An Overview of North Korea-Japan Relations

Authors: Rachel Blomquist and Daniel Wertz
April 2017

Updated by Dr. Naoko Aoki
October 2022

Last Updated by James L. Schoff
July 2026

Introduction

Japan and Korea share a history of exchange and conflict dating back nearly two millennia, and Japan's 1910-1945 period of colonial rule in Korea continues to cast a long shadow over its relationships with both halves of the Peninsula. Since the end of World War II and the division of Korea, relations between Japan and North Korea have been mostly defined by tension and distrust, punctuated by occasional periods of trade and tentative engagement. The ethnic Korean community in Japan has played an important role in this relationship, with the pro-North Korean organization, Chongryon, acting as an unofficial North Korean embassy in Japan.

Japan's current priorities regarding North Korea continue to center on the issue of North Korea's past abductions of Japanese citizens, as well as concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The latter have been exacerbated by North Korea’s closer military ties with Russia and their conclusion of a mutual defense treaty in 2024.1 North Korea, which frequently issues strong criticisms of Japanese policies, has prioritized in previous rounds of dialogue with Tokyo the normalization of relations between the two countries and receiving financial compensation for perceived historical injustices. Diplomacy between the two countries has remained stalled for several years, and direct trade is effectively frozen.
 

Historical Background

After the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan assumed de facto control over Korea, formally annexing the Peninsula in 1910. As part of an effort to build an economically self-sufficient empire, Japan invested in Korea's industrialization, establishing most of the heavy industry in the northern half of the Peninsula. Korea supplied Japan with industrial equipment such as steel, tools, machinery, chemicals, and foodstuffs. However, the benefits of this growing economic productivity did not reach the majority of the Korean population.

Japan implemented harsh and restrictive policies toward the Korean people throughout the colonial period, with policies of forcible assimilation hitting a peak as Japan expanded its empire during the 1930s and 1940s. As Japan waged war throughout Asia and the Pacific, its government and military began to recruit Koreans (often coercively) to work at jobs left behind by Japanese conscripts, as well as Korean women to serve soldiers at military installations across its empire. Tokyo also sought to forcibly assimilate Koreans into Japanese culture by assigning Koreans Japanese names, promoting the exclusive use of the Japanese language, and banning the teaching of Korea's language and history.

The circumstances surrounding Japanese colonial rule prompted various forms of Korean resistance, including a major series of protests for independence that began on March 1, 1919. Left-wing resistance groups formed during the 1930s among the ethnic Korean communities in Manchuria. One of these guerilla groups was led by Kim Il Sung, who was forced into exile in the Soviet Union in 1941 after a series of Japanese counterinsurgency campaigns.

Immediately after Japan's defeat in World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel, initially as a temporary administrative measure to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces.2 Three years later, this led to the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) led by Kim Il Sung in the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) led by Syngman Rhee in the south. War between the two Koreas broke out on June 25, 1950, as the North Korean People's Army invaded the South. The United States, which led the Allied occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, used Japan as a command center and major logistical base for its intervention under United Nations (UN) auspices in the Korean War. A contingent of former Japanese Imperial Navy ships provided logistical support for UN operations and conducted minesweeping operations in the waters around North Korea’s coast during the war.3 Seven U.S. military bases in Japan are still designated as UN Command rear bases for potential multilateral use in case conflict erupts again on the Korean Peninsula.4 
 

Chongryon and Japan-DPRK Relations

At the end of World War II, over two million Koreans were living in Japan. The majority returned to South Korea after the war; however, 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. These "Zainichi Koreans" often experienced systematic discrimination in Japan, losing their Japanese nationality and facing barriers to formal employment. Those who identified as North Korean or sympathized with the DPRK established Chongryon – the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan—with assistance from North Korea in 1955. Chongryon, also known as “Chosen Soren” in Japanese, has functioned as a network and advocacy organization for pro-DPRK Koreans in Japan. It also served as a portal for trade with North Korea and acted as an unofficial North Korean Embassy in Tokyo. A different organization, Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan), supports ethnic Koreans residing in Japan that identify with the Republic of Korea. Although most Korean residents of Japan supported Chongryon in the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of Koreans in Japan began to identify with Mindan following Japan-ROK normalization in 1965.

Between 1959 and 1984, Chongryon facilitated the "repatriation" of more than 93,000 Korean residents in Japan to North Korea, most of whom were originally from the southern half of the Peninsula. One of those who were "repatriated" was Ko Yong Hui, the mother of Kim Jong Un and his two siblings. Ko was born in Japan and is believed to have moved to North Korea in the 1960s.

