By Anton Sokolin
Introduction
Nearly two years into their renewed romance, humble diplomatic exchanges have metamorphosed into massive arms transfers and even troop deployments. But North Korea’s military cooperation has raised questions about Russia boosting Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities.
While it is hard to rule this scenario out, several factors are likely to prevent the Kremlin from directly contributing to the DPRK’s offensive nuclear program.
What Does Kim Want?
One area where Moscow has probably helped DPRK capabilities is short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The Russian military provided North Korea a unique opportunity to test KN-23 missiles in Donbas under real-life combat conditions.
Indeed, Ukrainian military and intelligence noted rapid improvements in the accuracy and reliability of these weapons. Direct or indirect exchanges between the DPRK military and Russian engineers seem to have contributed to several upgrades in guidance and maneuverability. Pyongyang is well-positioned to mount nuclear warheads on these missiles.
Moreover, Kyiv has assessed that Russia is transferring "low yield tactical nuclear weapons and submarine missile launch systems" to North Korea in exchange for manpower and artillery rounds, such as 122mm rockets and 155mm shells.
Fueling further speculation about Russian involvement, Pyongyang has unveiled its first nuclear-powered submarine. Boosting naval and nuclear prowess has been a top priority for DPRK leader Kim Jong Un. Some have even argued that with Russian technological support in the near future Pyongyang could deploy submarines capable of firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
While Russia’s assistance with quality inspections and design is hard to rule out, its role in submarine technology remains unclear, raising questions about when exactly Moscow may have chipped in, considering the project has been in the works for over a decade.
Moscow’s habit of keeping its advanced tech close to its chest casts additional doubt on whether it would go beyond incremental help. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to help the DPRK launch satellites in 2023, but only one bare-bones satellite with questionable capabilities has actually reached orbit.
If Ukraine’s claims about tactical weapons are correct, Pyongyang might seek help upgrading cruise and strategic missiles, like its Hwasal-1, Hwasal-2 and Pulhwasal models. Hypersonic missiles are also a priority for Kim. For this goal, North Korean cyber-attackers reportedly hacked Russia’s Zircon missile design bureau in early 2023.
North Korea’s wishlist doesn’t stop there. The U.S. military suggested Pyongyang’s primary demand from Putin could be military equipment like the MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets to modernize Kim’s dilapidated air force.
The DPRK leader might also expect Russia’s help with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (known as C4ISR) to improve its responses to potential threats given the absence of a reliable satellite constellation.
Additionally, Moscow’s success in developing and deploying ballistic missiles with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) that could carry a nuclear payload is undeniably something Kim could set his sights on.
The NPT Argument
If these exchanges have taken place, even at a limited scale, Moscow has undoubtedly kept them secret to dodge accusations of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintain plausible deniability.
However close its ties with North Korea, Russia won’t go as far as overtly contributing to the DPRK’s enrichment program or nuclear arsenal, which already includes some 100 warheads, mostly developed before deepening ties with Moscow.
The Kremlin’s role as a staunch defender of the NPT since its inception in the 1960s also matters. Notably, it was Moscow that pushed the DPRK to sign this agreement in the 1980s. The USSR even offered North Korea a civilian nuclear plant in exchange.
Furthermore, despite the economic turmoil of the 1990s, Russia upheld the NPT, refraining from aiding North Korea’s nuclear efforts, although financial troubles on both sides may have played a role.
By contrast, South Korea reportedly received reactor blueprints and training for a nuclear-powered submarine project from a Russian institute for $1 million in the 1990s. It is possible that this research institute acted behind the government’s back to raise funds amid economic difficulties. Seoul, meanwhile, officially denied the cooperation took place.
Paradoxically, Russia still supports the NPT, despite largely acknowledging North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. The U.S. has also adjusted its tone, with President Donald Trump and his officials occasionally referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power.”
Russian authorities have long proclaimed denuclearization of the DPRK unrealistic, but that doesn’t mean the Kremlin would help Pyongyang bolster its nuclear weapons.
