles," but the breakdown between Scud-B and Scud C missiles is not known.⁴⁷ Based on Soviet technology, North Korean-designed scuds have been imported by an extensive list of countries.⁴⁸ Although the Soviet Scud-B has limited capabilities, most notably its poor accuracy, this model has been replicated by a number of Third World countries.⁴⁹ This is because its technology is widely available, especially among Middle Eastern and former Eastern Bloc countries.⁵⁰

SCUD-B (Hwasŏng-5) (*Tested, Deployed, Exported*)

The Scud-B is a road-mobile, Soviet-made, tactical ballistic surface-to-surface missile system.⁵¹ The DPRK produces a variant of the missile called the Hwasŏng-5. The Hwasŏng-5's estimated maximum range is about 300 km (about 186 miles), which puts Seoul within striking distance.⁵² The Scud's payload is about 1,000 kg (approximately 2,204 pounds).⁵³ Scud-B missiles are equipped with high explosive (HE) warheads, although it is believed that they may also be capable of carrying chemical weapons.⁵⁴

Many countries produce variants of the original Soviet Scud-B. Republic of Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, UAR, Vietnam, and Yemen have imported the North Korean Scud-B and its technology.⁵⁵

SCUD-C (Hwasŏng-6) (*Tested, Deployed, Exported*)

At 700-750 kg (about 1540 to 1653 pounds) the weight of the warhead of a the Scud-C or Hwasŏng-6 may be less than that of its predecessor, the Scud-B⁵⁶ which contributes to its longer range of 500-600 km (about 311-373 miles).⁵⁷ The entire southern half of the peninsula is within range of the Scud-C. However, since the North Koreans did not upgrade the missile's guidance system, the Scud-C has poor accuracy.⁵⁸ This missile's warhead may be equipped with HE, chemical, or sub-munitions.⁵⁹ One source hypothesizes that since "the dimensions, fuel, oxidizer and other components of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 are essentially identical, the missiles should be interchangeable at the missile bases and launch sites."⁶⁰

The DPRK sold the Hwasong-6 to Iran, after which Iran produced its indigenous version known as the Shahab-2.⁶¹ The Iranian government also imported Scud-C production equipment during the 1990's to update its own missile development program.⁶² North Korea assisted Egypt in building a Scud-C production facility⁶³ and sold Scud-Cs or Scud-C technology to Libya, Syria, Iran, Yemen and possibly Pakistan and Iraq.⁶⁴

Nodong-1 (*Tested, Deployed, Exported*)⁶⁵

The Nodong-1 is a MRBM) with a range of 1,000-1,600 km (about 620 to 995 miles), which could make Japan a potential target.⁶⁶ The Nodong-1 has poor accuracy and cannot be used on hardened targets; one source hypothesizes that if it were used to carry nuclear warheads it could cause significant damage to “soft targets” such as cities.⁶⁷ It is estimated that the DPRK has deployed 150-200 Nodong-1s.⁶⁸ The Nodong-1 or its components have been exported to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Syria. Iran’s Shahab-3 and Pakistan’s Ghauri-II are based on the Nodong-1’s design.⁶⁹

Musudan (Nodong-B) *(possibly tested in Iran)*

The Musudan (Nodong-B, the BM-25, Taepodong-X and Mirim), is an RBM with a range between 2,500 and 4,000 km (about 1,553 to 2,485 miles).⁷⁰ The range estimates vary because there has been no public flight test in the DPRK. However some analysts believe that in January 2006 and May 2007 Iran ran “surrogate test flights”.⁷¹ North Korea first displayed the Musudan in public during an April 2007 military parade.⁷² North Korea reportedly signed an agreement to sell to Iran 18 Musudan missile kits that same year.⁷³ The missile was on display at an October 9, 2010 military parade in honor of the 65 anniversary of the Worker’s Party.⁷⁴ In December 2011, it was reported that North Korea had been developing road-mobile missiles, possibly a variant of the Musudan.⁷⁵

Taepodong-1 *(tested, possibly deployed)*

The Taepodong-1 or Paketusan-1, a MRBM, is believed to have a range of 1,500-2,500 km (about 930-1,555 miles).⁷⁶ As noted above, it was tested in 1998, when it failed to launch a satellite. Some analysts believe that the DPRK has deployed 10 Taepodong-1 missiles.⁷⁷ However, other analysts believe that the Taepodong-1 is “a transitory product for the development of the Taepodong-2.”⁷⁸ Such analysts think it is unlikely that the Taepodong-1 has been deployed, since it does not offer significant strategic advantages over the Nondong-1.⁷⁹

Taepodong-2 *(tested)*

The Taepodong-2 or Paketusan-2 is believed to be a two- or three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Its development has garnered great interest. With a range of 7,000-7,500km (about 4,350-4,660 miles) for a two-stage missile and 10,000-10,500 km (approximately 6,215-6,524 miles) for a three-stage missile, the Taepodong-2 might have the capability reaching the continental United States.⁸⁰ North Korea does much of its missile development underground,⁸¹ and there were no reported flight tests of this missile until July 5, 2006 when North Korea test-launched the Taepodong-2 and other types of missiles into the East Sea.⁸² This test was declared a failure.⁸³ As described above, the DPRK’s April 2009 satellite launch used a Taepodong 2 rocket. This was considered by the UN Security Council to be the second test-flight for this ballistic missile. This test was also deemed a failure, although it demonstrated that progress had been made. Arms Control Association expert Greg Thielmann noted that there are differences in the technical information gained from a satellite launch and the information gained from a long-range ballistic missile test.

He said "Unlike the 2006 ballistic missile test, North Korea's satellite launch permits it to test some, but not all of the performance required by a military system. For example, the 2009 test provides no information on whether North Korea has successfully designed the front end of a long-range military missile, which must withstand the severe stress of reentry through the atmosphere-not a trivial technological challenge."⁸⁴ However, the test still revealed information about modifications to the Tapedong-2,⁸⁵ "demonstrated a more complete performance than the 2006 test,"⁸⁶ and allowed analysts to hypothesize about the North's ballistic missile program development.⁸⁷

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Resources

Arms Control Association *ACA provides key news articles, documents and analyses related to DPRK-US relations and the nuclear negotiations process.*
<http://www.armscontrol.org/country/northkorea/>

Congressional Research Services North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Steven A. Hildreth. *Last updated February 24, 2009 (RS21743).*
http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/CRS_DPRK_Ballistic_Missile_Threat_RS21473_2009.pdf

Federation of American Scientists *FAS has detailed information about the DPRK's ballistic missiles and missile systems, and is a useful resource for technical specifications, range, payload, etc.*
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/index.html>

GlobalSecurity.org *Global Security is a source for information on North Korea's ballistic missiles, military capabilities, ideology, nuclear programs and intelligence agencies.* <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/index.html>

"The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States," Anthony H. Cordesman, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner and Robert Hammond, *has a section on North Korea's missile program that compares different sources.*
https://csis.org/files/publication/110201_KoreaMilitaryBalanceMainRpt.pdf.

Missilethreat.com *A project of the Claremont Institute, this website has an index of Missiles of the World, with pages on individual missiles that include capability and history. A "news" section keeps the site up-to-date.*
<http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles-of-the-world/>

"North Korea's Missile Program," David Wright. *This October 2009 paper was produced as part of the project "Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing*

the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options.”

http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Wright_North_Koreas_Missile_Program_10_09.pdf

NTI *This website provides comprehensive information; it is well organized and easy to use. A comprehensive timeline covering North Korea's imports and exports of ballistic missiles and a 30 page section on “capabilities” are excellent web-based sources for information.*

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html

¹ This briefing covers only North Korea's ballistic missiles. It does not cover cruise missiles, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, etc. For useful summary charts of North Korea's ballistic missiles and their ranges, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner and Robert Hammond, “The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States,” February 14, 2011, pp. 150-151 at https://csis.org/files/publication/110201_KoreaMilitaryBalanceMainRpt.pdf and NTI North Korea Country Profile: Missiles: Capabilities at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/capabilities.html.

² NTI: “North Korea Country Profile/Missiles.” Accessed on March 30, 2011 at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ MilitaryToday.com, “KN-02 SRBM” access on April 1, 2011 at http://www.military-today.com/missiles/kn_02.htm

⁵ NTI: “North Korea Country Profile/Missiles,” *op. cited.*

⁶ Japanese Defense White Paper for 2010, quoted in Anthony H. Cordesman, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner and Robert Hammond, “The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States. Executive Summary.” February 14, 2011. P. 32. Accessed on March 24, 2011 at https://csis.org/files/publication/110201_KoreaMilitaryBalanceExecSuml.pdf.

⁷ Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger “Gates Warns of North Korea Missile Threat to U.S.,” *The New York Times*. January 11, 2011. Accessed on April 28, 2011 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/asia/12military.html>

⁸ Bill Gertz, “North Korea Making Missiles Able to Hit U.S.,” *The Washington Times*, December 5, 2011. Accessed on December 13, 2011 at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/5/north-korea-making-missile-able-to-hit-us/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS

⁹ Don Kirk, “Rumsfeld calls Pyongyang the world's leading proliferator : For North Korea, missiles pay.” *New York Times*. December 12, 2002. Accessed on April 5, 2011 at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/news/12iht-korea_ed3_.html.

