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ABSTRACT

The quest to regularize US-DPRK relations has proved extremely complex and time-consuming. Initially the effort, which dates from 1992, centered on the road map spelled out in the October 1994 bilateral Agreed Framework. While one of the goals of the accord was to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, this was actually one of five US prerequisites for the normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations with North Korea. One of the most successful undertakings in building cooperation and mutual trust was the US Army-Korean People’s Army Joint Recovery Operations of 1996-2005. The Bush administration of 1989-93 had made recovery of the remains of US military personnel missing in action from the Korean War one of its priorities for the normalization of relations. Earlier, the US Senate had established its Select Committee on prisoners of war and missing in action to promote the effort regarding those missing in all wars. This paper reviews the history of the US Army’s effort in North Korea between 1996 and 2005, and assesses its diplomatic, political and military consequences as they relate to the normalization of US-DPRK relations.

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1 FINDING CORPORAL LEBOEUF

It took the United States (US) government 46 years to find Corporal Lawrence LeBoeuf. On a hot and humid day late in July 1996, an ageing North Korean farmer led a small group of North Korean and American soldiers across a lush green mountain ridge to a shallow grave southwest of Unsan, in North P'yŏngan province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). A century earlier an American company had won exclusive rights to mine the still produc-
tive gold mine at Unsan. Sixty years later, on a November morning in 1950 some 20 miles south of the China-DPRK border, bugles blared as thousands of Chinese People’s Volunteers rushed up the ridge toward advance elements of the US Eighth Army. The corporal was one of some 800 American soldiers who died in the ensuing battle.

The farmer, a teenager in 1950, followed his father’s instructions and buried LeBoeuf in his fox hole where he had died. We collected the corporal’s remains, including his blond hair, confirmed his identification, and later his family was notified in Brooklyn, New York.

The search for Corporal LeBoeuf and his fellow soldiers achieved impressive results between 1996 and May 2005, but then the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld abruptly and unilaterally ended the effort. Presented here are merely the endeavor’s beginning and more apparent accomplishments. Eventually, it must be hoped, a fuller account will materialize.

2 ERASING THE PAST

Finding Corporal LeBoeuf was part of a complex US-DPRK effort to erase the legacy of mutual hatred and mistrust lingering from the Korean War (1950-53), with the aim of normalizing relations. The October 1994 bilateral Agreed Framework, the two nations’ first diplomatic agreement, aspired to do much more than halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Most students of the 1994 Agreed Framework have focused on the negotiations that produced the accord and the subsequent international effort to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea. In actual fact, ending North Korea’s nuclear programs was but one of five prerequisites for achieving normal relations. This focus and the passage of time have dimmed memories that the accord served primarily as a road map for achieving the normalization of US-DPRK relations.

When the agreement was being formulated, both sides recognized that successful implementation required more than words on paper. Unlike agreements between the US and other former enemies, Americans and North Koreans shared nothing but a legacy of killing and quarreling. The authors of the framework knew that building trust and fostering co-operation were imperative for the success of the accord and to sustain peace on the Korean peninsula. They built into it a se-
This study aims to begin broadening our perspective of the Agreed Framework beyond its nuclear aspects and to clarify its ultimate goal: normal relations between the US and the DPRK.

3 SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

Prior to the Agreed Framework negotiations, the sole regular channel of bilateral communication from 1951 to 1992 had been the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) created by the Korean War armistice of 1953. Meetings of the MAC convened in P’anmunjom, a village in the Demilitarized Zone that became the de facto border between North and South Korea. There representatives of the United Nations Command (UNC), mostly US military personnel, frequently clashed with their counterparts from the North Korean People’s Army (KPA). These meetings were not negotiating sessions, nor did they make any effort to end the Korean War. Rather they continued it by using words and propaganda.

Real diplomatic communication between the US and the DPRK commenced after 1988 when what was called the ‘Beijing channel’ opened. It facilitated limited bilateral diplomatic communication in the hope of resolving problems before they escalated into confrontation. But it was not until January 1992 that diplomats from the two sides finally sat face to face to discuss their nations’ differences. This meeting on 22 January 1992 in New York City brought together ranking officials from both sides for a single day to exchange views on what each side wanted the other to do before bilateral relations could be normalized.

The US listed five preconditions for the normalization of relations. The DPRK should:

• end the nuclear program,
• continue the South-North Korea dialogue,
• facilitate the recovery of American military remains from the Korean War,
• cease the export of ballistic missiles,
• renounce publicly reliance on international terrorism.
All but the export of ballistic missiles became core elements of the Agreed Framework.


