Strengthened North Korea-Russian Relations Poses Risk to the US and its Allies

Author: Bruce Klinger
March 2025

All views expressed are the author's own.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had far-reaching implications not only for Europe but the Indo-Pacific as well. It served as the single biggest factor in the Japanese public abandoning long-standing resistance to expanding the country’s defense posture encapsulated in three national security documents released in December 20221.  While Japanese security professionals had long warned of the dangers of potential Chinese action against Taiwan, the Japanese public had an overnight epiphany of the danger of hostilities near its shores.

Similarly, South Korea responded to Russia’s invasion by imposing sanctions on Moscow and increasing its criticism of China’s coercive actions against its neighbors. Seoul highlighted growing security linkages between European and Indo-Pacific security threats, particularly after evidence of Beijing’s financial and Pyongyang’s military support to Moscow became clear.

South Korea warned of the dangers to the Korean Peninsula of Russia’s reciprocal economic assistance and potential transfer of military technology to North Korea. Seoul provided extensive indirect military support to Ukraine by replenishing U.S. and Polish ammunition and weapons stocks after their transfers to Kyiv. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration repeatedly warned that it might provide direct lethal aid to Ukraine if Russia or North Korea crossed unspecified red lines. Seoul continues to watch with great trepidation for any transfer of Russian military technology to North Korea, particularly for nuclear, missile, or submarine weapons.

The Evolving North Korean-Russian Relationship

North Korean-Russian relations have ebbed and flowed over the decades due to changing national priorities and periodic quests by each for alternative partners. North Korea has long played its Chinese and Soviet benefactors off against each order in order to reduce either of their influence over Pyongyang. In the 1990s, Moscow slashed its benevolent aid after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its desire to invigorate economic relations with South Korea.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in 2000 to restore relations, though without the economic largesse of the past. Bilateral relations continued to languish and Russia even signed onto a series of punitive UN resolutions and sanctions in response to North Korean nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a resurgence of ties between Moscow and Pyongyang and brought new relevance to the relationship. In July 2022, North Korea supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by diplomatically recognizing the “independence” of the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine2. 

In September 2022, the U.S. announced that North Korea had sold “millions of artillery shells and rockets” to Russia3.  The declaration was greeted with some skepticism since no shipments had yet been observed on commercial satellite imagery. Washington subsequently confirmed that North Korea had completed an arms delivery, which included the delivery of rockets and missiles, to the Wagner Group in November 2022 for use in Ukraine4. 

In July 2023, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to North Korea in the first visit by a Russian defense minister since 1991. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un escorted Shoigu to an exhibition of North Korean weapons systems. Shoigu reportedly asked Pyongyang to sell more artillery ammunition to Russia and proposed North Korea join Russian-Chinese combined naval exercises for the first time5. 

The following month, Washington warned that North Korea and Russia were “actively advancing” negotiations for a new arms deal following an exchange of letters by the two leaders “pledging to increase their bilateral cooperation.”6 

In September 2023, Kim Jong Un traveled to Russia for a summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin, confirming the growing military and diplomatic entente between the two countries. During Kim’s trip to Russia—his first travel outside North Korea in four years—he doubled down on his support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, depicting it as a fight to “punish the evil forces that ambitiously pursue hegemony and expansion.” 

Kim visited a Russian civilian rocket launch facility, military factories for air, naval, and ground weapons, and watched a demonstration of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, hinting at the technology that Putin could provide in return for the North Korean arms shipments supporting Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. In subsequent months, senior Russian and North Korean officials as well as numerous economic, agricultural, and development delegations traveled to each country.
Putin reciprocated Kim’s visit to Russia by traveling to North Korea in June 2024, his first visit outside the country since 2020. Most notably, the two leaders signed a comprehensive partnership agreement pledging “the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties to this document.”7  

In 1961, the two countries had signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance which included a clause for automatic military intervention if either country was attacked. The treaty ended in 1996 after Moscow established diplomatic relations with South Korea. In 2000, the two countries signed a bilateral cooperation agreement, but it did not specify any military relationship.
The 2024 bilateral pact stipulates that if either party falls into a state of war due to foreign armed aggression, the other shall immediately “provide military and other assistance by all means available.”8 However, the agreement falls short of a guarantee of automatic intervention, and Putin downplayed it as “defensive.”9 Neither leader specified the circumstances under which the new accord would be implemented or whether the assistance would be military forces, logistics supplies, or diplomatic or economic assistance.

