CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

DEAR COLLEAGUES: When we consider the possible unification of the Korean Peninsula at some time in the future, the German model of unification often comes to mind. The purpose of the attached report is to alert Members that another outcome is possible. China’s historical claims to territory within the borders of the Korean Peninsula and the expanding investment by China within North Korea point to a situation where China may attempt to manage, if not oppose, the process of Korean Peninsula unification. The attached report includes extensive information regarding China’s trade and economic interaction with North Korea and the growing investment by Chinese companies inside North Korea.

For historical perspective, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff obtained information about Chinese claims that parts of the Korean Peninsula were historically part of China, and South Korean assessments about those claims. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to write about how China presents its historic claims to the Korean Peninsula so that Members would be alerted to this situation. The Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul greatly assisted by providing South Korea’s view of China’s historic claims. Neither the committee nor I take any position on the disputes over the history of the Korean Peninsula discussed in this report.

Important questions are raised toward the beginning of the attached report for the Senate’s consideration regarding prospects for unification, the significance to the United States and our overall Korea policy.

I would like to express appreciation to several scholars on North Korean affairs (referenced in the Appendix section) who assisted Keith Luse and other Committee staff in the development of this report, which may be a helpful future reference on Korean Peninsula unification.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR,
Ranking Member.

(V)
CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE

“Pyongyang today looks more like a tidy Chinese provincial city than the Spartan capital of the world's last Stalinist state.”1

BACKGROUND

For some time, China has been viewed by the West as the main intermediary with North Korea. The West has believed with some justification that because China serves as a lifeline and benevolent provider for the North, it would leverage that role to influence North Korea's decision—making process in such matters as nuclear weapons development, nuclear tests, missile launches and other areas of international concern.

In recent years, as official Washington has assessed denuclearization prospects in North Korea, it has viewed the China factor with varying degrees of hope, anticipation, and dismay. China's willingness and desire to chair and manage the Six Party Talks process was accepted with optimism by many in the White House and the Congress. Reality has however begun to come to the forefront. The interests of China and the United States related to North Korea—regional stability vs. denuclearization—are not the same. In looking to the future, for similar reasons, China is a wild card on the subject of Korean Peninsula Unification—an eventuality that Chinese leaders may determine they cannot allow.

INTRODUCTION

When Members of the U.S. Senate consider prospects for unification of the Korean Peninsula, they often reflect upon the demise of the East German government and the unification of East and West Germany, anticipating a similar outcome on the Korean Peninsula.

However, another outcome is possible.

China's historical claims to territory within the borders of contemporary North Korea (and across parts of the entire Peninsula) and the expanding economic footprint of China in the North are among the factors creating a dynamic that leads away from eventual Peninsula unification.

Whether the impetus for unification is the warming of relations between the North and the South, accompanied by accelerated commercial and other activities, or an abrupt seismic event within North Korea contributing to the demise of the present government, China could attempt to manage, and conceivably block the unification process. While working to safeguard its own commercial assets, and to assert its right to preserve the northern part of the pe-
ninsula within China’s sphere of influence, Beijing might seek to defend its actions as necessary to ensure regional stability. (Another important point to note is that increased economic cooperation between China and North Korea benefits China’s own development as well and enhances China’s access to North Korean natural resources for energy and other purposes.)

The possible presence of American military personnel north of the 38th Parallel does not conform to China’s definition of regional stability and is unacceptable to most Chinese officials.

“The conventional thinking in China is that it benefits from the maintenance of a divided peninsula and a fraternally allied socialist state on its border.”

As noted in the Interim Report of the University of Southern California (USC) Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) regarding Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, “There has been a traditional resistance to talking openly about unification scenarios. Policy-makers and scholars avoid the issue for fear of diplomatic fallout from China or the DPRK or because it operates in the realm of meaningless speculation and punditry. The absence of such discussion is a recipe for disaster.” (emphasis added)

The preparation of this report revealed a series of questions for Members.

**QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE**

- What are the foreign policy and national defense implications for the United States of an ongoing divided Korean Peninsula in comparison to a unified Peninsula?
- What are the origins of resistance, and in some cases outright opposition to unification within South Korea?
- Is China’s incremental economic integration with North Korea similar to its intent for relations with South Korea?
- What is in the best interest of the United States—to pursue multilateral “Six Party Talks” with North Korea or engage in bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, having separate and concurrent consultations with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia? Or is a “third way” preferable?

**CHINA’S HISTORIC CLAIMS THROUGHOUT TIME**

“… disputes (between China and South Korea), have become intense and frequent over the past several years as China has increasingly asserted cultural hegemony, or Sinocentrism, commensurate with its ascendancy in the global economy and politics.”

To document China’s long-term interest in and claims on the Korean Peninsula, the Committee obtained South Korean and Chinese perspectives on the issue.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to provide information about Chinese claims that territory on the Korean Peninsula was historically part of China, with a focus on maps published in the People’s Republic of China depicting those claims. The
CRS memorandum, authored by Susan V. Lawrence, a CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, discusses several works of state-supported Chinese scholarship on the subject, including maps depicting borders on the Peninsula at points in history between 475 B.C. and 1982 A.D. The CRS memorandum is included in an appendix to this report.

Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning of the Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul, was the point person for a team of Korean experts who provided analysis on behalf of the Republic of Korea regarding the Chinese perspective on this issue. The Foundation’s report is also included in an appendix to this report.

China’s historic claims on the Peninsula raise the possibility of future Chinese intervention in the Korean unification process.

THE RECENT PAST

The 1976 Area Handbook for North Korea prepared by Foreign Area Studies program of The American University provides an overview of China-North Korea relations following the Korean War. Excerpts included below provide important background:

• During the last six decades, China and North Korea have experienced a generally amiable relationship deemed of mutual benefit. China’s intervention in the Korean War prevented the almost certain demise of North Korea as an independent state, and in the postwar years stationed troops inside North Korea until 1958. In 1961, North Korea and China signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

• As North Korean-Soviet relations cooled, North Korea maintained an active relationship with China. In the early 1960’s, Kim Il-Sung supported China verbally during the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. “It was against this backdrop of comradeship that an old border dispute between the Chinese and Koreans over Mount Paektu (Paektu-san) was reportedly settled when the PRC Chief of State, Liu Shao-chi, visited Pyongyang in September 1963. At that time, the PRC apparently recognized North Korean sovereignty over much of the disputed 100-square-mile area involving Mount Paektu, a major concession to the Koreans.”

• Following Premier Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, the Soviet Union took a more conciliatory approach to North Korea which was immediately noticed by the Chinese. There were mild tremors in the relationship which became more publicly apparent e.g. in 1965 when the North Korean Embassy in Moscow reported that Peking had claimed the Mount Paektu area as “compensation” for its military intervention and assistance during the Korean War; and in 1967 the Chinese Red Guards alleged that Kim Il-Sung had been arrested by his army following a coup. In 1969 North Korea-Chinese relations began to improve and in 1970 Premier Chou En-lai paid a state visit to North Korea where he heralded a new era of cordiality and mutual cooperation.

• Warm relations between North Korea and China continued in the 1970’s with evidence that Pyongyang was taking an “even-
handed or independent posture toward Peking and Moscow.” During a nine-day visit to China in 1975, the two sides reaffirmed a “blood-sealed militant friendship.”

Disputes about the Korea-China borderline are historic and endless. Complicating analysis of research on borders is the fact that authoritative sources within China do not always agree. The attached analysis and documentation of China's numerous historic claims on the Korean Peninsula may mean that many within Chinese leadership circles believe that areas of the Koreas (North and South), are in fact, part of China.

Through the careful review of Chinese and Korean sources, analysts have documented China's tenacious commitment to viewing parts of the Korean Peninsula as historically its own. Any future success at negotiations between North Korea and the United States, or with North Korea in a Six-Party or other multilateral context, is unlikely to change China's perspective of its paternal role with North Korea. China is likely to resist direct or indirect challenges to its preferred status quo.

TODAY

Chinese officials are prepared to take action as they deem necessary to preserve regional stability, (especially stability along the border with North Korea). Chinese officials earlier informed Senate Foreign Relations' Committee staff that China reserved the right to place troops across the border inside North Korea to prevent hungry or impoverished North Koreans from fleeing into China. These plans have been described not as an invasion, but as a pre-emptive move that would be taken in consultation with North Korean authorities. In addition, China has contingency plan options to respond unilaterally to situations within North Korea which Chinese officials might deem as potentially destabilizing.

INSTITUTIONAL POLICY COORDINATION BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

There are multiple examples of increased policy coordination between China and North Korea at the institutional level. Examples include:

- Strategic consultations between senior leaders.
- Policy discussions and harmonization at the inter-party, inter-military, inter-governmental and inter-ministerial levels and exchanges between provincial and local authorities (party, people's committees, mass public organizations, civil groups, etc.)
- Chinese advisory role and sharing of technical expertise at the sub-ministerial and sub-agency level, including regular exchanges and technical assistance at the vice-ministerial level (e.g. agriculture, electric power, light industry, banking, transportation, etc.)
- Sharing of managerial control at mainstream North Korean enterprises with Chinese stakes.

In addition, during 2011, China's Ambassador in Pyongyang, Liu Hongcai, “had an extraordinarily active year, … both as a
facilitator of exchanges and as a support base for managing the comprehensive contacts between Chinese leaders and the full range of DPRK elites at the top ranks of leadership.”  

But even more significant than the Ambassador’s public schedule is the reach of the embassy into the top echelons of North Korea’s elite leadership during visits by Chinese senior officials . . . as well as efforts by the embassy to follow-up with Kim Jong-il to schedule various special occasions following his visits to China.  

THE MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION—THE MAKING OF A 21ST CENTURY TRIBUTARY PROVINCE

… keeping Pyongyang afloat is not only an immediate consideration, but also a long-term security hedge (for China).  

For over a decade, Chinese authorities “have attempted to put the economic relationship with North Korea on a market basis by reducing the amount of subsidies provided to North Korea from China’s central, provincial and local governments.” North Korean leaders rejected this approach preferring the subsidies over assuming political risks accompanying economic reform.  

The more recent China-launched investment and trade offensive directed at North Korea reflects an incremental economic integration with the North and is reminiscent of similar situations involving other sovereign states bordering China including Cambodia and Laos. However, North Korea represents a point of unique anxiety for Chinese officials who are determined to preserve what they call “regional stability.” China’s active facilitation of closer economic ties with North Korea supports China’s economy while quietly establishing an extensive business and trade infrastructure within North Korea that China will be prepared to protect, if ever necessary.

... a significant challenge for future North-South relations is the dominance of China in North Korea’s current external economic relations and the diversity and genuinely commercial motivations for the rapidly expanding trade and investment activities along the China border. These are indicators of a process of economic integration underway. The large ethnic Korean population on the Chinese side of the border also provides a fertile soil to nurture this process of gradual economic integration in the border areas.  

POINTS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA COMMERCIAL INTERSECTION

The October 2009 visit to North Korea by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was a benchmark event which leveraged Communist Party of China (CPC) ties with the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) “to deepen (the) bilateral commercial relationship for mutual benefit. Beijing shored up (the) stability of (the) Kim Jong-il regime and Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK natural resources—
puts which will significantly aid sustainable economic development of (the) PRC’s three northeastern provinces.”

It is important to note that it is difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the status of North Korea’s economy or precise figures on the sources and amounts of Chinese investment in North Korea.

There is more going on than meets the eye, both positively and negatively. It is very unusual for Chinese firms to complain publicly about their hosts, as Xiyang did, especially in sensitive situations. Most likely, this was the culmination of a number of fundamental problems. The North Koreans have shown no sign they understand what a commercial contract is. The notion of $7 billion in pending Chinese investment is thus difficult to accept. Moreover, some sources, notably in South Korea have a record of exaggeration when it comes to DPRK economic reporting.

On the other hand, the scope of the land leases, infrastructure development (drop in the bucket though it is), and mining operations indicate that the UN figure for investment stock is too low. It should either be read as excluding non-monetary transactions or representing nominal prices far below those even in other poor economies. Trade figures are similarly too low.

- In March of 2012, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) published new foreign investment laws for the two special economic zones North Korea is promoting on the Chinese border—Rason as well as the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands Zone. (Since 1993, North Korean laws governing the status of the special economic zones (SEZs) have been amended six times in an effort to improve incentives for foreign investors).
- A joint China-North Korea Committee oversees the development of the two special (SEZs). “SEZs are acceptable to the North Korean government because they are relatively easy to control.”
- Rason (the combined towns of Rajin and Sonbong) was established as an SEZ in 1991. While the North Koreans have tried to attract investment there with poor results in the past, a new push is now underway.
- In 2011, China’s Shangdi Guanquin Investment Company signed a letter of intent with North Korea’s Investment and Development Group for an investment of $2 billion in the Rason Industrial Zone.
- The road to the Chinese border from the Rason Economic Zone is now finished, cutting a 3-hour journey to under 50 minutes. The road has also improved connectivity between regions in the Special Economic Zone for local citizens.

North Korea’s Joint-Venture & Investment Commission, designed by the North Korean government to attract foreign investment, signed an agreement in September with the Chinese Overseas Investment Federation to jointly launch the “Special Funds for North Korean Investments” project, supported by (US $480 million) from Chinese sources.
The lack of electricity is a major challenge to Chinese expansion along the border and within North Korea—a drag on investment in production factories. The lack of a credible plan for infrastructure investment in the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands zone is a major obstacle as well.23

... integration of North Korea’s economy and China’s northeastern provinces, particularly the provinces of Liaoning and Jilin, ensure that Northeast China will pay a significant price should North Korea implode. Economic stability in these “rust belt” provinces, part of the struggling industrial region known informally in the West as Manchuria, is a key concern for Beijing.24

- The proportion of North Korea’s total foreign trade that is accounted for by China-North Korea trade increased to more than 60% in 2011.25
- Chinese visitors are one of North Korea’s key sources of foreign currency. Sixty thousand to seventy thousand Chinese tourists visited North Korea in 2011 compared to an estimated 40,000 visitors from China in 2010.26
- China, along with Germany, France and South Korea are among the countries producing clothing in North Korea for export. Tens of thousands of North Koreans, many highly skilled, are employed by companies from these countries.27
- In August of 2012, a high level North Korean delegation visited China to develop consensus on renewed cooperation in key sectors of North Korea’s economy including emphasis on the development of economic zones along the China-North Korea border.