A second major step toward improved relations followed when diplomats again met in New York in June 1993 to negotiate a halt to North Korea’s threatened withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Evidence collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during its first inspection of the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear research center in June 1992 and US satellite photographs taken in August 1992 had strongly indicated that North Korea was attempting to hide the truth about its earlier plutonium production. At issue were North Korea’s compliance with its promises under the NPT, its pledges under the Joint South-North Korea Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (December 1992) and its ability to build a plutonium nuclear bomb.

Persistent diplomacy failed to induce North Korean co-operation. The IAEA, responsible for implementation of the NPT, at the end of February 1993 determined that the DPRK must submit to a ‘special’ inspection of its nuclear facilities. On 11 March, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT at the end of the mandatory 90-day waiting period. A crisis ensued until North Korea agreed to engage in negotiations with the US. These yielded the June agreement that ‘suspended’ the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT and enabled the negotiations to continue, culminating in two important developments: the first joint statement and the establishment of the ‘New York’ channel.

The 11 June 1993 US-DPRK Joint Statement formed the foundation of the Agreed Framework. It committed both sides to exchanging concessions of equivalent value. North Korea agreed to ‘suspend’ its withdrawal from the NPT and to maintain ‘full scope nuclear safeguards’ under IAEA monitoring. The US on its side promised not to use or threaten to use armed force against the DPRK. At the same time, the New York channel was opened to facilitate direct communication between the Department of State in Washington DC and the DPRK mission to the United Nations in New York. Originally it consisted of telephone and fax communication between the mission and
the author, then North Korea affairs officer in the State Department’s Office of Korea Affairs.

A third significant step came on 24 August 1993, when US Air Force Major General Nels Running, representing the United Nations (UN), and his North Korean counterpart, Major General Ri Dok Gyu, representing the KPA, signed the Agreement on Remains-related Matters (see below, Section 6). The fourth major step materialized in February 1994 when Thomas Hubbard, deputy assistant secretary of state, and Ho Jong, the DPRK’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, reached the Agreed Conclusions. These formalized the process of ‘simultaneous steps’ by both sides when implementing their bilateral agreements. The process required both sides to act at the same time when exchanging concessions of equivalent value. The aim was to gradually build trust and confidence. For North Korea, ‘simultaneous steps’ remain a fundamental principle regarding its relationship with the US. The latter, however, assigned waning significance to the concept after the Clinton administration left office in January 2001.

These four elements initiated the process of creating trust and cooperation. Also established prior to signing of the Agreed Framework was both sides’ commitment to allowing the State Department and the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to play the lead roles in bilateral communication and the improvement of relations. Soon elements of the US Department of Defense and the KPA would take issue with this premise.

4 IMPLEMENTING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

Once the Agreed Framework had been finalized in October 1994, implementation began hesitantly with a series of simultaneous steps:

- The DPRK froze all activity at its Yongbyon nuclear research center;
- it allowed US nuclear experts to visit the center and to negotiate an accord to facilitate the placement of 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods in long-term storage under IAEA monitoring;
- the US was to ship 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as compensation for the latter shutting down the five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon;
the US undertook to host negotiations about opening diplomatic liaison offices in each other’s capital;
the US undertook to begin phasing out selected economic sanctions on North Korea;
the UNC and the KPA undertook to negotiate an agreement to facilitate the recovery of the remains of American soldiers missing in action in the Korean War.

Robert Gallucci, the then US chief negotiator and assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs assumed responsibility for overall co-ordination of the US effort and formed teams to implement various aspects of the agreement. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of Energy were to oversee the spent fuel project at Yŏngbyŏn. The State Department’s Korea desk was to handle the liaison office issue. Implementation of the 24 August 1993 accord on recovery of the missing in action (MIA) was to be in the hands of the Defense Department’s Prisoners of War (POW) and Missing in Action Office (DPMO), the UNC, and the US Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI).

From the beginning, the DPRK jumped ahead of the US when it came to carrying out ‘simultaneous steps’. Within two weeks of the signing of the Agreed Framework, the US spent fuel team was able to visit Yŏngbyŏn, confirm that the nuclear reactor had been shut down, and negotiate the outline for an agreement on storage of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. Meanwhile, the IAEA resumed monitoring activities at the center.

The US, however, struggled with funding shortages and bureaucratic turf battles. This delayed for almost one year initiation of the spent fuel storage operation and prevented regular deliveries of heavy fuel oil for two years. The spent fuel project proved much more difficult to carry out than anticipated, but the lack of funds also impeded progress and it was not completed until late 1997.