North Korean Military Assistance to Russia

Satellite imagery provided growing evidence of massive North Korean ammunition and arms shipments to Russia. During 2023-2025, large numbers of railcars and maritime shipping containers were identified transiting Russia. At the time of this writing, it is assessed that Pyongyang sent at least 20,000 shipping containers carrying an estimated 8 million artillery shells, predominantly 122mm and 152mm artillery shells10. Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources reported that North Korean ammunition accounted for 50 to 60% of that used by Russia in Ukraine and nearly one-third of all Russian ballistic missile launches11.  

However, Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have commented on the inferior quality of North Korean munitions provided to Russian forces. Some shells have exploded in the barrel, damaging or destroying the weapons and injuring Russian soldiers12.  Inaccurate shells mean that more ammunition must be expended to achieve a mission, which in turn means greater wear on gun tubes and greater exposure to counter-battery fire. 

Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR), reported that North Korea had provided approximately 120 170mm M1989 Juche long-range self-propelled artillery guns (an improved version of M1978 Koksan gun) and 120 M-1991 240mm multiple launch rocket systems and would likely send at least as many more in the future. 

Budanov also reported that Pyongyang had sent 148 newly-produced KN-23 (Hwasong-11A) short-range ballistic missiles in 2024 and was expected to send 150 more KN-23 in 202513. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Russia first used North Korean missiles against Ukraine in December 202314. Early reports indicated that half of the recently produced short-range ballistic missiles malfunctioned15. However, by February 2025, North Korean short-range ballistic missiles appeared to have much improved accuracy to within 50 to 100 meters of the intended target. The reason for the improvement could not be discerned but may be the result of better navigation systems or an augmented steering mechanism for maneuvering16. 

To accommodate Russia’s high demand for ammunition and weapons, the North Korean Central Military Commission directed an increase of military exports and a doubling of existing weapons production. The Ministry of Defense allowed the export of ammunition and weapons that were nearing or had passed their expiration date to be included in exports to Russia17. Pyongyang is expanding a missile manufacturing factory to produce more KN-23 missiles for Russia18 and Kim Jong Un called for the mass manufacturing of attack drones, although it is unclear if the latter is for export to Russia19.  

North Korea Deploys Troops to Ukraine

Reports that Pyongyang would deploy a large contingent of combat troops to participate in Russian operations in Ukraine were rejected as unrealistic. Russian military pundit Igor Korotchenko claimed in August 2022 that North Korea had offered 100,000 troops to assist Russia in fighting in Ukraine20. It was presumed that Pyongyang would instead provide military advisers and technicians to assist Russians operating North Korean weapons. 

Previous North Korean military deployments included sending fighter pilots to participate in the Vietnam War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the latter to support Egypt. They also operated multiple rocket launchers for the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982 and Ethiopian tanks in the Ethiopian-Eritrean War from 1998 to 2000. More recently, small units of military advisers and troops participated in Syria’s 2016 civil war and trained Ugandan troops in martial arts and helicopter gunnery.

In October 2024, The National Intelligence Service (NIS) disclosed satellite imagery of North Korea transporting special forces to the Russian Far East via a Russian naval ship. The NIS also obtained a video showing North Korean troops being issued Russian uniforms, equipment, and fake identification cards to disguise themselves as Russian units from Siberia21. Ukraine reported that North Korean advisers had established training grounds for artillery live fire training in Russian-occupied Donetsk22.  

Ukraine also reported in late October 2024 that North Korea would deploy 3,000 combat troops to form the “Special Buryat Battalion” within the Russian 11th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade23. Later reporting indicated that North Korea would send 12,000 troops to assist Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The North Korean troops are drawn from the 11th “Storm” Corps, the headquarters of all special forces, considered to be the most elite soldiers24. 

The dispatch of such a large number of North Korean troops marked a major escalation of Pyongyang’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and the first time it has deployed large-scale ground forces overseas. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, Kim proposed sending his troops to assist Russian forces in Kursk to which Putin agreed25. North Korea’s action will prolong the conflict and could lead to greater Russian willingness to supply more sophisticated military technology to Pyongyang. 

North Korean Forces Suffer Heavy Casualties

Prior to their deployment, there was uncertainty over the combat capabilities of North Korean soldiers. Pyongyang’s ground forces lacked combat experience, sophisticated weaponry, and exposure to modern combat. The North Korean military had not trained with Russian units in combined-arms operations, nor did it have integrated command, control, and communication systems with Russian forces.

After preliminary battles, North Korea's soldiers were described as relentless, almost fanatical, in pursuing objectives despite casualties. Ukrainian General Oleksandr Syrsky commented that North Korean troops are “highly motivated, well-trained, and brave.”26 Ukrainian military sources praised North Korea unit cohesion which was maintained even when under heavy attack, being more disciplined than Russian troops, and their strong marksmanship27.  

