

## S. 1635: Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act, FY 2016

### Sections Relevant to North Korea Policy

*On April 28, 2016, the Senate unanimously passed a [State Department Authorization bill](#), an important piece of legislation authorizing and providing guidance to U.S. diplomatic activities. As of May 2016, the legislation has not yet been taken up by the House. Sections pertaining to North Korea are excerpted below.*

#### SEC. 104. INTERAGENCY HOSTAGE RECOVERY COORDINATOR.

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall designate an existing Federal officer to coordinate efforts to secure the release of United States persons who are hostages of hostile groups or state sponsors of terrorism. For purposes of carrying out the duties described in paragraph (2), such officer shall have the title of “Interagency Hostage Recovery Coordinator”.

(2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall have the following duties:

(A) Coordinate and direct all activities of the Federal Government relating to each hostage situation described in paragraph (1) to ensure efforts to secure the release of all hostages in the hostage situation are properly resourced and correct lines of authority are established and maintained.

(B) Establish and direct a fusion cell consisting of appropriate personnel of the Federal Government with purview over each hostage situation described in paragraph (1).

(C) Develop a strategy to keep family members of hostages described in paragraph (1) informed of the status of such hostages and inform such family members of updates, procedures, and policies that do not compromise the national security of the United States.

(b) **LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY.**—The authority of the Interagency Hostage Recovery Coordinator shall be limited to hostage cases outside the United States.

(c) **QUARTERLY REPORT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—On a quarterly basis, the Coordinator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the members of Congress described in paragraph (2) a report that includes a summary of each hostage situation described in sub-section (a)(1) and efforts to secure the release of all hostages in such hostage situation.

(2) **MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DESCRIBED.**—The members of Congress described in this subparagraph are, with respect to a United States person hostage covered by a report under paragraph (1), the Senators representing the State, and the Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives representing the district, where a hostage described in subsection (a)(1) resides.

(3) **FORM OF REPORT.**—Each report under this subsection may be submitted in classified or unclassified form.

(d) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the Federal Government to negotiate with a state sponsor of terrorism or an organization that the Secretary has designated as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ([8 U.S.C. 1189](#)) or any other hostage-takers.

(e) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **HOSTILE GROUP.**—The term “hostile group” means—

(A) a group that is designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ([8 U.S.C. 1189\(a\)](#));

(B) a group that is engaged in armed conflict with the United States; or

(C) any other group that the President determines to be a hostile group for purposes of this paragraph.

(2) **STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.**—The term “state sponsor of terrorism”—

(A) means a country the government of which the Secretary has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, to be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and

(B) includes North Korea.

**SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-CHINA STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC DIALOGUE REVIEW.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, and in consultation with other departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall—

(1) conduct a review of the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (referred to in this section as the “Dialogue”); and

(2) submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the findings of such review.

(b) **CONTENTS.**—The report described in subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a list of all commitments agreed to by the United States and China at each of the first 6 rounds of meetings;

(2) an assessment of the status of each commitment agreed to by the United States and China at each of the first 6 rounds of meetings, including a detailed description of—

(A) any actions that have been taken with respect to such commitments;

(B) any aspects of such commitments that remain unfulfilled; and

(C) any actions that remain necessary to fulfill any unfulfilled commitments described in subparagraph (B);

(3) an assessment of the effectiveness of the Dialogue in achieving and fulfilling significant commitments on United States priorities in the bilateral relationship, including—

(A) the security situation in the East and South China Seas, including a peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in the region;

(B) denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;

(C) cybertheft of United States intellectual property;

(D) the treatment of political dissidents, media representatives, and ethnic and religious minorities;

(E) reciprocal treatment of United States journalists and academics in China, including issuance of visas;

(F) expanding investment and trade opportunities for United States businesses;

(G) repatriation of North Korean refugees from China to North Korea; and

(H) promoting and protecting rule of law and democratic institutions in Hong Kong; and

(4) recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the Dialogue in achieving and fulfilling significant commitments on United States priorities described in paragraph (3), including consideration of the use of predetermined benchmarks for assessing whether the commitments achieved are significantly furthering such priorities.

...SEC. 114. **SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE UNITED STATES ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN.**

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the alliance between the United States and Japan is a cornerstone of peace, security, and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world;

(2) Prime Minister Shiuzo Abe's visit to the United States in April 2015 and historic address to a Joint Session of Congress symbolized the strength and importance of ties between the United States and Japan;

(3) in 2015, which marks 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States and Japan continue to strengthen the alliance and work together to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world;

(4) the Governments and people of the United States and Japan share values, interests, and capabilities that have helped to build a strong rules-based international order, based on a commitment to rules, norms and institutions;

(5) the revised Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation and Japan's policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" will reinforce deterrence, update the roles and missions of the United States and Japan, enable Japan to expand its contributions to regional and global security, and allow the United States Government and the Government of Japan to enhance cooperation on security issues in the region and beyond;

(6) the United States remain resolute in its commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any armed attack in the territories under the administration of Japan;

(7) although the United States Government does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they are under the administration of Japan and opposes any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such administration;

(8) the United States Government reaffirms that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect the United States acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands;

(9) the United States Government and the Government of Japan continue to work together on common security interests, including to confront the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(10) the United States Government and the Government of Japan remain committed to ensuring maritime security and respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight; and

(11) the United States Government and the Government of Japan continue to oppose the use of coercion, intimidation, or force to change the status quo, including in the East and South China Seas.