Once in North Korea, the "returnees" frequently faced economic hardship, suspicion from security agencies, and limited ability to communicate with relatives back in Japan. Several thousand migrants were Japanese citizens; these included the Japanese spouses of ethnic Koreans, the children of ethnically-mixed unions, and ethnic Koreans who had gone through the lengthy process of obtaining citizenship. Migration slowed as economic conditions worsened in North Korea and news about realities there filtered back to the Korean community in Japan.

Chongryon established a significant presence in Japan by creating an ethnic Korean enclave in Japanese society. The organization established and operated its own businesses, banks, schools, hospitals, and a newspaper. Prior to restrictions being imposed in the 2000s, Chongryon operated commercial vessels transporting goods between Japan and North Korea with few restrictions or inspections, while also remitting earnings from Koreans in Japan to their families in North Korea. From 1992 until the imposition of sanctions in 2006, a large ferry and cargo ship, the Mangyongbong-92, sailed regularly between the Japanese city of Niigata and the North Korean coastal city Wonsan. Chongryon also established a network of pachinko parlors in Japan, which allegedly served as a front for gambling and illicit activities.

Credit unions associated with Chrongryon, known as chogins, reportedly played a major role in raising and sending money to North Korea by making false loans or engaging in other fraudulent practices in order to illegally remit funds. In the late 1990s, several of the loosely-regulated chogins went into bankruptcy, leading to their consolidation and a multi-billion-dollar bailout of their depositors by the Japanese government. Japanese authorities subsequently cracked down on these financial institutions, putting their activities under greater scrutiny and arresting former executives for embezzlement.
 

Diplomatic Outreach

During the Cold War era, intense competition between the two Koreas for domestic and international legitimacy shaped Japan's relations with the Peninsula. Although Japan developed informal diplomatic and trade links with North Korea through organizations such as Chongryon and the Japan Socialist Party, it established formal diplomatic relations exclusively with South Korea. Tokyo's 1965 agreement on normalization of relations with Seoul provided an $800 million aid package and acknowledgement of the ROK as "the only lawful government in Korea." However, as the South Korean government adopted a policy of Nordpolitick in the late 1980s, which sought to improve relations with North Korea and other communist nations, a door opened for Japan to discuss establishing formal ties with the DPRK.5

In 1990, a top Liberal Democratic Party official, Shin Kanemaru, traveled to Pyongyang to begin discussions on normalization of relations. Although the government of Japan retracted Kanemaru's initial offer to provide compensation for the division of Korea, this outreach continued through eight rounds of subsequent Foreign Ministry talks.6 However, by 1992, this process stalled due to the mounting North Korean nuclear crisis as well as the DPRK's unwillingness to address the abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents.7

Tokyo's relations with Pyongyang improved somewhat after the U.S. and DPRK signed the Agreed Framework on North Korea's nuclear program in 1994: Japan agreed to help finance the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project resulting from the agreement and donated over 500,000 tons of food to the DPRK for famine relief between 1995 and 1996.8Several Japanese women who had moved to North Korea with their spouses as part of the Chongryon "repatriation" were also allowed by Pyongyang to return to Japan to visit their families during this period. 9 However, after North Korea's launch of a two-stage Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, which overflew Japanese territory without prior warning, Japan issued sanctions on North Korea and temporarily froze its funding to KEDO.10

Dialogue restarted in 2000, as Japan resumed food aid to North Korea and Pyongyang engaged in negotiations with Washington over its missile program. Through three rounds of talks, Japan indicated that it would be willing to offer the DPRK an economic assistance package, similar to that offered to the ROK in 1965, in lieu of reparations and upon normalization of relations. The package reportedly would have been between $5 billion and $10 billion USD. However, disagreement over whether to refer to the funds as an “economic assistance package” (Japan) or “reparations” (North Korea), as well as continuing disputes over the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues, led to an impasse in negotiations.11 Soon thereafter, in December 2001, a North Korean spy ship was caught in Japanese waters by Japan’s Coast Guard, which led to a firefight and the sinking of the North Korean vessel, magnifying distrust.12

Following a two-year hiatus in official talks, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in September 2002 for the first meeting of the two countries' heads of state. These talks produced the "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration," under which North Korea agreed to extend the missile test moratorium that began in 1999, fulfill its commitments regarding its nuclear program, and continue to pursue bilateral negotiations toward normalization. In return, Koizumi apologized for the Japanese occupation of Korea and reiterated Japan's commitment to provide the North with economic assistance upon the normalization of relations. During this summit, in a radical shift from the North's previous stance, Kim Jong Il also acknowledged and apologized for the past abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents.13