Although unlikely to facilitate system-wide DPRK economic reform in the near-term, Beijing’s Sunshine Policy appears to be sufficient to bolster the stability of the new regime through the immediate benefits that the Kim Jong-un leadership can realize from preferential commercial arrangements with PRC partners. In practice, the Communist Party of China is bailing out the Workers’ Party of Korea via political and commercial arrangements.28

- Since earlier this year, China has issued over 40,000 work visas for North Koreans to work in three Northeast provinces: Jilin, Lianoning and Heilongjiang.29 (Some suggest that whether or not this number of visas has been issued, the number of North Koreans presently working in China may be fewer than 40,000).
- Press reports suggest that China and North Korea have reportedly agreed on a labor program under which China would take anywhere from 40,000 to 120,000 North Koreans to work in factories as industrial trainees and to work in the hospitality industry.30

(North Korea has also increased the number of workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex which is managed by South Korean companies. Over 46,400 North Korean workers were at the industrial park in February, 2012, compared to 42,415 over a year ago. South Korean companies have reportedly asked North Korea for an
additional 20,000 workers for the Kaesong Complex. North Korean workers at Kaesong, in China, in Mongolia and other countries provide millions of dollars of annual income for the North Korean government).31

- China has gained the rights to use North Korea’s port of Chongjin on the East China Sea. The agreement reportedly provides China with the rights to use two wharves at Chongjin for 30 years which are capable of processing 7 million tons of cargo on an annual basis.32

- Total accumulated FDI in North Korea reached $1.475 billion in 2010—according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.33

- Nearly $7 billion of additional FDI “is in the works as Chinese infrastructure companies plan new ports, highways and power plants, according to Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul.”34

- As of 2010, 138 Chinese companies were registered as doing business in North Korea.35

The North Korea-China trade and economic interaction is augmented by a network of state trading companies in North Korea with affiliations to the Worker’s Party of Korea, the Korean People’s Army and North Korea’s Cabinet. “While financial sanctions continue to dominate (the) U.S. approach to dealing with (the) DPRK, PRC companies have been deepening their interactions with (the) DPRK state trading companies operating in China.”36

All of the indications about expanding Chinese investment in North Korea do not mask the enormous challenges to investors resulting from the lack of transparency and rule of law in North Korea. Actions by the North Korean government to revise investment law do not compensate for the challenges to investors posed by some North Korean officials or business people making their own rules and issuing new demands on an individual deal basis. There have been multiple reports in 2012 of Chinese partners pulling out of deals due to friction with their North Korean business partners or government officials.

> North Korea does not have a good reputation in honoring contracts, and surveys of Chinese investors and traders with North Korea have documented both the risks they face and mitigation strategies that have been adopted by those choosing to invest and trade.37

A Magnet for China—North Korea’s Natural Resources—Mining and Rare Earth Materials

North Korea has sizeable deposits of over 200 different minerals including coal, iron ore, magnesite, gold ore, zinc ore, copper ore, limestone, molybdenum and graphite. It is estimated that North Korea has up to 20 million tons of rare earth materials (rem) deposits.38

Using 2008 as the base year, one estimate projected the potential value for key mineral deposits in the North at over $6 trillion. Exports of rare metals to China in 2009 stood at $16 million.39 A 2012
report suggests that North Korea's underground mineral resources amount to nearly $10 trillion.40

A November, 2011, North Korean science journal article identified the “main industrial rare earth materials in North Korea as monazite, bastnasite, cerium pyrochlore and britholite, while secondary minerals include fergusonite, gadolinite and cerite. The genetic-petrographic types of rem deposits are deposits related to laurvikites, placer deposits, apogranite deposits and pegmatite deposits. Laurvikites and placer deposits are large-scale deposits and main industrial genetic types that are widely distributed.”41

As North Korea seeks outside assistance related to its mining projects China is an attractive partner for joint operations. (North Korea's main gold mine in Unsan County, North Pyongyang province, was originally opened by a United States company in 1896.)42

Forty-one percent of the Chinese companies registered as doing business in North Korea in 2010 extract coal, iron, zinc, nickel, gold and other minerals.43

North Korea mining projects announced or underway include the following.

- Beijing Bao Wian Hung Chang International Trading Ltd and North Korea reportedly signed a deal to develop three mines in North Korea—one gold and two iron-ore.44
- In 2007, the DPRK Ministry of Mining Industries and the Wanxiang Resources Limited Company of China established Hyesan-China Joint Venture Mineral Company. Copper ore production from the Hyesan Youth Mine goes to China. North Korean and Chinese workers completed a modernization project of the mine in September of 2011.45 The Hyesan Youth Mine reportedly has an annual capacity of 50 to 70,000 tons of copper concentrate that is expected to contain 20-30% copper with all of it to be sold to China.46 Also, China has reportedly invested $860 million in the mines under this joint venture and holds a 51% stake.47
- Four Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development rights to Musan Iron Mine according to the ROK's “The Institute for Far Eastern Studies.”48 120 tons of iron ore are reportedly exported to China annually from the Musan Mine which is believed to be the largest outdoor mine in Asia.
- Chinese, South Korean and about 30 European companies have invested in copper and gold mines in North Korea, as well as factories producing medications and blue jeans, and even Internet Service.49

**UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES BY AND FOR NORTH KOREA**

North Korean leaders' steady refusal to give up their nuclear weapons program continually has diminished prospects for economic development assistance from international financial institutions, the United States and other countries. This economic estrangement, combined with South Korea’s policy of disengagement from North Korea50 has resulted in the growing economic and other assistance from China.
This scenario is not particularly discomforting to Chinese leaders who carefully managed the Six Party Talks process to maintain “balance”—preserving regional stability. Chinese leaders have adeptly cajoled or pressed North Korean leaders according to the situation at hand—in response to Beijing’s own “loss of face” when North Korea proceeded with a nuclear test, for instance, as a result of U.S. impatience with the North.

As a former State Department official with long experience in Korea noted, “The day China decides to break with the DPRK and the moment the PRC decides that a reunified Korean Peninsula (under Seoul’s aegis) is more in its interest than a divided peninsula, that is when the process of Korea’s national unification will begin in earnest, and there will be little the DPRK can do to sustain itself as an independent entity. It is for that reason that the North has been extremely cautious in its ties with Beijing. … China is the DPRK’s lifeline and insurance policy, which for a nationalistic North Korea is something that necessarily sticks in the craw, but it is a fact of life.”

**IS THE TREND OF NORTH KOREA BECOMING A CHINESE PROTECTORATE AND ECONOMIC COLONY IRREVERSIBLE?**

Some would suggest that the present trend is not necessarily irreversible, as there “is no love lost between Pyongyang and Beijing. The North Koreans are intensely nationalistic and do not want to become overly dependent on Beijing. And there are many in China who warn that North Korea is a strategic liability.”

In addition, it is important to note that North-South relations impact the degree to which North Korea engages (or needs to engage) China. Will a new government in the Republic of Korea seek closer relations with the North?

However, these points do not counter the reality of China’s historic claims to the Korean Peninsula and that China views the North Korea as a “strategic buffer against a unified, pro-American Korea.”

**IN SUMMARY**

In the event the unification of the Peninsula does proceed in some manner, and/or there is a collapse of the North Korean government unification will be complicated. Depending on the circumstances that prompt a move toward unification, would consensus be achieved among key players (including China, the U.S. and South Korea), to focus on “securing stability on the Peninsula versus creating legitimacy?”

The findings of the USC-CSIS interim study on Korean Peninsula unification were that “for the Korean case, finding the balance between stability and legitimacy … becomes key. First-movers into a collapse of the DPRK may be trying to act in the name of efficiency, but will they necessarily be seen as legitimate? South Korea undeniably sees itself as the only legitimate party with the authority to act. But China is likely to focus legitimacy on a UN process that is protracted. China is therefore likely to focus on a longer time line for intervention and would only see a UN process as legitimate. This fits with the Chinese proclivity to be good at invest-
ing in the status quo rather than reacting to rapid change. The United States and the ROK, conversely, are better at responding to crises and trying to shape the outcome.”

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APPENDIX II.—CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR LUGAR REGARDING CHI-
NA'S PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL BORDERS ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA

March 9, 2012

This memo responds to your request for information about areas of the present-day Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) that the People's Republic of China (PRC) considers to have once been parts of China. Per your request, the memo includes detailed discussion of Chinese maps showing those claims and also examines other state-supported PRC scholarship on this subject. CRS was asked only to summarize PRC state-supported scholarship, so this memo does not reflect scholarship by experts from the ROK, DPRK or other countries.

This memo provides both Chinese and Korean names for ancient kingdoms and certain place names, with the Chinese listed first because of the memo’s focus on PRC claims.

OVERVIEW

Since the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese government has devoted significant resources to research on China’s historic borders. In promoting such research, the Chinese government has appeared to be driven by several motivations:

• The Chinese government sees the research as contributing to national unity and the “stability and development of China’s border areas.” With non-Han Chinese ethnic minorities occupying large swaths of territory within the borders of the PRC, the government appears to believe that research showing border areas as historically part of China can help solidify those areas’ sense of belonging to the PRC, and undermine any calls for such areas to break away from the PRC.

• The Chinese government seeks to amass historic evidence to rebuff any claims by other nations to what the PRC considers to be its territory. For Chinese policymakers, memories remain fresh of Japan’s efforts to justify its invasion of China in the first half of the 20th century on the basis, in part, of claims to ancient kingdoms. China has commissioned historical research to defend all its sovereignty claims and has deployed historians to help make the historical case for its sovereignty over contested territory in such places as the South China Sea.

• The government seeks to foster patriotism by highlighting what many in China see as the indignities that a weak China suffered in the 19th and 20th centuries at the hands of imperialist powers, and contrasting those humiliations with what the PRC portrays as its vigorous defense of Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty. The indignities highlighted include
"unequal treaties" that forced China to cede territory and acquiesce to foreign exploitation of Chinese resources.

This memo presents PRC views about the history of the Chinese land border with North Korea. It does so by examining three significant works of state-sponsored PRC scholarship chronicling China's historic borders. The first work of PRC scholarship examined is an eight-volume set of maps, published in the 1980s as The Historical Atlas of China. Thirty-nine maps from the Atlas, depicting areas of the Korean peninsula over the course of a millennium and a half, are discussed. The second work of PRC scholarship examined is a 67-page chapter on the Chinese-Korean border included in History of China's Modern Borders, a two-volume study charting the history of China's land and maritime borders. It was published in 2006. The third work examined is an essay in a 2003 volume, Research on China's Northeast Borderland, published by the Northeast Project, a collaboration among the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Communist Party Committees of three provinces. The essay, “Certain Issues in Gaogouli Research,” explores the political motivation for Chinese scholarship on an ancient kingdom known in Chinese as Gaogouli and in Korean as Koguryo. The Koguryo kingdom once straddled the present day Chinese-North Korean border. Chinese scholars associated with the Northeast Project consider the kingdom to have been Chinese; Koreans consider it to have been Korean.

In summary, the first PRC work examined, The Historical Atlas of China, depicts Chinese territory as having once extended along the western half of the Korean peninsula all the way to the peninsula's southern tip. It also presents as historically parts of China a number of ancient kingdoms that many Koreans consider to have been Korean. Such an approach has raised concerns among China's neighbors that China may be seeking to rob them of their history. China's historical claims have also raised fears among some of China's neighbors that China may be seeking to lay the groundwork for possible future territorial claims on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. China shares land borders with 14 countries. Listed by geographic location, they are North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia. In addition, China claims maritime territory that is also claimed by one or more of eight governments: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The opening chapter of the second PRC work examined, the History of China's Modern Borders, presents the view that the contours of the current Chinese-North Korean border were largely settled in the 15th century, during the Ming Dynasty, when Chinese and Korean rulers agreed that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers should form their border. It describes disagreement, however, between China and Korea over where the border lies in the short stretch of territory between the sources of the two rivers. The chapter also covers what the author describes as China's uphill struggles in the late 19th century and early 20th century to persuade Korea, Japan, and Russia to accept and respect the Tumen/Tuman River and Yalu/Amnok River borders. History of China's Modern Borders suggests a strong current Chinese commitment to
the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok River borders, but suggests some Chinese dissatisfaction about the status of the border with North Korea in the territory between the two rivers.

The third PRC work examined, the essay in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland on the political motivations for China’s research on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, portrays China’s research as primarily defensive in nature, intended to fend off potential efforts by North Korea to claim territory in the present PRC. The author appears to undercut his argument that the research is defensive, however, when he urges Chinese scholars to document Chinese claims to other ancient kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula, too, including those kingdoms that occupied the southern end of the peninsula, far from the current Chinese-North Korean border.

Complicating analysis of this state-supported research on China’s historical borders is the fact that authoritative sources do not always agree. While the essayist on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom insists that the kingdom was always Chinese, for example, The Historical Atlas of China depicts the kingdom, in different periods, as having been under the jurisdiction of the central Chinese regime, having been a Chinese border minority-controlled territory, and having been an independent, non-Chinese kingdom.


In 1954, just five years after the Communist Party took power in China, the official Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched a major project to update maps depicting Chinese territory over the centuries. The project ultimately lasted three decades and involved more than 100 scholars from a dozen institutions. In the project’s later years, sponsorship shifted from one official research institution, CAS, to another, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The project culminated in the publication of an eight-volume atlas set, The Historical Atlas of China, the last volume of which was released in 1987. China’s premier modern cartographer, Tan Qixiang, served as the chief editor for all eight volumes, as well as for The Concise Historical Atlas of China, based on the eight volume set and published in 1991. The Historical Atlas of China and The Concise Historical Atlas of China, both published by the official Cartographic Publishing House, are considered the most authoritative maps of China’s historical borders yet produced in the People’s Republic of China.