However, North Korean troops quickly suffered significant casualties due to relying on mass wave attack tactics without Russian armor or artillery support and with little understanding of the lethality of drone warfare. Many of the North Korean forces had been trained as special forces for small unit infiltration operations but were instead utilized as light infantry units.

Roman Kostenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, concluded that the North Koreans are well trained soldiers but used outdated Soviet tactics, including attacking in large formations in a predictable manner making them easy targets. General (ret.) Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. forces in Europe, assessed that the North Korean troops were “helpless against the Ukrainian military.” He commented that the Russians initially used the North Korean troops as “bullet shields” and that the North Korean soldiers had not shown signs of having learned from their losses nor adapted their tactics28. 

North Korean troops responded to drone attacks by having one soldier stand in the open as a target while two others hid and shot their rifles at attacking drones. Such tactics were ineffective. Ukrainian forces claimed that they killed 77 North Korean troops and wounded 40 more during a single battle in December 202429. North Korean troops were instructed to commit suicide using grenades to avoid capture and, according to a Ukrainian platoon commander, Russian forces also sought to prevent the North Koreans’ capture, even targeting them with drones30.  

The North Korean troops achieved only limited tactical successes. Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR), was unimpressed with the quality of North Korean ground troops, describing them as “biological robots.”31 US officials reported that the North Koreans were conducting “hopeless assaults” using human wave tactics that were ineffective32.  

Konoval Ihor Ihorovych, the commander of the reserve group of the 4th Company of the 33rd Assault Regiment, commented that North Korean troops charged his unit “like a World War II movie” and were being used as “cannon fodder.”33 Another Ukrainian military official stated that North Korean soldiers were being sacrificed by Russian forces as “human mine detectors.”34  

In January 2025, after only one or two months of North Korean offensive operations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that 3,800 North Korean soldiers had been killed or wounded35. The British Ministry of Defense similarly assessed 4,000 North Korean troops, one-third of the total sent to Ukraine, had been killed or wounded.  At that rate, all of the 12,000-strong North Korean contingent could be killed or wounded by April 202536.  

By late January 2025, the North Korean units had been temporarily removed from the front line in the Kursk region in order to reassess their tactics and reconstitute their units, according to Ukrainian military sources37. After a short hiatus, the North Korean troops returned to the front lines. Andrii Kovalenko, chief of Kyiv’s Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council, declared that despite earlier reports that the North Koreans would adapt after undergoing “error correction” training, the units’ tactics had not changed with the same assault groups still advancing head-on and suffering losses.”38 

In contrast to these negative assessments, other sources commented that North Korean troops had evolved after having gained experience in Ukraine. Captured North Korean documents identified mistakes during initial combat operations and recommendations for revised combat tactics. The documents assessed that heavy combat losses were caused by having failed to suppress enemy artillery and drone launch points and recommended that units should be dispersed into smaller groupings, establish unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teams, and use portable jammers for electronic warfare39. 

Stanislav Krasnov, a Ukrainian platoon commander in the 95th Air Assault Brigade, commented that North Korean tactics had changed with assaults now being conducted by smaller units of 10-15 troops rather than 50 person groups and moving more cautiously40. 
 

Additional Forces to be Deployed

South Korean and Ukrainian government sources reported that Pyongyang was planning to deploy additional forces in support of Russian operations in Ukraine. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff commented in December 2024 that multiple intelligence sources showed that North Korea was preparing to rotate or increase the deployment of troops in Russia41. In January 2025, the South Korean JCS stated that Pyongyang was “accelerating preparations for the additional deployment of its troops to Russia amid multiple casualties and occurrence of prisoners.”42 

Ukraine assessed that the new North Korean troops would mostly be missile and artillery troops to operate the numerous North Korean artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers, and KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles already deployed to the Kursk region rather than many new ground combat troops.”43  

However, in early February 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Pyongyang was expected to send an additional 20,000–25,000 troops as reinforcements to Kursk in the near future without specifying a timeframe for their deployment44. 

Russia Provides Wide-Ranging Benefits

While difficult to quantify, North Korea has received extensive diplomatic, economic, and military benefits in return for its shipments of weapons, ammunition and troops to Russia. The economic benefits include fuel, food, and funding.

Diplomatic
Russia has long sided with North Korea in the UN Security Council, shielding Pyongyang from stronger international sanctions, though occasionally willing to acquiesce to a series of incrementally stronger UN resolutions and sanctions after North Korean nuclear and ICBM tests. Russia and China would implement the new sanctions for a few months before again turning a blind eye to violations occurring on their soil or surrounding waters.