The Abduction Issue

During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea performed covert operations to kidnap Japanese citizens. These operations were conducted for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to espionage training.14 Until 2002, North Korea adamantly denied any involvement when confronted by Japan about the issue. Japan officially identified 17 cases of abductions of its citizens by North Korean agents. While Japanese organizations involved with the issue have estimated that the total number is closer to 100, the precise figure remains unknown.15

In his statement at the 2002 summit with Prime Minister Koizumi, Kim Jong Il reportedly said that the issue "is regretful and I want to frankly apologize," and that those responsible for the kidnappings would be "sternly punished."16 North Korea eventually admitted to the abduction of 13 Japanese citizens, claiming that five were alive and eight had died from various natural causes or accidents. However, some of the reported deaths appeared to take place under suspicious circumstances and could not be confirmed.17 Additionally, North Korea denied knowledge of any other abductees.18

Kim Jong Il's acknowledgement of the abduction issue stoked public anger in Japan, giving prominence to victims' family members and to organizations calling for the return of the abductees. Megumi Yokota, a Japanese girl who had disappeared in 1977 at the age of 13, became a public symbol for the abductees' plight; North Korea's initial claims that she committed suicide in 1993 did not stand up to scrutiny, and her parents expressed the belief that she could still be alive in North Korea. 19 Given the public outcry over the abduction issue, its resolution became a top political priority for Japanese leaders in their dealings with North Korea. Shinzo Abe, a member of Prime Minister Koizumi's Cabinet and his successor as prime minister, gained prominence through his public advocacy for the abductees.20

Shortly after the 2002 summit, North Korea allowed the five acknowledged living victims to travel to Japan with the understanding that Japan would send them back to North Korea. In order to guarantee this agreement, North Korea barred the victims' family members from traveling with them. However, after the victims' reunification with their families in Japan, the Japanese government refused to return them to North Korea and demanded repatriation for the victims' families still residing in North Korea.21

In May 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi returned to North Korea to negotiate the release of the families of the abductees.22 Following this visit, five children of returned abductees were allowed to go to Japan. The visit also yielded North Korea’s release of Charles Jenkins, who had lived in North Korea since his desertion from the U.S. military in 1965 and had subsequently married Japanese abductee Hitomi Soga. They reunited with their two children in Japan soon after Koizumi’s visit.23 In November 2004, North Korea repatriated what it said were the remains of Megumi Yokota to Japan; however, subsequent DNA tests raised questions in Japan about the true identity of the remains. Doubts grew in Japan that North Korea would be willing to settle remaining issues related to the abductions in good faith.24 At the same time, North Korea described the abduction issue as "solved" and insisted that Japan take steps to normalize relations and provide compensation for the colonial era.25

Japan and the Six-Party Talks

Not long after the first Koizumi-Kim summit was held in 2002, the U.S. accused North Korea of clandestinely developing a uranium enrichment program in violation of the Agreed Framework. KEDO subsequently halted energy shipments to North Korea. In response, North Korea declared the 1994 agreement nullified, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and began to reprocess plutonium.26 In August 2003, the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas initiated the Six-Party Talks to address the new nuclear crisis.27 Japan sought to prioritize the abduction issue as well as the nuclear issue during these talks, which at times led to tensions with other participants.28

The first several years of the talks did not lead to any progress on the abduction issue, nor to any concrete actions limiting North Korea's nuclear program. After the DPRK tested a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, Japan imposed sanctions banning all North Korean imports and prohibiting the Mangyongbong-92 ferry from entering the country.29 These unilateral sanctions went beyond the scope of those imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) following the nuclear test, as well as subsequent UNSC resolutions related to North Korea.