The scope of The Historical Atlas of China is considerably broader than the most ambitious previous effort to compile historical maps of China, undertaken by the celebrated Qing Dynasty cartographer Yang Shoujing. In a foreword to the first volume of The Historical Atlas of China, Chief Editor Tan notes that Yang’s maps, “were limited to areas under the direct jurisdiction of central China regimes, and what they actually gave was an incomplete picture even of the central China regimes.” In contrast, Tan explains, the compilers of the PRC-era The Historical Atlas of China embarked on their work under the principle that, “our great motherland has been the joint creation by dozens of nationalities, of which all the national minorities constitute an inseparable part of China no matter what historical period they existed in and what form of regime
they established, independent or in vassalage to the existing central China regime. The scope and range our maps cover should include all their distribution areas and the territories of the regimes they founded.”

Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese scholarship on China’s historical borders stems from this decision to characterize as part of China all territory once occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities’ kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas of China distinguishes between the territory of “the central China administration” and areas occupied by “China’s border minorities” by depicting them in different colors. The compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, that they consider both categories of territory to make up the contours of “China” in each historical period.

The Historical Atlas of China’s Treatment of the Korean Peninsula

Of the 304 maps in The Historical Atlas of China, several dozen include the Korean Peninsula. The maps show Chinese territory extending the furthest south on the peninsula in the Tang Dynasty (618–906). A map for 669 AD, after the Tang allied with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, shows Tang territory extending along the west side of the peninsula to the peninsula’s far southern tip. (The Xinluo/Silla Kingdom is shown controlling the eastern side of the peninsula.)

For many hundreds of years, the maps show Chinese territory covering all or part of the northern half of the peninsula, between approximately 37 and 40 degrees north latitude. The maps indicate that today’s border between China and the DPRK, which follows the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, was largely established as the border between China and Korea by 1433, during the Ming Dynasty.

A narrative of the territorial shifts over the centuries, as depicted by the maps in The Historical Atlas of China, follows below. The maps are discussed chronologically, from earliest history to most recent. CRS numbering is followed, in parentheses, by location of the maps in the Atlas.

Maps 1 and 2 (Vol. I, Maps 31–32 and 41–42), from the Warring States Period (approx. B.C. 475–B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of the Great Wall of China. The maps show the fortifications extending well south of the Yalu/Amnok River into the current territory of the DPRK.

Maps 3 and 4 (Vol. II, Maps 3–4 and 9–10) show the first borders of a central Chinese administration, the Qin Dynasty (B.C. 221–B.C. 206 BC). The maps show the fortifications extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known as the 39th parallel), stopping just short of today’s Pyongyang. The maps indicate that the Qin state encompassed the full area inside the fortifications. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is listed on the map as Chinese border minority territory, although the map does not mark its borders.

Maps 5 and 6 (Vol. II, Maps 13–14 and 27–28), depicting the Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 8), show the territory of the
central Western Han state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south of the 38th parallel, just north of today's Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part of the central Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the kingdom's borders within the central Western Han state. In yellow shading, map 5 shows much of today's Northeast China, including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, outside of the borders of the central Chinese administration.

Maps 7 and 8 (Vol. II, Maps 40–41 and 61–62), depicting the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), show the central Eastern Han state occupying the western part of the Korean peninsula to just south of the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the Eastern Han's territory on the peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 degrees east longitude. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside the borders of the central Chinese administration. The border between the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean as Puyo, is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as occupied by Chinese border minorities.

In Maps 9 and 10 (Vol. III, Maps 3–4 and 13–14), which depict China's borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, the Wei Kingdom's territory is shown as extending across the full width of the Korean Peninsula down to below the 38th parallel. Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border minority territory just outside the territory of the Wei Kingdom. As before, the border between the Gaogouli/Koguryo and Fuyu/Puyo Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the territory of Chinese border minorities. Maps 11 and 12 (Vol. III, Maps 33–34 and 41–42), show China's borders 19 years later, in 281, and depict the borders on the Korean Peninsula as largely unchanged.

Map 13 (Vol. IV, Map 3–4) shows China's borders in the year 382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. The territory of the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is depicted as extending only a little east of today's Chinese border city of Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border minorities is, however, shown in mustard yellow as extending down the peninsula to an east-west line that includes today's Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this Chinese border minority territory.

Maps 14 through 19 (Vol. IV, Maps 17–18, 19–20, 21–22, and 23–24, and Vol. V, Maps 3–4 and 19–20), showing China's borders in 449, 497, 546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.

Map 20 (Vol. V, Map 32–33), depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the Tang allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo and Baaji/Paekche kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory extending all the way to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory on the east side of the
peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This was the only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese territory extending so far south on the peninsula.

Maps 21 and 22 (Vol. V, Maps 34–35 and 50–51) show a very different situation just 72 years later, in 741. Here, the Tang Dynasty’s territory has shrunk back to north of what is now known in Chinese as the Datong Jiang, and in Korean as the Taedong River, leaving today’s Pyongyang in Chinese Tang Dynasty territory. The Korean peninsula south of that line is shown to be the non-Chinese territory of the Xinluo/Silla.

Map 23 (Vol. V, Map 36–37), showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang territory on the peninsula as having receded further, to include only a small portion of the northwest side of the peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the current Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of central Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today’s Chinese cities of Changchun and Yanji and areas north as being the territory of Chinese border minorities.

Map 24 (Vol. V, Map 82–83) shows the situation in 943, during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao Dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The Liao’s border with Korea is depicted as being well south of the Yalu/Ammok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, following a curved line whose northern tip is just below the 40th parallel. The peninsula south of that line is shown as non-Chinese Gaoli/Koryo territory.

Maps 25 through 29 (Vol. VI, Maps 3–4, 8–9, 42–43, 48–49, and 44–45), covering the years 1111, 1142, 1189, and 1208, show the Korean peninsula as non-Chinese territory under Gaoli/Koryo rule up to a line just north of the 40th parallel.

Map 30 (Vol. VII, Map 3–4), depicting the situation in 1280, during the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, shows the Chinese border further south, just north of Kaesong.

Maps 31 and 32 (Vol. VII, Maps 5–6 and 13–14), showing the situation in 1330, still during the Yuan Dynasty, depict the border as having crept north again, to just above the 40th parallel on the west, though Yuan Dynasty territory is shown extending below the 40th parallel on the east.

Maps 33–38 (Vol. VII, Maps 40–41, 42–43, and Vol. VIII, Maps 10–11, 3–4, 12–13, and 5–6), showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu/Ammok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, the rivers that form all but a small portion of the modern border between China and North Korea.

Vol. VII, Map 1–2, the final map in the set, shows the territory of the People’s Republic of China as of 1982.

CONTINUITY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

To probe whether The Historical Atlas of China represented a departure from claims made by the PRC’s predecessor regime, the Republic of China (ROC), CRS examined a set of four maps commissioned by the ROC’s Ministry of Education and printed in 1947 for use in Chinese classrooms. The maps provide a crude snapshot of the territory ascribed to various Chinese dynasties and show a significant degree of continuity between Chinese claims during the
PRC and ROC eras. The first map, depicting the territory of China's Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), shows the Han border extending to a line south of present-day Seoul. The second map, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907), shows Chinese control extending down the west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula's southern tip. The third map, showing the territory of the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), depicts the Yuan border extending to a line south of Pyongyang and north of Kaesong. The final map, depicting the territory of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), shows the Chinese border with the DPRK largely as it is today.

2. HISTORY OF CHINA'S MODERN BORDERS (2006)

In 1983, as work on the Historical Atlas of China was winding down, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established a new research center focused on study of China's historical borders, the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography (Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu Zhongxin). The center's Chinese-language website portrays the center's goals as including “to inherit and carry forward the great heritage of China’s borderland history and geography and the patriotic tradition of the Chinese peoples,” and to “make contributions to the safeguarding of national unity and the stability and development of China’s border areas.”

According to the Research Center’s website, the center currently has 32 staff and is divided into several research sections, including sections focused on China’s northeast and northern borders, its northwestern borders, its southwestern and maritime borders, and “theoretical” questions related to borders. The center has also established “work stations” in Yunnan Province (which borders Vietnam, Laos, and Burma), China’s northeast (which borders North Korea and Russia), Xinjiang (which borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and areas of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and India), and Guangxi (which borders Vietnam). In addition, the center oversees an “Information Center on China’s History and Culture,” a “Research Center on Xinjiang’s Development,” and a “Research Base on Conditions along China’s Northeast Border.”

In 2007, the Research Center produced a 1,228-page two-volume study charting the history of all China’s land and maritime borders, History of China’s Modern Borders. It is in some ways the textual counterpart to The Historical Atlas of China. The study was originally launched as a high profile project for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during the 1986–1990 Seventh Five-Year Plan, and took two decades to complete. A top UK-based expert on the relationship between Chinese maps and national identity refers to it as a “standard-setting” work.

In a preface, the chief editor of History of China’s Modern Borders, Lu Yiran, describes the study as being intended to “make people understand how China’s modern borders were formed, how the imperialist powers cut up and occupied China’s territory, how the corrupt Chinese [Qing Dynasty] government was forced to conclude and sign unequal treaties, and how the Chinese people struggled to safeguard the country’s territory and sovereignty.” Lu wrote that
a major goal for the book was “to sum up lessons from historical experiences."  

*Treatment of the Chinese-Korean Border in History of China’s Modern Borders*

The opening chapter in *History of China’s Modern Borders* is a 67-page exposition on the Chinese-Korean border, written by Yang Zhaoquan, a researcher with the Korean Studies Institute of the Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences. The chapter begins in 668, the year that the Chinese Tang Dynasty allied with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom. It describes how the Tang established administrative control over the area previously occupied by the Gaogouli/Koguryo, and made Pyongyang its local capital. After the alliance between the Tang and the Xinluo/Silla broke down, the chapter relates that the Tang was forced in 676 to move its local capital north. By 735, the Tang was forced to cede all territory south of the Datong/Taedong River to the Xinluo/Silla. The border moved north again some 200 years later, after the collapse of the Tang in 907 and the Xinluo/Silla in 936. The chapter records the border as following its present course, along the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, as of 1440, during the Chinese Ming Dynasty.

Yang nonetheless devotes considerable space to controversies over the border that arose in later centuries. In the 18th century, the Chinese and Korean governments found themselves at odds over the course of the border in the short stretch of territory between the starting points of the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, both of which originate in streams that flow from the Changbai Mountains. Yang writes that in 1712, the Qing Emperor Kangxi sent a local official to inspect the area in the company of a Korean official. They placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan and Koreans call Mount Sobaek in the Changbai Mountains. Characters carved on the marker noted that the Yalu/Amnok River lay to the marker’s west and the Tumen/Tuman River to its east. Yang relates, however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate the border, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which of the streams that feed the Yalu/Amnok and the Tumen/Tuman Rivers should be considered their “true” headwater streams for boundary purposes.

China’s position, according to Yang, was that the Tumen/Tuman River has three headwater streams, the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, and Hongtu Shui, and that only the Hongdan Shui lies to the east of the original site of the 1712 marker, the direction in which the marker indicated that the Tumen River flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the Hongdan Shui should form the border. The Korean position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, known in Korean as the Sogul, be deemed the headwater stream of the Tumen/Tuman River and form the boundary between the
two countries. In 1889, with no agreement on which stream should
be deemed the headwater stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu or-
dered the erection of ten boundary markers, starting at the Shiyi/
Sogul stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the
boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute
went unresolved.

Another dispute that erupted in the late 1800s centered on the
question of whether the Tumen River should, in fact, be considered
the boundary between China and Korea. The Korean side asserted
that what it called the Tuman River was not the Tumen River that
formed the border, opening the door to claims that territory north
of the Tumen/Tuman River, including the ethnic Korean area
around Yanji, was not in fact Chinese. Japan later adopted the
same position. Yang chronicles Korean attempts to assert control
over areas north of both the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Riv-
ers, and Russian and then Japanese moves to abet those efforts. At
the turn of the 20th century, Japan, Yang observes, was keen to
gain control of Chinese Yanbian as a “back door” for its planned
expansion into China.

The chapter ends with discussion of a 1909 treaty between China
and Japan. Japan had by then turned Korea into a protectorate,
and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ulti-
mately recognized the Tumen/Tuman River as forming part of the
border between China and Korea. It also specifically agreed that
this part of the border ran from the 1712 border marker to the
Shiyi/Sogul stream and along the stream to the Tumen/Tuman
River. In exchange for that recognition, China granted Japan a
broad array of rights in Chinese territory, including the right to
open trading posts and establish consulates and sub-consulates.
China also agreed to extend a railway to the Korean border, where
it would link up with a railway on the Korean side. Yang notes
that this agreement facilitated Japan’s later transport of troops to
occupy northeast China.

In documenting China’s struggles in the 19th and 20th century
to secure agreement that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Riv-
ers form the border between China and Korea, Yang appears to sig-
nal a strong continuing Chinese commitment to those river borders.
From Yang’s account, China’s position on the stretch of territory
between the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers may be less
clear. The issue is significant not for strategic reasons, but because
the area in question is in the Changbai/Choson’gul Mountains,
which Chinese consider the mythical birthplace of the ancestors of
the Manchu Emperors, and Koreans consider the birthplace of the
Korean people. The official biography of North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il lists him as having been born on Mt. Paektu, the tallest
peak in the mountain range, although most scholars believe he was
actually born in Russia.

3. RESEARCH ON CHINA’S NORTHEAST BORDERLAND (2003) AND THE
ESSAY, “CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN GAOGOU LI RESEARCH”

One of the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and
Geography’s most controversial projects has been its “Northeast
Borderland History and Current Situation Series Research
Project,” launched in February 2002 and known in abbreviated
form as the “Northeast Project.” The project is a collaboration among the Research Center and the Communist Party committees of China’s three northeastern provinces, Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. The center’s website portrays the project as a response to challenges presented by “some countries’ research institutions and scholars with ulterior motives engaging in ‘research’ on historical relations that distorts historical facts, and a few politicians with political purposes publicly promoting all sorts of fallacies, creating chaos.” Among the Northeast Project’s goals is to, “further safeguard the stability of the Northeast border areas.”