Beginning in 2006, the UN Security Council passed 11 resolutions condemning North Korea for its nuclear and missile activity, and imposed sanctions for the regime’s violations of previous resolutions. These resolutions not only preclude any North Korean nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, but require Pyongyang to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Since 2022, however, Moscow and Beijing vetoed all proposals for additional resolutions and new sanctions after North Korea’s ICBM launches, including the multi-warhead Hwasong-17 and solid-fueled Hwasong-18. Russia and China have also proposed adding “sunset” clauses to allow existing sanctions against North Korea to expire if they are not unanimously renewed by the UN Security Council.

In 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 1874 established an investigatory panel of eight experts which monitored compliance with UN resolutions related to North Korea. The panel produced biannual reports with extensive data and photographs documenting evidence of North Korea’s nuclear violations and monitoring UN member states’ shortcomings in enforcement of required sanctions. The panel also made recommendations for improving the implementation of measures.

During the panel’s tenure, Russia and China habitually watered down or rejected evidence of North Korean violations to minimize punitive measures against Pyongyang. In recent years, Russia and China became more obstructionist on the UN Security Council and more blatantly shielded Pyongyang from any additional resolutions or sanctions. In 2024, Moscow blocked the annual renewal resolution to continue the UN Panel of Experts45.  

Disbanding the Panel of Experts eliminated an important means to monitor international compliance with the required sanctions and induce international action against North Korea’s repeated transgressions. 

After the panel’s demise, the US and South Korea announced the creation of the bilateral Enhanced Disruption Task Force to disrupt North Korea’s illicit financing of its nuclear and missile programs and importing of fuel supplies in excess of UN-mandated limits46. In the past, US officials privately met with foreign government, banking and business officials to provide evidence of violations occurring in those countries or entities. 

Economic
A study by Olena Guseinova of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul estimated North Korea’s military transfers could be worth up to $5.5 billion USD. Depending on prices assessed for each artillery shell and missile, as well as the estimated volume of overall shipments, the total cost of the arms deal is estimated to range between $1.72 billion and $5.52 billion.”47 The figures do not appear to include the price of North Korean artillery weapons systems shipped to Russia.

Pyongyang could also receive between $143 million and $572 million in annual revenue for the deployment of 5,000 and 20,000 troops. That estimate is based on Russia’s promise of a one-time bonus of $4,600 and a monthly salary of $2,000 for recruits, with the majority of the funding being paid directly to the regime48. 

Russia is estimated to have supplied North Korea with at least a million barrels of oil in 2024, according to satellite imagery analysis. The imagery report identified more than a dozen different North Korean oil tankers arriving at an oil terminal in Russia’s Far East a total of 43 times during an eight-month period in 2024. These transfers violate UN Security Council Resolution sanctions which limit North Korea to importing only 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum annually49.  

An unsubstantiated Radio Free Asia report indicates Moscow may provide Pyongyang with vast areas of land in Russia for North Korean workers to cultivate wheat and corn that would be sent to North Korea. The discussions have reportedly been underway since December 2023 and would entail Pyongyang sending tens of thousands of discharged soldiers or other workers to work on cooperative farms. North Korea has insufficient farmland due to geographic and climate conditions. A similar proposal for North Koreans to grow soybeans in Russia was discussed between 2007-2008, but did not take place50. 

Military
Pyongyang attains benefits from the deployment of its troops and equipment by gaining insights on the performance or failure of attack tactics and weapons capabilities. The Ukraine battlefield provides the first battle experience in decades for its ground units and conventional weapons as well as the first use of its modern short-range ballistic missiles in combat conditions. Identified shortcomings can be rectified in troop training or production facilities. 

Russia has reportedly provided modern air defense systems to Pyongyang in return for North Korean arms shipments to Moscow, according to South Korean intelligence officials. Though unspecified, it most likely includes the S-400 surface-to-air missile system, with a range up to 250 miles, which is more sophisticated than anything in North Korea’s inventory. Russia has previously exported the S-400 to Algeria, Belarus, China, India, and Turkey51.  

Details of any Russian military technological assistance to North Korea remains unknown. Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang is likely to announce any transfer of military technology lest it trigger sanctions enforcement by the international community.

Some experts speculate that Moscow might provide the crown jewels of military technology, such as designs for nuclear warheads, reentry vehicles, or ICBMs. However, such technology appears to be too high a price for old, unreliable North Korean artillery ammunition, particularly as Russia ramps up its own production capability. Pyongyang has not provided and could not provide any weapons or technology that are better than Russia can produce itself.

It is more likely that Russia would provide technology or production assistance for advanced conventional weapon designs such as aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, and military reconnaissance satellites. In February 2025, a North Korean military source reported that Russia is expected to provide crucial technology for precision missile guidance, aircraft assembly, and radar systems. Pyongyang is seeking advanced technology to upgrade its MiG-29 and Su-25 fighters along with aircraft assembly and radar development capabilities.  Moscow may provide technical assistance to improve multiple types of North Korean drones which would then be mass-produced and provided to Russia52. 

Any future success in North Korean conventional, missile, or nuclear weapons may be attributed or misattributed to Russian assistance. For example, North Korea’s first successful satellite launch in November 2023 after two previous failures that year was assessed by some as the result of Russian technology transfer. South Korea reported that a large number of Russian experts traveled to North Korea after the September 2023 Kim-Putin summit in Russia to help with North Korea’s spy satellite efforts53. In December 2023, Kim Jong Un declared that North Korea would launch three additional reconnaissance satellites in 202454. However, the only attempted satellite launch ended in a mid-air explosion in May 2024.

In January 2025, the North Korean National Aerospace Development Administration submitted a report to Kim Jong Un which analyzed the failed launches as well as technical limitations of the successful “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite. Kim approved the proposals to overcome technical hurdles in launch vehicle and reconnaissance capabilities, including through Russian cooperation. The report identified three areas for Russian support: high-resolution sensor technology, metals for small satellite production, and improvements to delivery vehicle reliability and stability55. 

North Korean-Russian Cooperation Violates UN Resolutions

Numerous UN Security Council resolutions prohibit North Korean-Russian military or even economic collaboration. UN Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, prohibits North Korean exports of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and missiles, and requires UN member states to prevent their transfer (paragraph 8)56. 

UN Resolution 1874 (paragraph 9), passed in 2009, and UN Resolution 2270 (paragraph 6), passed in 2016, expanded the export ban to include all North Korean arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as “technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel.”57 

North Korea also is prohibited from any military exports that “support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State.” (UN Resolution 2270, paragraph 8).

Economic cooperation is also tightly constrained. UN Resolution 2397, passed in 2017, required the repatriation of all North Korean nationals, including civilian workers, from foreign countries by 2019 while prohibiting any North Korean nationals from earning income in other nations (paragraph 8)58. 

UN Resolution 2375, passed in 2017, prohibits the supply to North Korea of all condensates and natural gas liquids (paragraph 13)59. UN Resolution 2397, passed in 2017, limits the annual amount of crude and refined petroleum that can be provided to North Korea (paragraphs 4 and 5). The former resolution also precludes any joint ventures or cooperative entities with North Korea (paragraph 18); the latter resolution reiterates the prohibition of any North Korean national from earning income in other states (paragraph 8)60. 

For all these activities, North Korean or other nations’ airlines, shippers, or banks that provided logistical or financial services support also would be subject to UN sanctions. (UN Resolution 2094, passed in 2013, paragraph 11)61. 

Conclusion

The bilateral Russian-North Korean relationship now appears to be a more long-term strategic partnership than earlier perceptions of a short-term transactional relationship. The burgeoning relationship poses risks to US strategic interests in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. North Korean munitions enable Moscow to continue its aggression against Ukraine while gaining economic benefits which undermine the effectiveness of international sanctions.

If Russia remains desperate for North Korean munitions, Moscow may eventually be willing to provide more sensitive technology, including for Pyongyang’s nuclear or missile programs. Any augmentation of North Korean military capabilities is worrisome because it increases the threat to the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies. Kim might feel emboldened by both his growing military prowess and perceived Russian backing to become even more dangerously provocative. 

China, North Korea, and Russia each pose a significant threat to regional stability, cybersecurity, and the international financial system. The growing solidarity among the three rogue nations only adds impetus to the need for a rapid and coordinated multilateral counter-strategy.

A firm military and security response is the most immediate need for addressing growing security threats, but Indo-Pacific and European nations should also accelerate efforts to reduce their energy and financial reliance on Russia and China in order to minimize either nation’s ability to coerce and intimidate its trading partners. This requires long-term multilateral efforts to develop alternative suppliers of raw materials and producers of manufactured goods.

About the Author
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation, specializing in Korean and Japanese affairs. He previously served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Klingner was CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. Prior to that, he was the chief of CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea. He has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Klingner is a distinguished graduate of the National War College, where he received a master’s degree in National Security Strategy in 2002. He also holds a master’s degree in Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College and a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Middlebury College in Vermont.