When the Six-Party Talks began to gain momentum in early 2007, negotiators established different working groups including a bilateral "Working Group on the Normalization of Japan-DPRK Relations" to address the abductions and the issue of Japanese reparations for colonial rule. North Korea indicated a willingness to change its previous position that it had fully investigated and settled the abduction issue as the two countries held talks under this forum in Vietnam, Mongolia, and China.30 During talks held in Shenyang, China, in August 2008, North Korea agreed to the terms of a "reinvestigation" in exchange for the removal of some Japanese sanctions, including travel to and from North Korea. However, progress stalled after Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda abruptly resigned in September 2008 due to unrelated domestic political matters. North Korea stated its desire to postpone the implementation of the agreement until it was certain that Japan would follow through on its promises.31

As other Six-Party Talks members began delivering heavy fuel oil to North Korea as part of the negotiation process, Japan expressed an unwillingness to contribute energy assistance until the abduction issue had been satisfactorily resolved.32 In October 2008, as part of an effort to revive the now-waning talks, the U.S. agreed to remove Pyongyang from its list of State Sponsors of Terror. Some Japanese officials and family members of abductees strongly opposed the move, tying North Korea's support for terrorism with the abduction issue.33

In 2009, North Korea's relations with Japan deteriorated significantly. With the Six-Party Talks having faltered over the terms of verification, North Korea tested several ballistic missiles, including a three-stage Unha-2 space launch vehicle, followed by a second nuclear test. The Japanese government responded by extending its existing sanctions and adopting new measures, instituting a blanket ban on all exports to the DPRK.34

Japan-DPRK Relations Under Kim Jong Un

Relations between North Korea and Japan remained cold for the first two years after Kim Jong Un assumed power in late 2011. Tokyo condemned North Korea's April 2012 satellite launch, timed to commemorate the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung. In August 2012, the Japanese and DPRK Red Cross Societies met in China, nominally to discuss the repatriation of the remains of Japanese soldiers and personnel who died in Korea during World War II.35 Japan suspended planned follow-up to these talks after a second North Korean satellite launch in December 2012. After North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013, Japan further expanded its unilateral sanctions regime.36 The following month, Japan co-sponsored a UN Human Rights Council resolution with the European Union that established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate North Korean human rights abuses, including a provision requiring the Commission to look into North Korea's abductions of foreign nationals.37

Even with tensions high, periodic back-channel diplomacy between Tokyo and Pyongyang took place. Isao Iijima, a top advisor to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, met secretively with North Koreans in Pyongyang and China in May and October 2013.38 In March 2014, Japan-DPRK Red Cross talk on the repatriation of war remains resumed in China. Shortly after that round of talks, the parents of Megumi Yokota met with Megumi's daughter, Kim Eun-gyong, in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.39

In May, Japan and North Korea resumed formal diplomatic talks in Stockholm, Sweden, with a follow-up meeting held in Beijing two months later.40 Shortly after the second meeting, Pyongyang announced that it would reopen its investigations into the abductions cases and stated that it had created a special committee to do so, while Tokyo loosened sanctions by lifting some travel bans, relaxing restrictions on remittances, and allowing port calls by North Korean ships for "humanitarian" purposes.41 Prime Minister Abe, who had focused heavily on the abduction issue earlier in his career, said that he would aim for a "complete resolution" of the abduction issue.42

But Japanese officials saw little progress in North Korea's "reinvestigation" of the abduction issue, with an October 2014 Japanese Foreign Ministry delegation to Pyongyang achieving no new breakthroughs. Amidst this stalled process, Japan co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution condemning North Korea's violations of human rights, which included language specifically about the abduction issue and encouraged the UNSC to consider referring North Korea to the International Criminal Court.43 In response to the resolution, North Korea's National Defense Commission stated that if Japan "continues behaving as now, it will disappear from the world map for good, not just remaining a near yet distant country."44

In February 2016, North Korea announced that it was halting the investigations and dissolving the special investigation committee. This was seen as a retaliatory move following Japan's expansion of its sanctions against North Korea for conducting a long-range rocket launch and a nuclear test earlier that year, both in violation of UNSC resolutions.45

North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and missile tests under Kim Jong Un continued to be a major concern for Japan. North Korea conducted four nuclear tests and dozens of missile tests within the first six years of Kim Jong Un’s regime. The country has conducted at least 320 strategic or ballistic missile tests as of June 2026.46 Some of these tested missiles have landed in waters within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and when two intermediate range ballistic missiles flew over Japan in August and September 2017, the Japanese government alerted residents in some areas of the country to take shelter, using the country's emergency broadcast system.47 A similar “seek-shelter” alert scenario occurred again in 2022.48

Against this background, Japan supported U.S. President Donald Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign against North Korea, which aimed to force the country to give up its nuclear weapons through sanctions and military threats. But when tensions between North Korea and the United States gave way to a flurry of diplomacy with North Korea in 2018, Japan was largely left out. While North Korea held summit talks with the United States, South Korea, China and Russia, no such meeting was held between Japan and North Korea.