Controversy has sprung from efforts by scholars associated with the project to claim the ancient kingdom of Gaogouli or Koguryo as Chinese, rather than Korean. Critics in South Korea, in particular, have castigated such efforts as a Chinese attempt to steal Korean history. Some critics have worried openly about whether the Chinese interest in the Gaogouli/Koguryo may presage a future Chinese attempt to make a history-based claim to territory on the Korean Peninsula.

In 2003, the Northeast Project published Research on China’s Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a conference held a year earlier. The collection includes a revealing essay by a Chinese scholar presenting an explanation for the new scholarly interest in China in the Gaogouli/Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In “Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,” author Jiang Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun Normal University in China’s Jilin Province insists that the research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against territorial claims to parts of the present-day PRC primarily from China’s ostensible ally, North Korea. Jiang writes that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese territory have been longstanding, but that for many years, they took a back seat to the Chinese leadership’s insistence on the need to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and North Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the friendship has now frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns to be aired openly.

Jiang makes no bones about his position that the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom was Chinese. It was “an ancient local regime of our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han migrants,” he writes. He adds, “Because of geography, their economy and culture could not keep pace with the interior. Gradually, they became indigenized and the central plains dynasties came to see them as Yi and Di tribes.” Jiang charges that Korean efforts to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-historical justifications for Japan’s invasion of China. Japan, Jiang says, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and Koreans were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for Korea the ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekche, and Bohai/Parhae in order to provide historical cover for Japanese expansion into northeast China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/Parhae kingdoms were particularly important because their territories extended well into areas of northeast China that Japan coveted.

After Japan’s defeat in World War II, Jiang writes, North Korean scholars picked up the research into the ancient kingdoms. Mean-
while, Chinese scholars hands were tied, he laments, because China and North Korea shared a special relationship as socialist allies, and any research that might “harm Chinese-Korean relations” was restricted, including research on ancient Korean history.

Jiang reports that North Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 to gather materials about the ancient kingdoms. He names one such North Korean scholar, Ri Jirin (known in China as Li Zhilin), who spent five years at Peking University, with the years unspecified. Jiang tells us that Ri’s Chinese advisor reported serious concerns about the direction of Ri’s work, but was ignored. Ri’s Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient Chinese rulers as having “invaded” a then Korean territories, Jiang tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, became focused on “recovering lost lands” from China.

Jiang does not present any further information about North Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars are particularly fixated on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that shared their capital, Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to the Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri’s Peking University advisor as warning that while North Korean scholars’ desire to “recover lost lands” might not now amount to anything, if such positions are not countered, North Koreans might in future generations “use this excuse to grab territory.” Jiang reports approvingly that China’s government has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese and Korean scholarship on the ancient kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese scholarship on the ancient kingdoms.

In an exhortation that may alarm China’s neighbors, especially South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his academic colleagues not to neglect research on the ancient Baiji/Paekche Kingdom, which once occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. “We must not abandon it because its territory is not in our possession today,” Jiang writes. Jiang also urges his colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, saying, “We cannot, because it is the predecessor of a Korean nation today, overlook the fact that it was subordinate to us in the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].”

NOTES:


3 Lu Dianyang, ed., Maps of the Territory of the Han and Tang at their Height (HanTang shengshi jiangyu tu) and Maps of the Yuan and Qing at their Height (Yuan Qing shengshi jiangyu tu), commissioned by the Ministry of Education (Republic of China), Yaguang xingdi xueshe chubanshe, 1947. Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China was in power in mainland China until 1949, when it fled to...
Taiwan, leaving Mao Zedong's Communists to proclaim the People's Republic of China on the mainland.


APPENDIX III.—KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL CHANGE IN THE BORDERS BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA: A REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 9, 2012

EXPLANATION OF THE FORMAT OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS

This text treats historical border issues between Korea and China from ancient times to the early twentieth century. The historical sources used for research in this topic were written in Chinese characters, and typically in Chinese grammar. However, place names had different pronunciations, and thus different names, in the Chinese and Korean languages. Presenting those pronunciations in English thus has posed important problems of representation. The explanations below will introduce how these issues have been resolved for this text.

Korean words have been romanized using the McCune-Reischauer System. The government of the Republic of Korea uses a different system (Revised Romanization), but for this text the Northeast Asian History Foundation has chosen to use the system preferred by many scholars writing in English. Chinese words have been romanized through the Pinyin system.

For the names of rivers and mountains in the border area between today’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China, the following pattern has been used. The Korean name is provided first and then followed by the Chinese name in parentheses. For example, the river called Amnok in Korean and Yalu in Chinese is written as “Amnok (Yalu) River.” The mountain called Paektu in Korean and Changbai in Chinese is written as “Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai).” Foreign-language terms in parentheses are preceded with “C.” or with “K.” so to identify the language (Chinese or Korean) and are italicized.

At the end of this text is an Appendix. Here are found three sections, a collection of maps compiled by the Northeast Asian History Foundation that is called “Borders between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea,” a list of Korean reign periods and their dates, and a glossary of terms that appear in this text.
INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS

The Northeast Asian History Foundation, which has prepared “South Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the Borders between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012,” is the representative South Korean research institute for research in the histories of Northeast Asian countries and peoples. It has launched various academic projects to move beyond history issues between Korea and China or between Korea and Japan, and endeavors to construct stronger relationships of amicability and cooperation between and among these countries.

The Review and Comments has been prepared for the following purposes.

First, the Northeast Asian History Foundation agrees with the critical view of the CRS Memorandum of March 9, 2012, that the way in which the government of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter as “PRC”) understands the historical borders between Korea and China by relying solely upon Chinese historical maps and scholarship can result in incomplete research.

Second, we present the standard view in academic circles in the Republic of Korea on the historical borders between Korea and China by utilizing primary resources and research from such academic fields as history, archaeology, anthropology, and geography.

Third, in so doing we have prepared the Review and Comments to develop a fact-based understanding of how the borders between Korea and China have changed over time and how they have been represented in maps.

OUTLINE OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS REGARDING THE CRS MEMORANDUM

1. The Historical Atlas of China

The CRS Memorandum concentrated on three texts recently published in the PRC in Chinese and one report issued by the United States Department of State which treat China’s historical borders. These four texts are The Historical Atlas of China (C. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji, 1982-1987; hereafter as “the Atlas”), History of China’s Modern Borders, vol. 1 (C. Zhongguo jindai bianjieshi, 2007), Research on China’s Northeast Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu, 2003), and the Department of State’s International Boundary Study (1962). More specifically, the CRS Memorandum concentrated on one chapter from each of the latter two Chinese-language books. From History of China’s Modern Borders was used Yang Zhaquan’s chapter entitled “Zhongguo yu Chaoxian de bianjie” (The Chinese-Korean Border). And from Research on China’s Northeast Borderland was used Jiang Weidong’s “Gaogouli yanjiu de luogan wenti” (Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research). The sections of these four texts that focused on historical borders with Korea will be treated separately. Presented below are brief introductions to these texts and the issues that they raise.
The Atlas is a collection of historical maps published in an atlas format in the PRC, and is the atlas that has been most widely used in that country. The most important problem in this work is in the inclusion of areas that belonged to neighboring countries and peoples in the past. This problem stems from the three China-centered interpretations outlined below.

First, the Atlas depicts in a sweeping manner the borders of Chinese countries by the standard of their greatest territorial size as achieved through war. This means that all of the histories of the peoples who lived in the territory that is now contemporary China are China's history. Such an approach may lead readers of the Atlas to misconstrue the territory of neighboring countries or peoples under the occupation or influence of a Chinese country as being a fixed territory.

Second, in the Atlas, the process of determining borders follows the military activities of Chinese governments to the neglect of such aspects of history as the lives of local people and the exercise of dominance. Most of the military engagements of Chinese governments with countries in the Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria resulted in short-term military occupations. Nevertheless, the Atlas demarcates the occupied areas of those countries as the territory of the Chinese countries. As a result, those areas are marked as if they had been directly controlled for a long period of time by Chinese governments. Also important is that the counties and prefectures that Chinese governments established in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria were frontier counties and prefectures, and thus differed from those administrative units in China. The occupied lands were controlled in strategic areas whose defense was protected by fortresses, and along traffic routes that connected those areas. The Atlas errs in considering the frontier counties and prefectures, which were far from direct Chinese rule, as having been administered through the same type of direct control as were those in China.

Third, the Atlas merges non-Han Chinese peoples, which were ethnically, historically, and culturally different from Chinese, and their territories into the current boundary of the PRC under the principle of the “unified multi-ethnic country” (C. tongyi de duominzu guojia). For example, the Jurchens, who resided in areas between Liao (916–1125) of Kara Khitan ethnicity and Koryo (918–1392), were a third force that did not belong to either country but still were included in a Chinese country's territory in these Chinese maps.

2. Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders

The CRS Memorandum introduces the debate over the borders that followed the Amnok (C. Yalu) River, Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai; C. Changbai-shan), and the Tuman (C. Tumen) River based upon Yang Zhaoquan’s “The Chinese-Korean Border,” which is chapter one in History of China’s Modern Borders, and focuses on China’s effort to secure the border. Seen from South Korean scholarship, this chapter has three important problems.
First, by describing the establishment of the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River formed through the expansion of territory under Ming China’s rule in the fifteenth century, the chapter passes over the fact that the domain of Ming China (1368-1644) was limited in this region to the southern part of the Liaodong River and to the western downstream area of the Amnok River.

Second, without referencing historical sources, this chapter describes the original location of the Mt. Paektu boundary marker erected in 1712 as being on Mt. Sobaek. And it states that the determination of the border between Chosön and Qing China as being along the Mt. Sobaek-Sogol River (Mt. Xiaobai-Shiyi Stream; C. Xiaobai-shan, Shiyishui) resulted from the border conference held between the two countries in 1887. This claim overlooks the fact that the border between Chosön and Qing China had already been decided as following the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River in 1712.

Third, by highlighting the efforts of China in defending the Tuman (Tumen) River border in the negotiations held between Qing China and Japan from 1905 to 1907, this chapter discounts the fact that the Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement between Qing China and Japan in 1909 excluded Korea, which should have been a participant because this issue treated the border between Korea and Qing China.

3. “Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research,” in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland

The Chinese scholar Jiang Weidong argues in his chapter “Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research” in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland that Koguryo (C. Gaogouli) was “an ancient local regime of our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han migrants.” (CRS Memorandum, 9.)

However, Yemaek tribes established Koguryo (?–668). Differing from the Mo people who were active in northern China, these tribes came from a non-Han Chinese Dongyi people living in the Liaodong Peninsula and the northern and central areas of the Korean Peninsula. PRC scholarship believes the Mo or the Gaoyi people that appear in ancient Chinese sources to be the ethnic origin of Koguryo. However, there is from 1,500 years to 2,000 years between the historical activities of the Mo and Gaoyi peoples and the establishment of Koguryo.

Further, there is little archaeological evidence through which the Mo and Gaoyi peoples may be linked to Koguryo. As Koguryo expanded, some Han Chinese people became Koguryo people, but their numbers are thought to have been small compared to the Koguryo population.

That is, Koguryo was a different country from the contemporary Han Chinese countries. The ancient Chinese records, too, relate distinctions between Koguryo and these Chinese governments. In the “Records of the Dongyi People” in the Book of Wei (C. Dongyi zhuang, in Wei shu), which was included in the History of the Three Kingdoms (C. Sanguo zhi), one of the Chinese dynastic histories, are entries regarding Puyu (C. Fuyu), Koguryo, Ye, Eastern Okchó, Mahan, Chinhan, Pyonhan, and Wa (ancient Japan).
The “Records of the Dongyi People” describes the Dongyi as peoples having histories that differed from those of Wei China (220-265), Shu China (221-263), and Wu China (229-280). This pattern in the historiography on the historical governments in Manchuria and in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula continued into later historical records in traditional China. Further, the “Records of the Dongyi People” recorded the heaven-worship ceremonies of the Puyoˇ, Koguryoˇ, Ye, and Mahan peoples. Those descriptions show that these peoples sought to communicate directly with heaven and endeavored to introduce a means of receiving divine legitimacy. In other words, these four governments each formed a polity that was neither a vassal state nor a satellite regime of Chinese governments.

4. The United States Department of State International Boundary Study

Noting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter as “DPRK”)-PRC boundary treaty in 1962 and the DPRK-PRC border protocol in 1964, the CRS Memorandum notes the unresolved sovereignty over some sand islets. The 1962 treaty was of great significance in that it not only succeeded to the boundary conference held between Chosön and Qing China in the 1880s, but also finalized the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border between the DPRK and the PRC in the form of a modern treaty. The sovereignty of 451 islands and islets (264 to the DPRK, 187 to the PRC) along the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River was determined as recorded in the List of Sovereignty of Islands and Islets attached to the 1964 protocol.

5. Outline of Korean Historical Maps Accompanying the Review and Comments

Regarding the dispute over historical borders between Korea and China in the modern period, a problem that emerges in the PRC scholarship is the inclusion of historical areas with unclear borders or buffer zones that were not clearly determined in terms of sovereignty.

The Northeast Asian History Foundation has for several years compiled historical maps of Northeast Asia, including East Asia and Central Asia, in order to reflect research in other countries and to provide more accurate and impartial historical maps of the region. For this Review and Comments the Foundation has prepared a set of twelve historical maps. These twelve maps show historical borders between Korea and China over the past 2,000 years. They are intended to assist in clarifying issues of interpretation introduced above and discussed in further detail below. Readers of this Review and Comments are encouraged to consult these maps, as they read the Review and Comments. This set of maps, entitled “Borders between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea,” may be found in the Appendix. The maps are divided into four groups according to the standard periodization of Korean history. This periodization, too, may be found in the Appendix. These four groups are introduced in the following paragraphs.
Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 mark the territories and borders of Old Chosón (K. Kojosón) and the Four Han Chinese Commanderies (K. Hansagun). The earliest chapter of Korean history started with the foundation of Old Chosón, which controlled the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula. This country was destroyed by Han China in 108 BCE. Han China then established four commanderies in this large area. These administrative units, which differed from the county-prefecture system for local administration in Han China, were used for temporary purposes. The extent of Han China’s territorial control was limited to the main fortresses and the traffic routes connecting these military facilities. In 82 BCE, or about twenty-five years after the establishment of these commanderies, two of them were closed, and the Hyŏndo Commandery (C. Xuantu-jun) was later pushed back into the Liaodong area. In 313 CE, the Nangnang Commandery (C. Lelang-jun) was destroyed by Koguryŏ. And in 314, a new commandery, the Taebang Commandery (C. Taifang-jun), which was not established by Han China, was driven out by Paekche (?–660).

Maps 5, 6, and 7 cover the periods of Koguryŏ, the unification of the Three Kingdoms, and Parhae (698–926). The western border of Koguryŏ during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o (r. 391–412) was the Liao River, and it remained there until the collapse of Koguryŏ in 668. The allied forces of Tang China (618–960) and Silla (?–935) destroyed Paekche in 660 and Koguryŏ in 668. Tang China established the Ungin Commandery (C. Xiongjin dudufu) in the former territory of Paekche and the Andong Commandery (C. Andong duhuifu) in the former territory of Koguryŏ for military purposes. As the Andong Commandery was moved to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676, the influence of Tang China withered in the former Koguryŏ territory east of the Liaodong area. In 698, Parhae (C. Bohai) was established under the leadership of the former Koguryŏ people in the former territory of Koguryŏ. Parhae followed Koguryŏ as an independent state. During the reign of King Sŏn (r. 818–830), Parhae achieved its largest size, facing Tang China along the Liao River and the Khitans north of the Liao River.

Maps 8, 9, and 10 chart the borders between Korea and China during the Koryŏ period (918–1392) in Korean history. In its first years, Koryŏ established a local administration system in which the northern frontier was settled along the southern shore of the Taedong River (C. Datong-jiang) and Wŏnsan Bay. In the early eleventh century, the mouth of the Amnok River became the border between Koryŏ and the Khitans. One century later, the military expedition of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) led Koryŏ to achieve tighter control over the Jurchens in the Mt. Paektu and upper Tuman River areas. During the Mongol Intervention of 1239 to 1356, the area north of Ch’ŏllyŏng was left under the direct control of the Mongols. These areas were later restored to Koryŏ during the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1351–1374).

Maps 11 and 12 depict the borders between Korea and Ming China and between Korea and Qing China during the Chosŏn period (1392–1910). In its first decades the Chosŏn government expanded its northern frontier to the Amnok (Yalu) River in the northwest and to the coast of Hamgyŏng Province in the northeast.
In the fifteenth century, the border extended along the full lengths of the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River. In 1712, with the placement of the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border was confirmed. The border treaty between the DPRK and the PRC in 1962 and the border protocol between these same two governments in 1964 reaffirmed the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border, and this remains the boundary between the DPRK and the PRC today.

REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON TEXTS PUBLISHED IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The three texts introduced above that were published in the People’s Republic of China are discussed in the sections that follow. Each section includes direct quotations from the CRS Memorandum that are then followed by analysis and discussion. These comments, analysis, and discussion are not critical of the CRS Memorandum. Rather, they focus upon the information and interpretations provided in the Chinese texts.

1. The Historical Atlas of China

“Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese scholarship on China’s historical borders stems from this decision to characterize as part of China all territory once occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities’ kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas of China distinguishes between the territory of ‘the central China government’ and areas occupied by ‘China’s border minorities’ by depicting them in different colors. The compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, that they consider both categories of territory to make up the contours of ‘China’ in each historical period.” (CRS Memorandum, 3–4.)

The Atlas's treatment of both the “central Chinese administration” region and the areas where “China’s border minorities” lived as Chinese territory in each historical period may be questioned. For example, the Jurchens, situated between Liao and Koryo, did not belong to either Liao or Koryo. However, the Atlas includes the Jurchens in PRC territory. Since the 1980s, scholarship in the PRC has merged the history of foreign countries, such as Koguryo, into the history of China through the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country. As a result, areas that once were considered to be part of foreign histories have come to be incorporated into the history of China. Thus, the Atlas does not always reflect historical processes.

“Maps 1 and 2, from the Warring States Period (approx. B.C. 475–B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of the Great Wall of China. The maps show the fortifications extending well south of the Yalu River into the current territory of the DPRK.” (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
A key element in understanding the extent of the Great Wall is the location of the Taeryŏng River Long Wall (C. Daning-jiang changcheng). Contrary to claims in PRC scholarship, this military fortification was not constructed by Chinese dynasties, but rather by Old Chosŏn or by Koguryŏ in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula for defense against contemporary Chinese dynasties such as Yan, Qin, and Han. Objects appear infrequently in excavations there, but those items provide evidence of interactions between Korea and China in ancient times. It thus may be suggested that the argument that the Great Wall extended into the northwestern Korean Peninsula and that that area became part of Chinese territory in ancient times seems to lack empirical foundation.

The assertion in PRC scholarship that the Great Wall was extended into the northwestern area of the Korean Peninsula in the Warring States Period (475 BCE–221 BCE) is predicated upon two facts. The first is that the Taeryŏng River Long Wall was part of the Great Wall. The second is that some excavated objects, which were made in Yan or in styles common in Yan, are occasionally found in the northwestern Korean Peninsula. However, scholarship published in the Republic of Korea believes that the Taeryŏng River Long Wall was constructed during the Old Chosŏn period or the Koguryŏ period, and that the wall was used even during the Koryŏ period. Further, considering its location, this wall was designed to block enemies from the west to the east. The Yan, who resided northwest of the wall, cannot have been the people that constructed this impediment. Consequently, it is inaccurate to argue that this long wall was constructed by the Yan, that it was part of the Great Wall, and that the northwestern area of the Korean Peninsula was part of Yan territory.

“Maps 3 and 4 show the first borders of a central Chinese administration, Qin China (B.C. 221–B.C. 206). The maps show the fortifications extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known as the 39th parallel), stopping just short of today’s Pyŏngyang. The maps indicate that the Qin state encompassed the full area inside the fortification. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is identified on the map as Chinese border minority territory, although the map does not mark its borders.” (CRS Memorandum, 4.)

The statement that the Great Wall was extended to Pyŏngyang during the Qin period is not accurate. This statement found in PRC scholarship is based upon unreliable documents. Historically, the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula belonged to Old Chosŏn in the early third century BCE. (See the commentary on maps 1 and 2 in “Borders between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea” below.) Given the information in two Chinese texts, Treatise on the Xiongnu (C. Xiongnu liezhuan) and Biography of Meng Tian (C. Meng Tian liezhuan), which are included in Records of the Grand Historian (C. Shiji) by Sima Qian (circa 145 or 135 BCE–86 BCE), the area east of the Great Wall is believed to have been in today’s Liaoyang, in Liaoning Province.
Sources from later Chinese dynasties, however, sometimes wrote Jieshi instead of Liaodong, Nangnang instead of Jieshi, Koguryo instead of Nangnang, and Pyŏngyang instead of Koguryŏ. The inconsistent use of these place names in Chinese sources weakens the argument in PRC scholarship that the eastern end of the Great Wall reached Pyŏngyang. Further, it should also be noted that “Jieshi” was a common place name in ancient China, and may be seen in various locations in ancient Chinese sources. As a result, it is not accurate to describe Qin’s borders as extending to 39 degrees north latitude and near to Pyŏngyang.

“Maps 5 and 6, depicting the Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 8), show the territory of the central Western Han state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south of the 38th parallel, just north of today’s Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part of the central Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the kingdom’s borders within the central Western Han state. In yellow shading, map 5 shows much of today’s Northeast China, including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, and outside of the borders of the central Chinese administration.” (CRS Memorandum, 4.)

It is believed that the southernmost area of the four Han commanderies was in the Korean Peninsula, in the area of the Chaeryŏng River, Hwanghae Province (north of Mt. Myŏrak), and in northern Kangwŏn Province. The area south of the four Han commanderies was beyond the control of China. In general, little has been clarified regarding the relationship between early Koguryŏ and Han China’s county-prefecture administration, and scholars have not reached any definite conclusions. However, it is important to note that, as in the case of Hyŏndo Commandery relocation in 75 BCE, the retreat of Han China’s county-prefecture administration back to China coincided with the growth of Koguryŏ. The Atlas map which shows Koguryŏ in the territory of Western Han (202 BCE–9 CE) would thus seem to be out of historical context. And, such historical peoples as the Okchŏnd and the Suksin (C. Sushen) lived in the Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji areas of the present-day PRC and were independent people that differed from Han China in ethnicity and in culture.

The four Han commanderies, which were established after the collapse of Old Chosŏn, did not last. The Chinbŏn (C. Zhenfan) Commandery and the Imtun (C. Lintun) Commandery were closed in 82 BCE. The remaining prefectures attached to these two commanderies were incorporated into the Nangnang Commandery and the Hyŏndo Commandery. The influence of these county-prefecture areas was limited to the surrounding areas, and their administration tended to be loose and indirect. Therefore, Han China’s territory cannot be marked as extending to the south of 38 degrees north latitude. Specifically, Han China’s influence could only cover the area between the Taedong River and the Chaeryŏng River, and part of the Hamhŏng Plain in the northwestern Korean Peninsula. Other areas should be described as the lands of indigenous peoples from the time of ancient Korea.
To be discussed next are maps depicting the first three centuries of the Common Era.

“Maps 7 and 8, depicting the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), show the central Eastern Han state occupying the western part of the Korean peninsula to just south [of] the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the Eastern Han’s territory on the peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 degrees east longitude. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside the borders of the central Chinese administration. The border between the Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean as Buyeo or Puyŏ, is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as occupied by Chinese border minorities.” (CRS Memorandum, 4–5.)

During the Eastern Han period (25–220), the Nangnang Commandery could not extend southward to the Han River area. The growth of indigenous forces such as Koguryo accelerated the retreat of Han China’s county-prefecture administration back to China. (The second relocation of Hyoˇndo Commandery and the reduction of the area controlled by Nangnang Commandery were also caused by the expansion of Koguryo.) The description in the Atlas of Koguryo, Puyŏ, Ūmnu, and Okchŏ as border areas of Eastern Han points to an arbitrary interpretation based on the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country. This interpretation conflicts with historical facts, however. Koguryŏ, Puyŏ, and Okchŏ emerged from the Yemaek people and became part of the origins of the Korean people. Therefore, these peoples and countries are to be expressed as belonging to the realm of Korean history.

The borders of China in the second half of the third century appear next. “In maps 9 and 10, which depict China’s borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, Wei Kingdom’s territory is shown as extending across the full width of the Korean Peninsula down to south of the 38th parallel. Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border minority territory just outside the territory of the Wei Kingdom. As before, the border between Gaogouli/Koguryo and Fuyu/Buyeo Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the territory of Chinese border minorities.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

The Atlas exaggerates the dominance of Wei in occupying the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. It is true that Wei occupied the Nangnang Commandery and Taebang Commandery areas, but these two commanderies each administered only six prefectures. Considering this, Wei’s administration could not reach the middle of the Korean Peninsula. Thus the borders shown south of 38 degrees north latitude are inaccurate. Revision is also required of the depiction of the Ye area in the northeastern Korean Peninsula. The area is drawn as having been thoroughly controlled by the Nangnang Commandery when, in fact, the governance of the Nangnang Commandery centered mostly on the Pullae area. Further, the Ūmnu people, who were of Suksin ethnicity, cannot be placed into the history of the Han Chinese dynasties.

“In Maps 11 and 12, showing China’s borders nineteen years later, in 281, the borders on the Korean Peninsula are shown as largely unchanged.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
Long belonging to Koguryō, the northeastern Korean Peninsula should be depicted as territory of the Korean governments that followed Koguryō.

“Map 13 shows China’s borders in the year 382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. The territory of the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is depicted as extending only a little east of today’s Chinese border city of Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border minorities is, however, shown in mustard yellow as extending down the peninsula to an east-west line that includes today’s Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this Chinese border minority territory.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

Countries such as Koguryō, Puyō, Okchō, and Yemaek were important agents in Korean history. And the Khitan, Kumoxi, Rouran, and Didouyu belonged to neither traditional Korean history nor traditional Chinese history. The Atlas, however, places them in PRC territory or it ahistorically identifies them retrospectively as China’s border minorities (as is seen in other maps in the Atlas, as well).

“Maps 14 through 19, showing China’s borders in 449, 497, 546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

Given that Koguryō continuously expanded its territory toward the northeast, as shown by its expedition against Eastern Puyō (?–410) and its control over the Malgals (C. Mohe) during the reign of King Kwanggaet’o, Koguryō’s northeastern borders at that time should be corrected as in Map 5, “Koguryo Territory Following the Reign of King Changsu (circa 450),” compiled by the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

“Map 20, depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the Tang allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat Gaogouli/Koguryo and Baiji/Paekje kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory extending all the way to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory on the east side of the peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This was the only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese territory extending so far south on the peninsula.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

After the war in the Korean peninsula that ended in 668, Tang China failed to integrate the former territories of Paekche and Koguryō into its own territory. It succeeded only in destroying these two dynasties and temporarily establishing administrative districts. Although Tang China’s occupation of the Paekche and Koguryō capitals and the stationing of troops in those capitals cannot be regarded as territorial acquisition, Map 20 in the Atlas depicts the former land of these two countries as Chinese territory. The Atlas greatly exaggerates Tang China’s boundaries.

The Uṅgin Commandery was established after the fall of Paekche in 660, but it does not appear in historical sources after 665. In this same period, a Silla province called Soburi appeared
in former Paekche territory. Given this historical context, the Ungjin Commandery may be characterized as a headquarters for Tang Chinese troops during the war in the Korean Peninsula in the 660s. The Atlas inaccurately depicts a temporary occupation as complete control over the southwestern Korean Peninsula. While Tang destroyed Paekche in alliance with Silla and established the Ungjin Commandery, Silla’s army was also stationed in former Paekche territory. Thus it cannot be said that Tang China occupied all of the former Paekche territory. Describing the Ungjin Commandery as Tang Chinese territory should be reconsidered. As a result of the war between Silla and Tang fought from 668 to 676, Silla occupied areas south of the Taedong River to the Wonsan Bay in the Korean Peninsula. The depiction of the areas south of the Taedong River as Tang China territory in Map 20 thus is not accurate.

After the fall of Koguryo in 668, Tang China established the Andong Commandery in P’yongyang to govern the surrounding areas in a temporary form of administrative district. However, numerous attacks from military units organized by the former Koguryo army, and the Silla army compelled Tang China to relocate the Andong Commandery to Xincheng, in Liaoning Province, in 670 and then to Liaodong Fortress, in Liaoning Province, in 676. In 741, Tang China’s territory stopped west of the Liao River, and thus did not reach the Taedong River in the present-day DPRK. Parhae was east of the Liao River. This period is depicted in Map 21 of the Atlas. However, Map 21 does not include Parhae (698–926), a country which is part of Korean history. The period depicted in this map of Parhae’s history is that of the reign of King Mun (r. 737–793), the country’s third king. Most of the former Koguryo territory had been recovered during the reign of his predecessor, King Mu (r. 719–737). Thus, Tang China did not control any territory on the Korean Peninsula from the 670s on.

Although scholars in the PRC identify Parhae as an ethnic minority state under Tang China, the following facts show that as a successor to Koguryo, Parhae was an independent state not subjugated by Tang China. First, Parhae called its ruler Great King, the Reverent, and Imperial Highness. Parhae also had its own reign names and posthumous epithets (or, temple names) for its rulers. Second, Parhae people were permitted to sit for the Tang government’s special examination conducted only for foreigners. Third, Parhae placed the neighboring Malgals in a hierarchical relationship and had its own imperial government. Fourth, in official letters sent to the court of Japan at that time, the king of Parhae referred to himself as the “King of Koryo” or as the “heavenly descendant,” thus repeating the tradition of Puyō. Fifth, Parhae was a sovereign state that conducted independent diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, including Japan and Silla, as well as with Tang China.

“Map 23, showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang territory on the peninsula as having receded further, to include only a small portion of the northwest side of the peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the current Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of central Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today’s Chinese cities of Changchun and Yanji and areas
north as being the territory of Chinese border minorities.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

Around 820, the area extending from P’yŏngyang to the western coast of the Korean Peninsula and to the Liaodong Peninsula was under the control of Parhae, and not Tang China. The northeastern Korean Peninsula, Liaoning Province, Jilin Province, and Heilongjiang Province in the present-day PRC, and the Primorsky region of present-day Russia were also part of Parhae territory.

"Map 24 shows the situation in 943, during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao Dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The Liao’s border with Korea is depicted as being well south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, following a curved line whose northern tip is just below the 40th parallel. The peninsula south of that line is shown as non-Chinese, Gaoli/Koryo territory.” (CRS Memorandum, 5.)

After 933, Koryo territory was shaped by the lower reaches of the Amnok River and the Long Wall, which was in the Korean Peninsula. An important problem in setting the territory of Korea and China during the Koryo and early Chosŏn periods in the Atlas is the absence of a buffer zone or a neutral zone. In the early Koryo period, there were two groups of Jurchens living between Koryo and Liao (916–1125). The first group resided near Liao. The second group lived near the Koryo border and submitted to Koryo authority. If the first group were to belong to Liao, the second group must be included in Koryo territory. From the 1020s to the 1110s, Koryo significantly extended its influence to north of the Long Wall. During this period, Koryo ended the long state of hostilities with Liao and prepared a new stage of warfare with Qin (1115–1234), which was founded by Jurchens and had destroyed Liao.

“Maps 31 and 32, showing the situation in 1330, during the Yuan Dynasty, depict the border as having crept north again, to just above the 40th parallel to the west, though Yuan territory is shown extending below the 40th parallel to the east.” (CRS Memorandum, 6.)

In 1356, during the reign of King Kongmin, Koryo reclaimed the Ssangsŏng Commandery (C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu), which had earlier been incorporated into a frontier district of Yuan China. Koryo’s territory now reached the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River.

“Maps 33–38, showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the rivers that formed all but a small portion of the modern border between China and North Korea.” (CRS Memorandum, 6.)

In the early Chosŏn period, during the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418–1450), specifically in the 1430s, Chosŏn conquered Jurchen and established four counties in the upstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River and six garrisons in the downstream area of the Tuman (Tumen) River, setting the two rivers as the country’s northern borders. During this period, Ming China’s control over the area north of the Great Wall was limited to the southern region of Liaodong and the western area of the downstream region of the Amnok (Yalu) River. The Jurchens conquered the whole of main-
land China and established the Qing government in 1644, and the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River became settled as the border between Chosŏn and Qing China in the mid-seventeenth century.

Regarding text from “Continuity with the Republic of China” in the CRS Memorandum:

“Map B, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907), shows Chinese control extending down the west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula’s southern tip.” (CRS Memorandum, 6.)

Before its collapse in 668, Koguryŏ held the eastern part of Liaodong River and the northern part of Korean Peninsula as its territory. Later, these regions were taken over by Parhae (698–926). Tang China established the Ungjin Commandery after Silla and Tang together destroyed Paekche. However, Tang’s military occupation in the former Paekche territory was temporary because Silla also stationed troops there. Regarding the former territory of Paekche in its entirety as Tang China’s territory thus is not accurate.

“Map C, showing the territory of Yuan China (1271–1368), depicts the Yuan border as extending to a line south of Pyongyang and north of Kaesong.” (CRS Memorandum, 6.)

The Tongnyŏng Commandery (C. Dongning-fu), which was constructed by Yuan, was taken back by Koryŏ in 1290. Koryŏ also used force to restore the Ssangson Commandery in 1356. Lacking information about this history provided in this Review and Comments, this map may misrepresent the areas as belonging entirely to Yuan China at that time.

2. Chapter One of History of China’s Modern Borders

In this section, the second of the three texts published in the People’s Republic of China, History of China’s Modern Borders, in particular, chapter one, “The Chinese-Korean Border,” will be discussed.

In the first half of the fifteenth century, Chosŏn established its northern borders along the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) rivers after defeating Jurchen communities in that area. On the other hand, Ming China’s control was limited only to the southern area of the Liaodong Peninsula and the area west of the downstream part of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Chapter One of History of China’s Modern Borders describes from the perspective of China’s territorial expansion the formation of the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River border between Ming China and Chosŏn in the early fifteenth century. PRC scholarship notes that the control of the Ming government’s Nuergan Regional Military Commission (C. Nuergan dusi) which administered the Left Jianzhou Commandery (C. Jianzhou zuowei) reached the region north of the Amnok and Tuman rivers. However, as Ming China’s control did not extend into Jurchen areas after the early fifteenth century, the view that Ming China and Chosŏn then made these two rivers the border between their countries is inaccurate. According to Korean sources, during the reign of King Kongmin, the Koryŏ government established counties and prefectures for local administration and defense structures in the Amnok (Yalu) River area so that it controlled ter-
ritory south of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Later, during the reign of King Sejong in the first half of the fifteenth century, the Chosŏn government defeated Jurchen communities and then established four counties in the Amnok (Yalu) River’s upstream area and six military garrisons in the downstream area of the Tuman (Tumen) River. In this way the Chosŏn government extended its administrative control to the Amnok (Yalu) River and Tuman (Tumen) River areas.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 1: “In 1712 . . . [t]hey placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan in the Changbai Mountains, known in Korean as the Chosonggul or Jangbaek. Characters carved on the marker noted that the Yalu River lay to the marker’s west and the Tumen River to its east. Yang relates, however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate the border, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which of the streams that feed the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers should be considered their ‘true’ headwater streams for boundary purposes.” (CRS Memorandum, 7–8.)

PRC scholarship introduced the “move of the Mt. Paektu boundary marker” explanation according to which the marker was originally placed at the watershed of Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) but was later moved by Koreans to the southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). However, extant documents and historical maps concerning the erection of the boundary marker show that this explanation lacks supporting evidence. The “Mt. Paektu Boundary Marker Map” (K. Paektu-san chŏnggyebi to, 1712), held by the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies at Seoul National University, in the Republic of Korea, clearly portrays the boundary marker as a headwater marker (K. kangwŏnbi) at the southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). Kim Chinam (1654–1718) accompanied the Escort Commissioner Pak Kwŏn (1658–1715) in his capacity as First Chinese-language Translator (K. Susŏk t’ongyŏkkwan) at the time of the marker’s placement. Kim Chinam left a detailed account in his Records of the Northern Expedition (K. Pukchông rok). This text related the negotiation process between the Chinese representative Mukedeng and the Korean representative Pak Kwŏn. Hong Set’ae (1653-1725) left Writings on Mt. Paektu (K. Paektusan ki). In this travelogue based on information from Kim Kyŏngmun (dates unknown), who climbed Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) together with Mukedeng, Hong described the situation in which the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker was erected. These documents describe clearly and concretely the process by which the boundary marker was erected. It is thus certain that the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker was located at the southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai).

The Korean historical map below, which was compiled in 1712, shows the boundary marker on Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) erected earlier that year. In this map, the boundary marker is clearly depicted as a headwater marker. Meanwhile, Mt. Sobaeck (Mt. Xiaobai), drawn as a separate peak to the southwest of the marker, is next to Taegak Peak and Yŏnji Peak.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 2: “China’s position, according to Yang, was that the Tumen River has three headwater streams, the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, and Hontu Shui, and that only the Hongdan Shui lies to the east of the original site of the 1712 marker, the direction in which the marker indicated that the Tumen River flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the Hongdan Shui should form the border. The Korean position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be recognized as the headwater stream, and form the border. In 1887, the Qing government proposed what Yang describes as a compromise, suggesting that another stream, the Shiyishui, known in Korean as the Sogul, be deemed the headwater stream of the Tumen River and form the boundary between the two countries. In 1889, with no agreement on which stream should be deemed the headwater stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered the erection of ten boundary markers, starting at the Shiyishui stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute went unresolved.” (CRS Memorandum, 8.)

PRC scholarship avers that Qing China erected ten border markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Sogol Stream (Shiyi Stream) soon after the 1887 Choson-Qing China Border Conference in order to prove the agreement of the two countries on the Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai)-Sogol Stream (Shiyi Stream) border. However, no official records from Qing China prove that these ten markers were erected. There is one record which indicates that a border-de-
marcation committee member petitioned the General of Jilin for placing ten border markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Musan area. Wu Luzhen (1880–1911), who was in charge of negotiations with Japan over Kando (Jiandao), conducted extensive research on border-related documents. His Yanji Border Issue Report (C. Yanji bianwu baogao) in 1908 states that the markers were prepared but not erected because Qing China and Chosŏn failed to reach agreement. There is no record of discussion of the placement of ten border markers in Korean documents, either. Qing China requested that another border conference be held in 1888. These three facts also support the view that ten boundary markers were not erected.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 3: “The Chapter ends with discussion of the 1909 treaty between China and Japan. Japan had by then Korea into a protectorate, and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ultimately recognized the Tumen River as forming part of the border between China and Korea. It also specifically agreed that this part of the border extended from the 1712 marker to the Shiyishui stream and along the stream to the Tumen River.” (CRS Memorandum, 8.)

PRC scholarship contends that the Tumen (Tumen) River border was determined in the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement of 1909. However, the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement is null and void on the grounds that it was concluded by Japan, which intended to occupy Manchuria, and without agreement from Chosŏn, the very government with the authority to discuss such a border issue. In relation to this, another difficult point in this Chinese argument stems from the exclusion of Chosŏn from involvement in this border issue. Moreover, Chosŏn raised the question of the Tumen (Tumen) River border in order to solve the issue of immigrants moving to the north of the Tumen River, whereas Japan raised the question by opening the Kando (Jiandao) Police Substation at Longjing (K. Yongjong) in 1907 for the purpose of invading Manchuria. However, this agreement was signed without the participation of the Korean government during the negotiations and based upon the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, which had forcibly deprived Chosŏn of its diplomatic rights.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 4: “In documenting China’s struggles in the 19th and 20th century to secure agreement that the Amnok (Yalu) and Tumen (Tumen) rivers form the border between China and Korea, Yang appears to signal a strong, continuing Chinese commitment to those river borders. From Yang’s account, China’s position on the stretch of territory between the Tumen and Yalu Rivers may be less clear. The issue is significant not for strategic reasons, but because the area in question is in the Changbai/Chosŏn’gul Mountains, which Chinese consider the mythical birthplace of the Manchu Emperors and which Koreans consider the birthplace of the Korean people.” (CRS Memorandum, 8-9.)

Although the Amnok (Yalu) and Tumen (Tumen) rivers formed the border between Chosŏn and Qing China from the seventeenth century, the drawing of the border at the headwater stream of the Tumen (Tumen) River had not been finalized. In 1712, Qing clarified the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border by erecting the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)
boundary marker at the watershed running from the foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). During the Choson-Qing China border conference in the 1880s and during the negotiations over the Kando (Jiandao) issue from 1907 to 1909, the Tuman (Tumen) River border was at the core of the controversy. Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) itself was not brought into the dispute. Insofar as the starting point of the border discussion was the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, it can be said that Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) has been the border between Korea and China since that time.

3. “Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,” in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland

In this section, too, direct quotations from the CRS Memorandum are followed by comment and discussion.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 5: “In 2003, the Northeast Project published Research on China’s Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a conference held a year earlier. The collection includes a revealing essay presenting a Chinese explanation for the new scholarly interest in the Gaogouli/Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In “Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,” author Jiang Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun Normal University, in China’s Jilin Province, insists that the research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against territorial claims to parts of the present-day PRC primarily from China’s ostensible ally, North Korea. Jiang writes that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese territory have been longstanding, but for many years, they took a back seat to the Chinese leadership’s insistence on the need to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and North Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the friendship has now frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns to be aired openly.” (CRS Memorandum, 9.)

