Author: Lynn Rusten
One of the least noted but most concerning consequences of the rise in “great power competition” over the last decade or more is the reduced priority and willingness of those great powers – particularly Russia, China and the United States -- to work together on what had long been a shared mutual interest in preventing and rolling back nuclear proliferation by other states. As one example, their collective will to work together on a combination of sticks and carrots to slow down North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and coax it to the negotiating table has been moribund for years. While arguably not ideal for any of them, it seems that avoiding the nuclear problem in North Korea served their interests more than any alternative course.
That could change now. With the start of Donald Trump’s second administration, we see the promulgation of disruptive policies that will further complicate great power relations. It is the diplomatic equivalent of throwing pixie sticks up in the air. Where and how they land is anyone’s guess. What could this mean for policies toward North Korea and its nuclear program?
It remains to be seen whether and when the United States will turn its attention once again to the growing threat from the DPRK, but continuing to ignore it will only lead to an increasing threat to the U.S. homeland and our allies and greater instability in the Asia-Pacific region. If and when the U.S. decides to refocus on this challenge, notwithstanding President Trump’s unbounded confidence in the power of his personal diplomacy, history suggests that while U.S. leadership is essential, meaningful progress on freezing and rolling back the North’s nuclear program will also require sustained engagement and coordination among all the key regional players.
China, given its longstanding economic and political ties with North Korea, remains essential. No American nuclear diplomacy strategy toward the North will succeed without China’s engagement and buy-in. China’s calculations could be affected by the rapidly changing dynamics of U.S.-Russia relations, Russian-DPRK relations, U.S.-ROK relations, and of course Sino-U.S. relations. Benign neglect of the DPRK nuclear program may no longer be the least of the bad options for Beijing if it precipitates a ROK push to get nuclear weapons and additional U.S. nuclear deployments in Asia, and intensifies DPRK-Russian military cooperation at the expense of Beijing’s reduced influence.
Russia’s calculations may be changing too. It arguably has a greater interest and role to play now than in previous multilateral diplomatic efforts with the DPRK. As Russia has come to rely on the DPRK for conventional rearmament and military manpower to support its war aims in Ukraine, it has deepened its political and military partnership with the DPRK and backed away from enforcing UN sanctions on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs. But now, with Trump’s resuscitation of U.S.-Russian diplomacy and efforts to end the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s interests and priorities vis-a-vis the DPRK may evolve. Russia – which, like China, does not want the ROK to pursue nuclear weapons or the United States to deploy more nuclear capability in the Asia-Pacific -- could decide to use its expanded influence with the DPRK to encourage restraint on the Peninsula and a return to the negotiating table, just as Russia is likely to be a key intermediary in any renewed negotiations with Iran.
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of domestic political instability, South Korea has been frustrated by the years-long inattention of the United States, China and Russia to the growing security challenge it faces from the DPRK. The combination of the DPRK’s increasing belligerence and military capacity, lack of U.S. diplomatic focus on this problem, and genuine and growing concerns about reliability of the U.S. security guarantee are fueling debate in the ROK about whether it needs its own nuclear weapons capabilities.
Neither China nor Russia will sit idly by were the ROK to initiate an indigenous nuclear weapons program, nor will they react benignly to any significant build-up of U.S. nuclear capability in the region. Moreover, China has an interest in regaining influence with the North that it may have lost to Russia and finding ways to reduce tensions with the United States.
Thus it is possible, though not at all guaranteed, that the United States, China, and Russia for their own reasons could conclude that continued neglect of DPRK’s nuclear and missile buildup no longer serves their interests. This could be the impetus for a new diplomatic effort that would be very welcomed by South Korea and Japan.
The question is whether these states can once again align on a strategy of carrots and sticks that could bring the North back to the table. If President Trump seeks to play a leading role, his administration will have to demonstrate greater capacity for planning, executing, and sustaining a well thought out diplomatic strategy and coordinating with other key states in the region than did than his first one. If they do, the international community would welcome this effort, and many countries can help shore up the “sticks” element of the strategy as well as the “carrots,” which should include a cooperative threat reduction-type program1 offering economic and humanitarian incentives to the North Koreans in exchange for key concessions.
Alternatively, the continued failure of China, Russia, and the United States to prioritize and work jointly and with other states on a new round of multinational diplomacy to reduce nuclear dangers on the Korean Peninsula will only increase the prospects for military conflict -- and with it the risk of nuclear war. A diplomatic strategy far more sophisticated and orderly than a game of pickup sticks is essential to avert the growing nuclear dangers on the Korean Peninsula. It remains to be seen whether the great power disruptors will recognize and act on their mutual interest in rolling back and preventing further nuclear proliferation on the Peninsula and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.
About the Author
Lynn Rusten is a national security consultant. She was the Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation on the White House National Security Council staff from 2011-2014 and was a vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.