While the connections between North Korea and Chongryon continue, the organization has become a diminished force in recent years due to restrictions on contact and trade with North Korea, financial difficulties, and declining support among Zainichi Koreans. Chongryon's membership has declined to about 30,000 from the organization's peak of about 150,000,49 and Chongryon executives are barred from returning to Japan if they visit North Korea.50 By 2009, Chongryon had closed most of its credit unions and two-thirds of its schools, despite reported subsidies to these schools from the government of North Korea.51 By June 2012, a Japanese court ordered Chongryon to auction off its headquarters building in Tokyo in order to pay its outstanding debts; Chongryon lost ownership of its headquarters in 2015, although it has continued to lease space in the building.52 In March 2015, Japanese police raided the home of Chongryon chairman Ho Jong Man on suspicion of illegally importing North Korean mushrooms into Japan and later arrested four people, including Ho's son, in connection with the probe.53 Still, perhaps because of Kim Jong Un’s connection to Zainichi Koreans through his mother, North Korea’s leader makes an effort to encourage Chongryon, such as hosting a visiting art troupe of Korean boys and girls living in Japan in 2025, including personal meetings with them and publicizing the events widely in North Korean media.54

Diplomacy between Japan and North Korea remains stalled as of June 2026. Japan and North Korea have made no progress over the abduction issue since North Korea halted investigations in 2016, and North Korea continued to modernize its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. North Korea’s closer ties to Russia are a growing concern in Tokyo, as North Korea emerged as the largest supporter of Russia’s war against Ukraine with massive supplies of artillery shells, short-range missiles, and up to 15,000 North Korean soldiers fighting (and dying) on behalf of Russia in the Kursk region.55 Russia and North Korea also completed a new bridge between them in 2026 with accompanying customs facilities to expand trade relations.56

Japan worries that North Korea could feel emboldened by an influx of new military technology and energy resources from Russia and by the experience of modern military tactics and equipment it is gaining from its deployments at the Ukraine border. The emergence of a diplomatic and military bloc (of sorts) among North Korea, Russia, and China is part of what drives Tokyo’s desire to strengthen relations with Seoul, yet this puts further pressure on Japan-North Korea relations now that Pyongyang has labeled the ROK as a “hostile state” and abandoned the goal of peaceful reunification.57 Another factor is some concern in Japan about the future strength of its alliance with the U.S. in light of the Trump administration’s pressure on allies to be more self-sufficient, Trump’s threats to abandon NATO, and ahead of sensitive Host Nation Support negotiations (determining the level of Japanese financial support for US bases in Japan) to occur later in 2026 and into 2027.58

Prospects for Japan-North Korea diplomacy remain poor over the near-term. North Korea closed off its borders after the discovery of COVID-19 cases in China in early 2020 and maintained its isolation after an outbreak of the disease in the country in early 2022. Diplomacy and trade among North Korea, Russia and China have grown considerably post-COVID, but North Korea’s engagement with the United States, South Korea and Japan has been virtually non-existent aside from some regional sports diplomacy.59 Meanwhile, the kin of Japanese abductees are advancing in age, and the campaign has lost some prominent members. Shigeru Yokota, the father of abductee Megumi Yokota and a long-term head of a group representing the abductees, died in 2020. 60 This was followed by the death in 2021 of Shigeo Iizuka, a brother of another abductee who took over the group's leadership from Yokota.61 When Akihiro Arimoto passed away in 2025, that left only Megumi’s mother, Sakie Yokota, as the last remaining from the “parent generation” of abductees.62

One exception to the diplomatic chill surrounding Japan and North Korea occurred in early 2024, when Kim Jong Un sent a rare letter of sympathy respectfully addressed to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida following a devastating earthquake in Japan’s Noto Peninsula.63 Kishida’s appreciative response and additional kind words back and forth led to speculation that a high-level summit meeting might be possible, as Kishida offered a leaders meeting “without preconditions.”64 But, it did not take long for Japan’s expressed desire to address the abduction issue in any future meeting to receive North Korea’s rejection of such an agenda item, and the diplomatic spark fizzled quickly. The subsequent full embrace between North Korea and Russia (highlighted by Russia President Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024 and conclusion of a mutual defense treaty later that year) and growing ties among North Korea, Russia and China (including a two-day State Visit to North Korea by Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 2026) reflect a new geopolitical alignment that has boosted North Korea’s confidence, sharpened differences between North Korea and Japan, and made any sort of meaningful diplomatic compromise unlikely in the foreseeable future.

James L. Schoff is a Distinguished Sr. Fellow (Non-Resident) with Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA based in Washington, DC.