Research by scholars in the PRC on the northeast region in the modern period began with Jin Yufu’s Dongbei tongshi (A History of the Chinese Northeast, 1943), which was published before the founding of the PRC, and did not originate in concerns about the DPRK, the PRC’s ally. Jin believed that territory is historically formed, thus expanding or diminishing over time. However, as PRC scholars promoted the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country in part so to revise the history of Koguryo, but inaccurately marked the current territory of the PRC as if it had been the territory of China in the past. However, no historical sources support this argument. This argument of scholars in the PRC may be a good example of how China has reduced and expanded the borders for political needs, but this interpretation ultimately is not accurate history.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 6: “Jiang charges that Korean efforts to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-historical justifications for Japan’s invasion of China. Japan, Jiang states, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and Koreans were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for Korea the ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekje, and Bohai/Balhae in order to provide historical cover for Japanese expansion into north-
east China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/Balhae kingdoms were particularly important because their territories extended well into areas of northeast China that Japan coveted.” (CRS Memorandum, 9–10.)

In the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese historians studied Koguryô history through the Manchuria-Chosôn view of northeast Asian history (J. Mansen shikan). This approach, which separated the history of Manchuria from those of the Chinese dynasties, juxtaposed Manchuria, Korea, and Japan in the same historical framework, which had been introduced for the ideological purposes of Japanese imperialism, and rationalized the occupation of Manchuria. Jin Yufu caught such intentions of Japanese scholarship and wrote, “Koguryô was a local polity of ancient China,” in order to stress that Manchuria and Chinese governments originally were a single historical community in the past. He also argued that the basic premise of research on Koguryô history should be predicated upon the exclusion of any political perspectives from the countries of China and Japan. Jin also wrote that Koguryô history should be seen only through historical facts.

Regarding the history of Koguryô, scholars in the Republic of Korea are agreed that a) the growth and development processes in Koguryô emerged from the struggles with the local administration of Han China and from the withdrawal of Chinese administration from the Koguryô area; b) Koguryô, as an independent state, had its own reign names and royal succession system; c) Koguryô established tributary relationships with both the Southern and Northern dynasties in China based upon its own interests; d) Koguryô created a unique culture by incorporating Chinese and Central Asian cultures into its traditional culture; e) Koguryô had a Koguryô-centered world view that differed from those of contemporary Chinese governments; and f) the war between Koguryô and Tang China in the 660s was not a civil war but rather a war between two countries. Academics in the PRC had acknowledged these facts regarding Koguryô’s history until the launch of the PRC government’s Northeast Project in 2002.

Having a history can occur only when later generations recognize that history as theirs, record that history, and have a clear sense of succession to that history. Considering this, attention must be paid to the fact that official records of traditional Chinese history have described Koguryô as a predecessor of Koryô since the History of Song (C. Songshi) was completed in the fourteenth century. As seen clearly in the Korean texts History of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk sagi) completed by Kim Pusik (1075–1151) in 1145 and Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk yusa) by Iryôn (1206–1289) in 1281, too, Korean historians in premodern times also depicted Koguryô as a central part of their history together with Paekche and Silla. The Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms presents the mythical leader Tangun of Old Chosôn as the founder of the Korean people, and Chumong, the founder of Koguryô, as the son of Tangun. That is, Korean historians in the Koryô period understood that their history flowed from Old Chosôn to Koguryô, and then to Koryô. That history subsequently continued from Koryô to Chosôn, a kingdom that was founded in 1392. This perception of historical succession is clearly reflected in the English names of the
two Koreas, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (The name “Korea” came from “Koryo.”)

From the CRS Memorandum, item 7: “Jiang reports that North Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 to gather materials about the ancient kingdoms. He names one such North Korean scholar, Ri Ji-rin (known in China as Li Zhilin), who spent five years at Beijing University, with the years unspecified. Jiang tells us that Ri’s Chinese advisor reported serious concerns about the direction of Ri’s work, but was ignored. Ri’s Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient Chinese rulers as having ‘invaded’ Korean territories, Jiang tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, became focused on ‘recovering lost lands’ from China.” (CRS Memorandum, 10.)

Based upon differences in the bronze relics and graves discovered in the Liaodong area from those found in the central plains of China, Ri Jirin argued that the center of Old Chosón was in the Liaodong region. (See Map 1, “The Territory of Old Chosón.”) He believed that Old Chosón territory extended across Liaodong and the northwestern Korean Peninsula, and at its peak reached the Daling River, which is west of the Liao River. However, Ri’s book, Kojosón yōngu (Studies in Old Chosón History), which was published in 1963, does not urge the recovery of the ancient territory of Old Chosón in the Liaodong region. Nevertheless, Ri’s adviser at Beijing University and Jiang Weidong understood his argument as being for the purpose of territorial recovery. Their views, however, were assumptions that applied a Chinese perspective to Ri’s research.

From the CRS Memorandum, item 8: “Jiang does not present any further information about North Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars are particularly fixated on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that shared their capital, Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to the Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri’s Peking University advisor as warning that while North Korean scholars’ desire to ‘recover lost lands’ might not now amount to anything, if such positions are not countered, North Koreans might in future generations ‘use this excuse to grab territory.’ Jiang reports approvingly that China’s government has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese and Korean scholarship on the ancient kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese scholarship on the ancient kingdoms.” (CRS Memorandum, 10.)

The PRC’s assertion that scholars in the Republic of Korea and the DPRK are studying Koguryo history in order to justify the future recovery of lost territory reveals a Chinese perspective in which the PRC government would in the future absorb the history of that area into Chinese territory. It would appear that scholars in the PRC seem to have considered an example from Japan, which developed the theory of the Imna Nihon-fu in order to rationalize a historical claim to territory in the Korean Peninsula. However, the basic perspective in the historical scholarship conducted by scholars in the Republic of Korea is that historical research should exclude political purposes and move forward based upon facts.
From the CRS Memorandum, item 9: “In an exhortation that may alarm China’s neighbors, especially South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his academic colleagues not to neglect research on the ancient Baiji/Paekje Kingdom, which once occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. ‘We must not abandon it because its territory is not in our possession today,’ Jiang writes. Jiang also urges his colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, saying, ‘We cannot, because it is the predecessor of a Korean nation today, overlook the fact that it was subordinate to us in the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].’” (CRS Memorandum, 10.)

Jiang Weidong believed that Paekche and Silla, like Koguryo, were subordinate to Chinese dynasties because these two southern Korean kingdoms had tributary relationships with Chinese governments. However, scholars in the Republic of Korea believe that the tribute system in pre-modern East Asia was an international order for diplomatic relations and one form of trade. Viewing the international order and diplomatic relations between China and neighboring countries in pre-modern East Asia through the logic of subordination and dominance in the imperialist age does not correspond with historical facts.

The CRS Memorandum makes the excellent point that Jiang contradicted his own argument regarding the defensive nature of the historical scholarship in the PRC when he urged his colleagues not to neglect research on several ancient kingdoms in the Korean Peninsula, including the kingdoms which had once ruled the southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula, far from the current border shared by the DPRK and the PRC.

CONCLUSION

The Review and Comments has offered a Korean perspective on the historical borders between Korea and China. As shown above, this analysis sometimes matches and sometimes differs from those presented in the PRC. The Northeast Asian History Foundation believes that ongoing open dialogue among Korean and Chinese scholars will enhance discussion and contribute to future research on border issues in history, and enable countries in Northeast Asia to continue moving forward toward peace and cooperation.
Map 1 shows the territory of Old Chosón, the earliest government in Korean history. It is believed that Old Chosón controlled a considerable area of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria (present-day Northeast China) in ancient times. It developed a polity which differed from and was independent of the Chinese dynasties at that time. As early as the third century BCE, its territory is believed to have concentrated in the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula.
Map 2 depicts Qin China’s borders before the collapse of Old Chosŏn in 108 BCE. P’aesu, generally considered to be the present-day Amnok River, formed the border between Old Chosŏn and Han China.
Map 3: The Territory of the Han Commanderies at the Time of the Collapse of Old Chosón (108 BCE)

Map 3 shows the territory of the Four Han Commanderies after Old Chosón's conquest by Han China in 108 BCE. These commanderies, including the Nangnang Commandery, were established in the former territory of Old Chosón. Most of the Han Chinese commanderies were pushed into the Liaodong Peninsula by resistance from local residents, and, as in the case of the Nangnang Commandery, cultural and political attitudes of the Chinese were assimilated into local areas.
Map 4 presents the situation in 106 CE when the Hyŏndo Commandery (C. Xuantu Commandery) was pushed into the Liaodong Peninsula while Koguryŏ controlled Manchuria and both sides of the Amnok (C. Yalu) River. In the eastern coastal area, Okchŏ and Eastern Ye (K. Dongye) emerged near Koguryŏ.
Map 5 shows the border with China at the time of Koguryo’s greatest expanse. Koguryo restored the territory of Old Choson by expelling the Nangnang (C. Lelang) Commandery in 313 and the Taebang (C. Daifang) Commandery in 314. During the reign of King Kwanggaet’o (r. 391–412), Koguryo’s western border reached the Liao River. Later, Koguryo conquered Puyo (C. Fuyu) in the Nongan (C. Nongan) area and constructed the Puyo fortress. Its northernmost border was thus established. Koguryo maintained this border until defeated in war in 668.
Map 6 shows the period when the Andong Commandery moved to the Liaodong Peninsula and the influence of Tang China had completely waned. The Silla-Tang China forces defeated Paekche in 660 and Koguryo in 668. Tang China established the ōngjin (C. Xiongnu) Commandery in the former territory of Paekche and the Andong (C. Andong) Commandery in the former territory of Koguryo. However, Tang China’s control over these two areas was for the stationing of troops. Paekche and Koguryo people fought against the Tang troops, and even Silla started to gradually control area formerly held by Tang China. Later, Silla established Soburi Province in the former Paekche territory in 671 in order to push out the ōngjin Commandery. The Andong Commandery relocated to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676. This situation forced Tang China to wield a limited control over the Liaodong Peninsula. Subsequently, the Korean Peninsula was governed by two countries, Silla and Parhae.
Map 7 shows the border between Parhae and Tang China in 698, the year Parhae was founded by former Koguryo people in the former territory of Koguryo, particularly in Manchuria. Part of Korean history, this country’s territory also included area in the Liaodong Peninsula. As an independent state, Parhae inherited history and culture from Koguryo. During the reign of King Son (r. 818–830), Parhae achieved its greatest expansion, facing Tang China along the Liao River and the Khitans west of the Liao River.
Map 8 traces territorial changes in the early Koryó period. Line I shows that in its early decades Koryó established local administration in the northern frontier area along the Taedong River and Wŏnsan Bay. Line II shows the Koryó-Khitans border around 1044. By this time, Koryó had secured the downstream area of the Amnok River, particularly the six garrison settlements east of the Amnok River, through warfare and negotiations with the Khitans. Line III highlights Koryó’s indirect control over the Jurchens after the border settlement with the Khitans.
Map 9 illustrates the borders of Koryŏ and the areas to the northeast that were under Koryŏ's indirect control in the late eleventh century. The black line marks the border and the red line marks the area where Koryŏ exercised indirect control over the Jurchens. In 1073, Koryŏ established fifteen garrison settlements up to the present-day Kyŏngsŏng area of northern Hamgyŏng Province, where resided Jurchen tribes that were either politically loyal to the Koryŏ court or generally submissive to Koryŏ authority.
Map 10 represents the northern frontier of Koryó during the Mongol Intervention of 1259–1356. Koryó concluded a truce with the Mongols after a war that lasted thirty years. The areas north of Ch’oll’yŏng, centering on the Ssangsŏng Commandery, were left under the direct control of the Mongols. Later, the region was restored through the military activities of King Kongmin (r. 1351–1374) in 1356.
Map 11 shows the border of Chosôn (1392–1910) in its first years. Subsequently, Chosôn expanded its northern frontier to the Amnok (Yalu) River in the northwest and to the coast of northern Hamgyông Province in the northeast. Meanwhile, in the fifteenth century, Ming China exerted direct influence over part of the Liaodong Peninsula. The border between Chosôn and Ming China was formed along the downstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River at that time. The Jurchens in contemporary Manchuria were largely independent of both Chosôn and Ming China.
Map 12 shows the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River border between Chosön and Ming China in the early Chosön period. During the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418–1450), Chosön built six garrisons after defeating several Jurchen communities in the Tuman (Tumen) River area and established four counties in the upstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River, thus setting the two rivers as its northern border. During this period, Ming China’s control over the area north of the Great Wall was limited to part of the Liaodong Peninsula. And, as shown in the map, Ming China shared its western border with Chosön in the downstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River.
GLOSSARY

KOREAN TERMS:

**Place Names and General Terms:**
- 1905 Protectorate Treaty
- Amnok River C. Yalu River
- Andong Commandery C. Andong duhufu
- Ch’ölyöng
- Chaeryöng River
- Chínbön Commandery C. Zhenfan-jun
- Chinhän
- Chosön 1392–1910
- Eastern Okchö
- Eastern Puyö
- Four Han Chinese Commanderies K. Hansagun
- four counties
- Hamgyöng Province
- Hamhüng Plain
- Hwanghae Province
- Hýondo Commandery C. Xuantü-jun
- Imtun Commandery C. Lintun-jun
- Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement
- kangwön marker headwater marker
- Kangwön Province
- Koguryö (C. Gaogouli) ?-668
- Koryö, 918–1392
- Mahan
- Malgals C. Mohe
- Map of Mount Paektu Boundary Marker
- Mt. Myöarak
- Mt. Paektu C. Changbai-shan,
- Mt. Paektu boundary marker
- Mt. Sobaek C. Mt. Xiaobai
- Musan
- Nangnang Commandery C. Lelang-jun
- Okchö
- Old Chosön (K. Kojosön)
- P’yôngyang
- Paekche C. Baiji, ?-660
- Parhae C. Bohai, 698–926
- Puyö C. Fuyu
- Pyönhan
- Records of the Northern Expedition K. Pukchöng rok
- History of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk sagi
- Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk yusa
- Silla C. Xinluo –935
- six garrisons
- Sögü River C. Shiyi Stream
- Ssangsöng Commandery C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu
- Susök t’ongyökkwan First Chinese-language Translator
- Suksin C. Sushen
- Taebang Commandery C. Taifang-jun
- Taedong River C. Datong-jiang
Taegak Peak
Taeryǒng River Long Wall C. Daning-jiang changcheng
Tongnyǒng Commandery C. Dongning-fu
Tumanent River C. Tumen River
Umnu
Úngjin Commandery C. Xiongjin dudufu
Wŏnsan Bay
Writings on Mt. Paektu K. Paektu-san ki
Ye
Yemaek
Yǒnji Peak

