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H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, passed through Conference Committee on December 12, and was signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2011. This Issue Brief includes all language relevant to the DPRK. 

For previous versions and the legislative history of this bill, see http://thomas.loc.gov 
 

SEC. 1236. REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than November 1, 2012, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the specified congressional committees a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (in this section referred to as ‘‘North Korea’’). The report shall address the current and probable future course of military- technological development of the North Korean military, the tenets and probable development of North Korean security strategy and military strategy, and military organizations and operational con-cepts, through the next 20 years.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—A report required under sub-section (a) shall include at least the following elements:

(1) An assessment of the security situation on the Korean peninsula.

(2) The goals and factors shaping North Korean security strategy and military strategy.

(3) Trends in North Korean security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or that are inconsistent with, the goals described in paragraph (2).

(4) An assessment of North Korea’s regional security objectives, including those that would affect South Korea, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia.

(5) A detailed assessment of the sizes, locations, and capabilities of North Korean strategic, special operations, land, sea, and air forces.

(6) Developments in North Korean military doctrine and training.

(7) An assessment of the proliferation activities of North Korea, as either a supplier or a consumer of materials or technologies relating to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or missile systems.

(8) Other military and security developments involving North Korea that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.

(c) DEFINITION.—In this section the term ‘‘specified congressional committees’’ means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee

on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee

on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

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The Congressional Record (H8614, December 12, 2011) explains the history of this section:

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1224) that would require the Secretary of Defense to report on military and security developments in North Korea. The provision would require two reports: one due on March 1, 2012, and the other due on March 1, 2013.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would require a single report, due to specified committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives on November 1, 2012.

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SEC. 133. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OF U–2 AIRCRAFT.

(a) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of the Air Force may take no action that would prevent the Air Force from maintaining the

U–2 aircraft fleet in its current configuration and capability beyond fiscal year 2016 until—

(1) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certifies in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress that the operating and sustainment (O&S) costs for the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) are less than the operating and sustainment costs for the U–2 aircraft on a comparable flight-hour cost basis; and

(2) the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council certifies in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress that the capability to be fielded at the same time or before the U–2 aircraft retirement would result in equal or greater capability available to the commanders of the combatant commands.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

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The Congressional Record (H8570-8571, December 12, 2011) explains how this section is relevant to US Policy on the Korean Peninsula:

Limitation on retirement of U–2 aircraft (sec. 133)

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 135) that would prohibit the retirement of the U–2 aircraft until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) certifies that the operating and sustainment (O&S) costs for the Global Hawk are less than the O&S costs for the U–2 on a comparable flight-hour cost basis.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would add an additional limitation, requiring that the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council certify that the capability to be fielded at the same time or before the U–2 aircraft retirement would result in equal or greater capability available to the combatant commanders.

The USD (AT&L) certification in June, 2011, pursuant to the Global Hawk Nunn- McCurdy cost breach (section 2433a of title 10, United States Code), noted that the U–2 is less expensive to operate on a flight hour basis, but pointed out that, because the Global Hawk has greater endurance than the U–2, fewer sorties are required to fulfill requirements, such that the Global Hawk is less expensive in terms of a full mission profile. The conferees acknowledge this advantage, but believe that flight hour cost is a relevant metric that should favor the more modern, unmanned platform.

The conferees are concerned about Department of Defense (DOD) transition plans in U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The U–2 has been operated basically as a dedicated asset to support U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command, but the Global Hawks that are slated to replace them will be operated as a PACOM-wide asset, substantially reducing collection on the Korean Peninsula.

Global Hawk’s imaging sensors also have substantially less range than the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) and the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System II carried by the U–2. In the high-threat Korean Peninsula, this range disadvantage equates to reduced coverage and/or increased risk from operating at reduced standoff ranges. The conferees are informed that the Air Force is considering development of a SYERS-like electro-optical imaging system that would fit in the Global Hawk. While this initiative is welcome, it may be years before it is available, and does not address the gap in radar performance.

DOD hoped that a Foreign Military Sale to South Korea of a number of Global Hawks would mitigate the gap in coverage created by DOD’s Global Hawk transition plan in PACOM. This sale appears to have stalled, however. The conferees intend to assess whether the risk of a gap in intelligence collection in Korea is significant and to examine alternatives.