North Korean confidence in US commitment to the Agreed Framework further eroded when the US failed to supply the heavy fuel oil on a timely and regular basis. From the beginning, the US was unable to fulfill its promises in this regard. Although the US formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in March 1995 to provide the fuel oil and to construct the two nuclear reactors promised to the DPRK in the Agreed Framework, the State Department had responsibility for collecting funds for KEDO and its
heavy fuel oil shipments. The lack of money for the purchases and shipments seriously impeded the program until South Korea assumed responsibility for KEDO funding in 1998.

Liaison office negotiations began on a positive note early in December 1994, but soon encountered debilitating problems. Both sides hammered out an agreement in principle. When the US insisted that its diplomats should travel between Seoul and Pyongyang via P’anmunjŏm, the MFA could only promise to do its best to convince the North Korean army to allow this. On 17 December 1994, the day of the MFA delegation’s return to Pyongyang, a US Army helicopter pilot strayed repeatedly into North Korean air space. Lacking means of communication with the US army, the KPA shot down the helicopter, killing its pilot and capturing the passenger. Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Hubbard traveled to Pyongyang to resolve the incident and signed a written apology. The incident stymied progress on opening liaison offices. Late in 1995 it was agreed that the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang would represent the US, while the DPRK Mission to the UN would serve as North Korea’s liaison office.

Nor did the phasing out of sanctions improve the situation. The US Department of Treasury hesitated for several weeks before beginning to phase out selected sanctions as promised in the Agreed Framework. Finally it authorized Americans to make telephone calls to North Korea and to use credit cards issued on US banks in Pyongyang. The North was not impressed.

Meanwhile, US-DPRK negotiations dragged on about the type of nuclear reactors to be built in North Korea. When the Agreed Framework reached its first anniversary, North Korea had much more to brag about than the US regarding implementation of the accord. Rather than pulling back, the MFA intensified efforts to impress the US Congress with its ‘sincere’ attitude, possibly hoping to compel the US government to catch up. Such thinking might also explain why the MFA became increasingly involved with the missing in action issue and began to press the army to accommodate US congressional concerns in this regard.

5 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE MIA REMAINS ISSUE

When the Korean War ended, the remains of 8,100 American soldiers had yet to be accounted for. The 1953 armistice required all parties ‘to
cooperate in the search for, recovery, and return of remains.’ Between 1954 and 1991, about 1,000 MIA remains were recovered in South Korea. North Korea during the same period returned about 1,934 sets of remains through the Military Armistice Commission at P’annunjŏm. This left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 American remains still in the North. The remains-related agreement of August 1993 between the UNC and the KPA (see Sections 3.1 and 6) aspired to facilitate the recovery of these remains, but continuing tense relations between the UNC and the North Korean army retarded implementation.

One irritant was North Korea’s circumvention during the 1980s of the UNC. North Korean authorities repeatedly engaged private US citizens, veterans groups and members of Congress on the remains issue. The Republic of Korea (ROK) suspected, and the US ambassador in Seoul agreed, that North Korea’s overtures via unofficial channels were aiming to use the remains issue to manipulate the US into direct talks with the DPRK without either South Korean or UNC participation. The UNC also worried that the KPA was attempting to undermine its role as the primary channel for implementation of the armistice. Subsequently the US authorities barred their officials from meeting North Koreans other than at P’annunjŏm. Late in 1986, the KPA accepted ‘on a humanitarian basis’ information from the UNC about US military remains and a month later proposed joint US Army-KPA recovery teams to locate MIA remains. The Department of Defense chose not to respond.

5.1 Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

It is important to place the DPRK’s overtures in the context of US-Vietnamese relations during the 1980s. The Vietnam War also had produced hatred between the US and Vietnam. But the American families of US missing in action from Vietnam, supported by American Vietnam War veterans, pressed their government to intensify the search for missing military personnel, believing that some might be alive in the jungles and prisons of Southeast Asia. Lending further impetus to this was President George Bush’s assignment of top priority to the recovery of all US MIAs.

The Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Affairs emerged under the co-chairmanship of Senator Bob Smith (Republican) and Senator John Kerry (Democrat). The com-
committee prodded Defense to initiate joint recovery operations (JRO) staffed by members of the US and Vietnamese armies to recover US remains in Vietnam. These recovery operations commenced long before the two enemies regularized their relations, but their success contributed to the relatively rapid normalization of US-Vietnamese relations in 1995.

In 1987, the DPRK asked the Soviet embassy in Washington to invite select US congressmen to a meeting in New York to discuss the MIA issue. Nothing came of the overture until January 1990, when Ho Jong, North Korea’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, met Sonny Montgomery, chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, in New York to discuss the repatriation of remains. Five months later, in May 1990, the KPA handed five sets of remains to the congressman at a UNC-organized ceremony at P’anjumôn. For a while, Ho Jong became the main point of contact between the US Congress and the DPRK government.