Personal Names:
Hong Set’ae 1653–1725
Iryoˇn 1206–1289
Kim Chinam 1654–1718
Kim Kyongmun dates unknown
Kim Pusik 1075–1151
King Changsu, of Koguryǒ r. 413–491
King Kongmin, of Koryŏ r. 1351–1374
King Kwanggaet’o, of Koguryǒ r. 391–412
King Mu, of Parhae r. 719–737
King Mun, of Parhae r. 737–793
King Sejong, of Chosǒn r. 1418–1450
King Sŏn, of Parhae r. 818–830
Park K wn 1658–1715
Ri Jirin
Yun Kwan d. 1111

Chinese Terms:

Biography of Meng Tian C. Mengtian liezhuan
Book of Wei C. Wei shu
Dongyi “eastern barbarians”
Eastern Han China
Gaoyi people
General of Jilin
Heilongjiang Province
History of Song C. Songshi
History of the Three Kingdoms C. Sanguo zhi
Jiando K. Kando
Jieshi
Jilin Province
Left Jianzhou Commandery C. Jianzhou zuowei
Liaodong River
Liaoning Province
Liaoyang
Longjing K. Yongjong,
Ming China 1368–1644
Mo people
Nuergan Regional Military Commission C. Nuergan dusi
Pullae
Qin China 221 BCE–206 BCE
Jin China 1115–1234
Qing China 1644–1910
Records of the Grand Historian C. Shiji
Shu China, 221–263
Tang China 618–960
*Treatise on the Xiongnu* C. Xiongnu liezhuan
“unified multi-ethnic country” C. tongyi de duominzu guojia,
Wei China 220–265
Western Han China BCE 206–CE 8
Wu China 229–280
Yan China
Yanji Border Issue Report C. Yanji bianwu baogao

**Personal Names:**

- Jin Yufu 1887–1962
- Sima Qian circa 145 BCE or 135 BCE–86 BCE
- Mukedeng 1664–1735
- Jiang Weidong
- Wu Luzhen 1880–1911
- Yang Zhaoquan

**Other Terms:**

- Didouyu
- Jurchens
- Kara Khitan
- Kumoxi
- Liao 916–1125
- Manchuria-Chosŏn View of Northeast Asian History J. Mansen-
- Shi kan
- Primorsky region
- Rouran
- Theory of the Imna Nihon-fu
- Wa

**Periodization of Korean History**

- Old Chosŏn (K. Kojosŏn) ?–BCE 108
- Paekche ?–660
- The Three KingdomsKoguryŏ ?–668
- Silla ?–935
- Parhae 698–926
- Koryŏ 918–1392
- Chosŏn 1392–1910
APPENDIX IV.—“READING CURRENT & FUTURE COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES: NEW INSIGHTS INTO DPRK REGIME DYNAMICS” JOHN S. PARK, PH.D., NOVEMBER 27, 2012

Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves:
New Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics

November 27, 2012

John S. Park, Ph.D.

Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT
Associate, Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School
AGENDA

I. Communist Party of China + Workers' Party of Korea

II. Beijing's Sunshine Policy with Chinese Characteristics – A Game Changer?

III. Reading the Commercial Tea Leaves – Implications

I. CHINA TAILORS ITS FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES TO NE ASIA
   Centrality of Xiaokang in PRC's Foreign Policy Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRC’s Guiding Foreign Policy Principles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Primary Principles:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cooperation and participation in multilateral institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Sentences Comprise PRC’s DPRK Policy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-proliferation in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Peaceful settlement through dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Peace &amp; stability on the Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Need to give necessary consideration to DPRK’s security concerns</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Xiaokang: Core Focus of these Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 2 Primary Principles &amp; the 4 Sentences are intended to further Xiaokang goals by fostering the development of the following essential factors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A stable external environment for focusing on internal economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extensive &amp; deep relations with U.S. as a pillar for PRC economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although the “Four Sentences” comprise Beijing’s long-term approach to the Korean Peninsula &amp; remain unaltered, the means for achieving these objectives have changed — Beijing has become more proactive &amp; entrepreneurial in behavior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## I. CHINA'S PARALLEL TRACK WITH NORTH KOREA

*Fostering Sustainable Stability in the Northeast Asia Security Environment*

**Sustainable PRC Econ Dev**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means A:</th>
<th>Means B:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Bolstering DPRK regime stability with PRC political capital</td>
<td>• Promoting DPRK resource development for mutual benefit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foundation:**
Stabilizing North Korea is a fundamental external element to working towards PRC's sustainable economic development goals

*We shouldn’t be surprised by this separate, parallel Sino-DPRK track. PRC, like all countries, is seeking to further its national interests*

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## I. A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP:

**Communist Party of China (CPC) - Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Ties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Events</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1949</td>
<td><em>China and North Korea establish diplomatic relations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1950</td>
<td><em>China intervenes in the Korean War</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1992</td>
<td><em>China and South Korea establish diplomatic relations as part of Seoul's Nordpolitik</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2005</td>
<td><em>Vice Premier Wu Yi attends 60th anniversary celebrations in Pyongyang of founding of the WPK. Wu is accompanied by Commerce Minister Bo Xilai</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP:

**CPC - WPK Ties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Events</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td>• Premier Wen Jiabao attends 60th anniversary of founding of bilateral relations. Unique delegation accompanies him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>• Kim Jong-il &amp; Jang Song-taek meet with current (Hu, Wen) &amp; future (Xi, Li) CPC leaders in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2010</td>
<td>• Kim Jong-il &amp; Hu Jintao meet in Changchun, Jilin Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2011</td>
<td>• Kim Jong-il tours China’s economic development zones &amp; meets with Hu Jintao</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• PRC delegation presents a “comprehensive relationship.” Visit is culmination of efforts to restore CPC-WPK ties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Meeting occurs during height of post- Cheonan sinking period. Acceleration of DPRK leadership succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unfinished business from May visit is completed by Kim &amp; Hu. “Rising generation of Party” = Kim Jong-eun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Kim Jong-il seeks food aid; also pol &amp; econ support for succession of Kim Jong-eun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. PREMIER WEN’S DELEGATION DEEPENED THIS STRATEGIC COMMERCIAL BOND

Premier Wen’s October 2009 delegation leveraged CPC-WPK ties to deepen bilateral commercial relationship for mutual benefit. Beijing shored up stability of Kim Jong-il regime & Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK natural resources — inputs which will significantly aid sustainable economic development of PRC’s three northeastern provinces

**Internal Economic Development**

- PRC leadership’s goal of US$3,000/capita by 2020 has been attained ahead of schedule
- A core criterion of sustainable development is a stable external environment on its borders
- PRC concerned that sudden collapse of DPRK regime (from escalation or implosion) would result in regional instability
- Sino-DPRK trade & investment have strong synergies — PRC inputs drive chronically underdeveloped DPRK mineral resources sector

**No Linkage with Denuclearization**

- PRC econ dev engagement of DPRK occurring on a track separate from denuclearization process
- Increasing access to subsistence food & inputs are primary ways for PRC to maintain DPRK stability
- Vice Premier Wu Yi signed major trade deal with North Korea on 60th anniversary of KWP in Pyongyang (10/10/05) — re-affirmed on President Hu Jintao’s visit (10/30/05)
- Premier Wen’s 10/2009 visit launched important “tourism, education, econ development” deals

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1. The Organism — Understanding North Korea, Inc

**North Korea, INC**

- Through North Korea, INC — a network of state trading companies (STCs) affiliated to KWP, KPA, and Cabinet — regime derives funds to maintain loyalty of elites and to provide a mechanism through which different groups can generate funds for operating budgets
- While DPRK remains an opaque country, we now have greater access to unique defectors with following characteristics — prior experience working in DPRK state trading companies
- In post-Kim Jong-il period, new collective leadership will have to generate RMB on a recurring basis to stay in power. \[ P = R - C \] (Profit = Revenues – Costs)
I. NORTH KOREA, INC

SOURCE: Interviews with DPRK defectors

II. BEIJING'S SUNSHINE POLICY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

What are the PRC Characteristics?

- Beijing's SP much brighter than Seoul's earlier version — entire border region & mineral resources
- It increasingly radiates on PRC mainland — KPA firms very active
- Massive investment of political capital by CPC into WPK for institution-building
- No direct linkage between joint econ dev projects and short-term DPRK denuclearization activities
- No foreseeable time limit — PRC leadership won't be voted out

What are the Key Side Effects?

- ROK: Looming debate between conservatives and progressives on "Who Lost North Korea?"
- U.S.: DPRK is increasingly complex 3rd party issue in evolving Sino-U.S. relations. Pressuring PRC to rein in its DPRK ally has not worked
- Russia: Seeking to catch up to Beijing's Sunshine Policy
- DPRK: Beijing's SP similar to bailout package. What strings are attached to this package? How will the post-transition DPRK leadership deal with these strings?
II. DPRK REGIME STABILITY – THE CHINA FACTOR

While financial sanctions continue to dominate U.S. approach to dealing with DPRK, PRC companies have been deepening their interactions with DPRK state trading companies operating inside China.

II. CHINA-DPRK TRADE vs. INTER-KOREAN TRADE (1993-2011)

Sino-DPRK trade has dramatically increased from $970 million in 1993 to $5.6 billion in 2011 – far outpacing inter-Korean trade. Commercial air routes / Ports / Multi-lane highways = Dual-use transportation technology.

SOURCE: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, Korea International Trade Association, ROK Ministry of Unification
III. THE GOLDEN RULE: P = R – C
The Key Framework to Assess Internal DPRK Regime Dynamics

What's Change for North Koreans, INC?

- Dominant constraint for North Koreans in realizing fundamental regime stability has been inability to rebuild its economy. Lack of basic infrastructure (economic, transportation, electricity) resulted in inability to tame cost structure. **No Rebuilding = No Economic Reform**

- What's different now is **China factor.** DPRK state trading companies are increasingly operating inside PRC. In practice, that enables DPRK firms to **free-ride** extensive PRC infrastructure, thereby taming cost structure. **Monetization of CPC-WPK political deals = DPRK stability**

Universal Mechanics

- Profit = Revenues – Costs
- Irrespective of healthy revenues, most commercial ventures fail because of dramatic spikes in cost structure

III. READING THE DPRK-PRC COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES (I)

Pros for:

- Ability to piggyback off of economic, transportation & electricity infrastructure – foundations of econ development

Cons for:

- Political risk of CPC changing its policy – clampdowns, restrictions
- Demise of key CPC patrons
- Prey to PRC private partners

Inside:

- Ability to control political & commercial terms with PRC partner

Inside:

- Lack of E, T & E infrastructure – limits scale of Joint Venture projects
- Increasing difficulty containing spread of info about where money from JV projects go
III. READING THE DPRK-PRC COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES (II)

**Pros for:**
- Ability to control political element but more limited b/c current CPC prioritizes DPRK regime stability
- Ability to develop leverage with key DPRK elite groups
- DPRK illicit activities (drugs, counterfeiting) breeds criminal activities among PRC groups

**Cons for:**
- Virtual monopoly on massive potential of mining sector & access to deep-sea ports
- Risk of DPRK partner suddenly changing terms of contracts & agreements
- Lack of rule of law leaves no avenue for addressing disputes – PRC firm exits

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III. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF PRC’s DPRK-FOCUSED COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY ON WASHINGTON & SEOUL?

**Significance of PRC-DPRK Accords**
- PRC seeking to apply more of its growing commercial capabilities in addressing the greatest threat to Northeast Asian stability — North Korea variable
- PRC remains committed to DPRK denuclearization (D), but recognizes that DPRK will need a comprehensive partner first for stability (S): S > D
- ROK & U.S. adamant that D comes first. (U.S. ’North Korea policy = 2 conditions + a policy tool)

**Consequence for Washington & Seoul**
- PRC’s following investments have significantly enhanced DPRK regime stability:
  1) Political investment in future generation of WPK
  2) Commercial investments in DPRK via PRC SOE + DPRK state trading co. JVs = PRT
- PRC’s deepening comprehensive relationship (Positive Security Assurance) with DPRK reduces appeal of conditional concessions from U.S. & ROK
KEY CONSEQUENCES & POLICY IMPLICATIONS

#1
PRC’s evolving DPRK policy constitutes one of two pillars in its “balanced Korean Peninsula” approach. Highly unlikely PRC will deviate from this approach & select one Korea over the other — even if there’s a future DPRK provocation. PRC = Please Remain Calm

#2
PRC has realized major progress in CPC-WPK track & bolstered DPRK regime stability. Incisive PRC-DPRK “education, tourism & development” deals facilitate economic ties. In 2010. Liu Hongcai (PRC ambassador) & Ri Yong-hang (DPRK foreign trade minister) signed economic & technical cooperation accord

#3
CPC-WPK ties deepening while US implements financial sanctions & bolsters U.S.-ROK military posture. Unintended consequence? DPRK more dependent on PRC during DPRK leadership consolidation process. We’ll see more balancing of power between military & WPK. Key question for U.S. — go after PRC firms?

KEY CONSEQUENCES & POLICY IMPLICATIONS (II)

#4
While there is much speculation about post-Kim leadership, a basic fact that will confront the new leader(s) is the challenge of running North Korea, INC & generating funds — we now have an evaluation criteria. Will Kim Jong-un be able to develop the necessary capabilities to sustainability run North Korea, INC?

#5
Deepening CPC-WPK relationship has significant impact on prospects for Korean reunification. In next stage, inter-Korean relations will play out more inside PRC. ROK is building more factories in PRC targeting “globalizing PRC economy.” DPRK is conducting more North Korea, INC activities inside PRC

#6
This trend is leading to parallel realities for both ROK & DPRK: (1) status quo of divided Korean Peninsula with periodic military clashes & (2) peaceful coexistence inside PRC while conducting respective commercial activities with PRC & other foreign partners. For DPRK, revenues generated in PRC bolster regime stability