Beyond undermining the NPT regime, Moscow may fear that its technology ends up in the wrong hands — North Korea’s vast illicit networks are notorious. Destabilization of Russian borders is a non-starter for the Kremlin.
Additionally, Beijing has no interest in a nuclear crisis or confrontation on the peninsula. Encouraging Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup or helping with warhead yields and higher-grade fissionable material would clash with China’s stance.
Such a move could even push South Korea toward developing its own nuclear arsenal, which would trigger protests from Moscow and Beijing. Once again, it would undermine the NPT. An outbreak of national nuclear weapons programs would deal a blow to Russia’s role in maintaining peace on the peninsula.
Russia’s willingness to mediate U.S.-Iran nuclear talks is more proof of its commitment to the NPT. Openly providing Pyongyang help with enrichment or warhead miniaturization would damage Moscow’s credibility. For the Trump administration, Putin would return to the status of pariah.
Putin has previously floated the idea of arming North Korea with “high-precision weapons” in response to Western support for Ukraine, though it’s unclear if he meant nuclear arms. While not impossible, the remarks appeared to be more a strategic warning to the West than a call to action.
Importantly, Putin has shown restraint, refraining from using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Apart from a “lack of necessity,” concerns over environmental blowback and further political isolation have likely played a key role. The same logic could apply to the Korean Peninsula: Russia has repeatedly praised Pyongyang’s adherence to its nuclear test moratorium.
A detonation on the Korean Peninsula would risk contamination near Russian borders.
Institutional Barriers
While the U.S. has raised concerns over a new Russia-North Korea defense pact as potentially violating the NPT, particularly its “peaceful nuclear energy” clause, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Putin and Kim may act as a barrier to nuclear aid.
Although Russian officials deny it’s a military alliance, the pact grants Pyongyang protection that reduces its need to seek external help. Naturally, Moscow has touted the agreement as a “stabilizing” factor on the peninsula for propaganda reasons. But there is some truth in this claim.
Despite being fully ready to test its nukes at any point, the DPRK hasn’t conducted a nuclear test since 2017, a move that would put the Kremlin in a tough spot amid its war in Ukraine, tensions with Europe and ongoing engagement with the U.S. Tempering Pyongyang’s brinkmanship, at least for the time being, is in Russia’s core interests.
Russia’s new nuclear doctrine allowing use of nuclear weapons to defend its territory or that of allies is also a factor. Regardless of whether Russia counts North Korea as an “ally”, the strategic ambiguity benefits both sides: Kim gains deterrence and Moscow gets leverage without open proliferation.
Yes, Pyongyang expects significant rewards for its military support, but nuclear weapons are too dear a prize for Moscow. What’s more likely is that Russia will keep stringing Pyongyang along with incremental military tech, such as guidance tweaks and engineering support, while receiving arms and soldiers.
When the Ukraine war reaches an end, Russia will be even less inclined to offer nuclear armaments, with bilateral cooperation staying limited to conventional weaponry. Cash transfers, oil supplies and some commodity trade would mark the limit of Russia’s support.
Peaceful Atom?
Despite U.S. concerns, Russia-DPRK cooperation in civilian nuclear energy may follow a path Moscow explored in the 1990s. Recent visits by North Korean scientific delegations to Russian universities, including a nuclear hub, signal Pyongyang’s continued interest in this route.
Civil cooperation could even serve as a platform for diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and DPRK, offering North Korea incentives like improving its grid network and electricity output — North Korea is still plunged into darkness at night — in return for a missile test moratorium, warhead reduction or talks on arms control.
If U.S.-Russia mutual overtures prove durable, a framework similar to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization could even be revived, this time with the Kremlin at the helm. The two sides already discuss space and rare-earth mineral cooperation, while Russia positively views the prospects of U.S.-DPRK talks.
For now, Moscow will tread lightly, helping Pyongyang at the margins and denying direct involvement, while one can only hope their cooperation in “peaceful nuclear energy” won’t nudge the Korean Peninsula towards a nuclear calamity.
About the Author
Anton Sokolin is the data correspondent at NK News. He previously worked at Reuters, TASS and the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA).