NCNK Policy Recommendations for the Trump Administration

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Introduction

The National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) is a privately funded organization whose diverse membership of former diplomats, academics, Track II practitioners, humanitarian NGO officials and others come together to support principled engagement with North Korea. Some of NCNK’s past and present NGO members have over twenty years of on-the-ground experience in North Korea. Others have frequently engaged with the North Koreans in Track II and other fora.  

The following recommendations are submitted for consideration by the Trump Administration as US policy toward North Korea is developed and implemented in the years ahead. We convey our appreciation to officials of the US Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce who continue to review and respond to inquiries from NCNK members and other colleagues working to ensure compliance with US law, rules and regulations as they engage or attempt engagement with North Korea.  

Our recommendations are derived from a survey of NCNK members as well as input from others in the North Korea policy realm. Due to the country’s prolonged border closures as part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the North Korean decision to forego interaction with the US after the failed Hanoi summit, US-DPRK relations and communications have been largely non-existent. While the Biden Administration conveyed a policy of willingness to “meet the North Koreans anytime, anywhere”, the submission of specific proposals for North Korean consideration was lacking.  

What initiatives or diplomatic strategies would be most effective in fostering dialogue and trust between the US and North Korea? Acknowledging that it’s not clear at this point that North Korean leaders want better relations, the following is a range of options for longer term Administration consideration. 

Policy Recommendations

I. Seek an Interim Deal that Achieves Immediate Benefits for Security and Diplomacy 

  • Move away from demanding immediate complete denuclearization, a deal-breaker for North Korea.
  • Adopt a reciprocal, step-by-step approach to build trust, with the US being willing to make the first conciliatory move.  
  • Begin with smaller confidence-building measures before tackling larger issues.  

II. Reduce Military Tensions 

  • Reconsider the scale and location of joint military exercises. 
  • Evaluate the effectiveness of deterrence strategies noting that some level of proactive deterrence can exacerbate tensions and arms-racing.  

III. Sanctions Relief Strategy

  • Recognize limitations of the current sanctions’ regime.  
  • Consider targeted, phased sanctions relief tied to specific actions.  
  • Restructure economic incentives to encourage legitimate international consideration.

IV. Humanitarian and Development Assistance Should Be Depoliticized  

  • Expand humanitarian and development exemptions impacted by sanctions.
  • Don't use humanitarian aid as leverage for security concessions.  
  • Pursue family reunions for divided Korean American families.  
  • Remove travel restrictions for all NGO – related travel.  
  • Clarify general licensing requirements of the Treasury Department.
  • Establish a banking channel to the DPRK.  

V. Consider an End of War Proposal 

  • It could serve as a framework for improving relations.  
  • Provides an immediate and prominent signal of accomplishment and improving of relations.  

VI. Establish Official Communication Channels  

  • Support liaison offices or diplomatic missions.  
  • Create reliable channels for consistent diplomatic engagement. However, while this is  important, there are no reliable channels as long as US-DPRK relations remain hostile, therefore the focus should be on improving relations.

VII. Multilateral Engagement

  • Continue to collaborate with South Korea, Japan and China.  
  • Consider engaging Russia despite current tensions.  
  • Leverage the UN and neutral third parties (Mongolia, Indonesia, Sweden, etc).  

VIII. Academic and Scientific Diplomacy 

  • Use academic and scientific collaboration as a non-political trust-building mechanism.  
  • Determine those areas where North Korea would have interest in academic collaboration.  
  • Support joint projects that address shared concerns.  
  • Build relationships through experts and technical cooperation since the US and the DPRK have a track record of success in this area.