**...SEC. 116. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE UNITED STATES ALLIANCE WITH THE  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA.**

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea has served as an anchor for stability, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific region, and around the world;

(2) the United States and the Republic of Korea continue to strengthen and adapt the bilateral, regional, and global scope of the comprehensive strategic alliance between the 2 nations, to serve as a linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing the shared values of democracy, human rights, free and open markets, and the rule of law, as reaffirmed in the May 2013 “Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America”;

(3) the United States and the Republic of Korea continue to broaden and deepen the alliance by strengthening the combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula, enhancing mutual security based on the Republic of Korea-United States Mutual Defense Treaty, and promoting cooperation for regional and global security in the 21st century;

(4) the United States and the Republic of Korea share deep concerns that the nuclear, cyber, and ballistic missiles programs of North Korea and its repeated provocations pose grave threats to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and recognize that both nations are determined to achieve the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea and remain fully committed to continuing close cooperation on the full range of issues related to North Korea;

(5) the United States and the Republic of Korea are particularly concerned that the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of North Korea, including North Korean efforts to miniaturize their nuclear technology and improve the mobility of their ballistic missiles, have gathered significant momentum and are poised to expand in the coming years;

(6) the Republic of Korea has made progress in enhancing future warfighting and interoperability capabilities by taking steps toward procuring Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, and RQ-4 Global Hawk Surveillance Aircraft;

(7) the United States supports the vision of a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, free from the fear of war, and peacefully reunited on the basis of democratic and free market principles, as articulated in President Park's address in Dresden, Germany; and

(8) the United States and the Republic of Korea share the future interests of both nations in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

...SEC. 141. **SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPOSITION OF  
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF KOREA.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (in this section referred to as the “DPRK”) tested nuclear weapons on 3 separate occasions, in October 2006, in May 2009, and in February 2013.

(2) Nuclear experts have reported that the DPRK may currently have as many as 20 nuclear warheads and has the potential to possess as many as 100 warheads within the next 5 years.

(3) According to the 2014 Department of Defense report, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (in this subsection referred to as the “2014 DoD report”), the DPRK has proliferated nuclear technology to Libya via the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.

(4) According to the 2014 DoD report, “North Korea also provided Syria with nuclear reactor technology until 2007.”.

(5) On September 6, 2007, as part of “Operation Orchard”, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the suspected nuclear facility in Syria.

(6) According to the 2014 DoD report, “North Korea has exported conventional and ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical assistance to countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.”.

(7) On November 29, 1987, DPRK agents planted explosive devices onboard Korean Air flight 858, which killed all 115 passengers and crew on board.

(8) On March 26, 2010, the DPRK fired upon and sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 of her crew.

(9) On November 23, 2010, the DPRK shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing 4 South Korean citizens.

(10) On February 7, 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in DPRK (in this subsection referred to as the “Commission of Inquiry”) released a report detailing the atrocious human rights record of the DPRK.

(11) Dr. Michael Kirby, Chair of the Commission of Inquiry, stated on March 17, 2014, “The Commission of Inquiry has found systematic, widespread, and grave human rights violations occurring in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It has also found a disturbing array of crimes against humanity. These crimes are committed against inmates of political and other prison camps; against starving populations; against religious believers; against persons who try to flee the country—including those forcibly repatriated by China.”.

(12) Dr. Michael Kirby also stated, “These crimes arise from policies established at the highest level of the State. They have been committed, and continue to take place in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, because the policies, institutions, and patterns of impunity that lie at their heart remain in place. The gravity, scale, duration, and nature of the unspeakable atrocities committed in the country reveal a totalitarian State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.”.

(13) The Commission of Inquiry also notes, “Since 1950, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has engaged in the systematic abduction, denial of repatriation, and subsequent enforced disappearance of persons from other countries on a large scale and as a matter of State policy. Well over 200,000 persons, including children, who were brought from other countries to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may have become victims of enforced disappearance,” and states that the DPRK has failed to account or address this injustice in any way.

(14) According to reports and analysis from organizations such as the International Network for the Human Rights of North Korean Overseas Labor, the Korea Policy Research Center, NK Watch, the Asian Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for International and Strategic Studies, and the George W. Bush Institute, there may currently be as many as 100,000 North Korean overseas laborers in various nations around the world.

(15) Such forced North Korean laborers are often subjected to harsh working conditions under the direct supervision of DPRK officials, and their salaries contribute to anywhere from \$150,000,000 to \$230,000,000 a year to the DPRK state coffers.

(16) According to the Director of National Intelligence’s 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in East Asia.”.

(17) The Worldwide Threat Assessment states, “North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, ranging from close-range ballistic

missiles to ICBMs, while continuing to conduct test launches. In 2014, North Korea launched an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles.”.

(18) On December 19, 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation declared that the DPRK was responsible for a cyberattack on Sony Pictures conducted on November 24, 2014.

(19) From 1988 to 2008, the DPRK was designated by the United States Government as a state sponsor of terrorism.

(20) The DPRK is currently in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013).

(21) The DPRK repeatedly violated agreements with the United States and the other so-called Six-Party Talks partners (the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China) designed to halt its nuclear weapons program, while receiving significant concessions, including fuel, oil, and food aid.

(22) The Six-Party Talks have not been held since December 2008.

(23) On May 9, 2015, the DPRK claimed that it has test-fired a ballistic missile from a submarine.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the DPRK represents a serious threat to the national security of the United States and United States allies in East Asia and to international peace and stability, and grossly violates the human rights of its own people;

(2) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury should impose additional sanctions against the DPRK, including targeting its financial assets around the world, specific designations relating to human rights abuses, and a redesignation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror; and

(3) the President should not resume the negotiations with the DPRK, either bilaterally or as part of the Six-Party Talks, without strict preconditions, including that the DPRK—

(A) adhere to its denuclearization commitments outlined in the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks;

(B) commit to halting its ballistic missile programs and its proliferation activities;

(C) cease military provocations; and

(D) measurably and significantly improve its human rights record.