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¹¹ “North Korea Profile: Missile Overview,,” NTI, *op.cited*, and Charles P. Vick, “WMD Around the World: North Korea Hwasong 5,” *Federation of American Scientists*, December 2005 <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/hwasong-5.htm>. Both accessed on April 5, 2011.

¹² Charles P. Vick, “WMD Around the World: North Korea Hwasong 5,” *ibid.*

¹³ Eas Bokhari, “Scud Missile Syndrome,” *Defense Journal*, May 1999 <<http://www.defencejournal.com/may99/scud-missile.htm>>

¹⁴ Missile Technology Control Regime Objectives, accessed on April 5, 2011 at <http://www.mtcr.info/english/objectives.html>.

¹⁵ “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” *Arms Control Association*, updated November 2010. Accessed on April 5, 2011 at <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp>.

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- ¹⁷ Korean Central News Agency, September 1999, in "DPRK not to Launch," <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/24.htm>>
- ¹⁸ "DPRK not to Launch," KCNA, September 24, 1999. The article states "[I]n response to the U.S. demand the DPRK will have high-level talks with the US...it will not launch a missile while the talks are under way with a view to creating an atmosphere more favorable for the talks." Accessed on April 7, 2011 at <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/24.htm>.
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- ²⁰ "US – DPRK Joint Communiqué, U.S. Department of State, October 12, 2000." Accessed on April 28, 2011 at http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/US_DPRK_Joint_Communique_2000.pdf
- ²¹ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." Op. cited.
- ²² Donald G. Gross, "U.S.-Korea Relations: Slow Start in U.S. Policy toward the DPRK," *Comparative Connections* 1st Quarter 2001, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2001. p. 3. Accessed on April 28, 2011 at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0101qus_korea.pdf.
- ²³ "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on new U.S. administration's policy towards DPRK," KCNA. February 22, 2001. Accessed on April 6, 2011 at [http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200102/news02/22.htm#1](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0101qus_korea.pdf)
- ²⁴ Donald G. Gross, "U.S.-Korea Relations: Slow Start in U.S. Policy toward the DPRK," op. cited.p. 3.
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- ²⁸ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1695, S/RES/1695 (2006), July 15, 2006. Accessed on April 6, 2011 at http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/UN_Res_1695.pdf/file_view.
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- ³⁰ UNSCR 1718, items 2, 5, and 7. Available at http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/UN%20Resolution%201874.doc/file_view.
- ³¹ *Ibid*.
- ³² "KCNA Report on DPRK's Accession to International Space Treaty and Convention," March 12, 2009. KCNA. Accessed on April 28, 2011 at <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200903/news12/20090312-1lee.html>.
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- ³⁴ "KPA General Staff Warns against Any Interception of Satellite," KCNA, April 2, 2009. Accessed on April 6, 2011.
- ³⁵ UN Security Council Presidential Statement Regarding DPRK April 05 2009 Rocket Launch. Accessed on March 30, 2011 at http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/UNSC_April_2009_Statement_DPRK_Launch.doc/file_view
- ³⁶ See "UNSCR 1718 'Paragraph 8' Sanctions imposed July 2009," <http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/>
- ³⁷ James R. Clapper, "Testimony Presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." February 16, 2011, p. 6.
- ³⁸ General Walter L. Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command, Commander, United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, Statement for the House Armed Service Committee's April 6, 2011 Hearing, "U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea budget request 2012," p. 9, 11.
- ³⁹ Stated by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell during the question period of "Breaking the Cycle of North Korean Provocations," a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing convened on March 1, 2011. A video of the hearing is available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=e85bfd8f-5056-a032-528b-0969fbfd6ecc>. The exchange regarding Burma begins at 71 minutes. Campbell's first quotation

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⁴⁸ Missilethreat.com, "Missiles of the World: SS-1B Scud A." Claremont Institute. Accessed on April 6, 2011 at http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles_of_the_world/id.113/missile_detail.asp.

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⁵² "CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missiles Capabilities," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 22, 2006. Accessed on April 4, 2011 at <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/060321.pdf>.

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⁵⁴ NTI "North Korea Profile: Missile Capabilities." Op. cited.

⁵⁵ Duncan Lennox, Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 46 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, January 2007), 92-94.

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