Senator Bob Smith had the Vietnam joint recovery operations in mind when he met Ho Jong in New York in February 1991. He indicated to Ho that his government should avoid trying to imitate Vietnam by using the recovery of remains as a device to entice the US into normalizing relations with the North. Senator Smith next met a DPRK delegation at P’anjumôn in June 1991, which included Kang Sok Ju, the North Korean first vice-minister of foreign affairs, who later became the DPRK’s chief negotiator in the US-DPRK nuclear talks from 1993 to 1994. After a private meeting between Smith and Kang, DPRK officials gave the senator eleven sets of remains. Smith’s priority was to press for information about any living Americans, prisoners of war or otherwise, in North Korea. Kang, while promising to look into the matter, seemed intent upon bypassing the MAC and working directly with the US Congress, but Smith avoided making any commitment to Kang. North Korean officials also continued to insist there were no living American missing in action or prisoners of war in North Korea.

During 1992, the KPA re-engaged the MAC on the remains issue by expressing interest in concluding another agreement, but rejected a US proposal for joint recovery operations. Instead the KPA for the first time asserted a claim for compensation of expenses connected to its prior unilateral recovery and repatriation of US remains. This shifted the focus from recovery and return to money, a move that stymied progress until August 1993.
5.2 Senator Smith goes to Pyongyang

Senator Smith led the first US congressional delegation to Pyongyang from 19 to 21 December 1992. It was the first visit by a senator and a US diplomat (the author) to North Korea. Also accompanying them were a US marine congressional liaison officer and a member of the senator’s staff. Initially, Lawrence Eagleburger, acting secretary of state, fearing that a US diplomat’s presence in the delegation might arouse suspicions in the ROK that the US was making a fundamental shift in its North Korea policy, opposed such diplomatic participation. At the time South Koreans were electing a new president. But Brent Scowcroft, chief national security adviser, supported the senator’s request, and the author traveled to Pyongyang.

It was dark and cold when the delegation reached Pyongyang by plane from Beijing. We were taken to an MFA guest house, where we learned that our luggage was still in China and no flights would arrive from Beijing until the day of our departure. We also learned that ‘China had stopped oil shipments’. This meant there was no heat or hot water in our quarters. Tired, cold, hungry and unwashed, we retired for the night.

On Sunday, 20 December, after a cold breakfast, we began discussions with MFA officials. Bob Smith and Kang Sok Ju cordially exchanged views. Smith asked repeatedly whether there were any living American prisoners in North Korea and inquired about the extent of Chinese handling of UN POWs during the Korean War and similar questions. He stressed that his primary purpose was to ensure that the DPRK appreciated the Americans’ intense desire for a full accounting of all US military personnel missing in action in the Korean War. North Korea’s cooperation in this regard could improve the atmosphere between the two nations. He explained that he had neither the authority nor the desire to negotiate anything and urged the DPRK to conclude a new agreement with the UNC regarding compensation for MIA recovery-related expenses. He further urged the KPA in the future to preserve the context of sites where remains were discovered to improve prospects for identification. Toward this end, he proposed that North Korea give the US government access to documents and artifacts concerning the handling of prisoners of war during the war.

The North Korean side promised to provide access to archives, but urged that first bilateral technical talks be convened to sort out specifics. On China, the US side was advised to raise with Chinese au-
noted their control over UN POWs after their military intervened in the fall of 1950. The North Koreans claimed that some photographs of American POW camps had been taken in northeast China during the war. They confirmed what Smith had learned earlier in Moscow—26 US Army and 15 Air Force personnel were sent to the Soviet Union for interrogation. The North Koreans claimed that these prisoners had returned to camps in China and North Korea.

Monday morning, 21 December, began on a positive note. We paid a courtesy call on the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Yang Hyon Sop, a relative by marriage of Kim II Sung. A tour of the enormous Mansudae Supreme People’s Assembly Hall followed. Afterwards, to our amazement, we headed to the war museum. There we even explored the basement and photographed a floor-to-ceiling collage of pictures that depicted hundreds of American POWs being marched to prison camps. Piled on the floor in front of the display were hundreds of American rifles, helmets, uniforms, personal belongings and regimental battle flags. The display was designed to convince North Koreans that their army had defeated the United States ‘imperialist’ army.

Senator Smith impressed the North Koreans with his earnestness, patience, candor and adroit handling of sensitive issues. The visit succeeded beyond expectations. Only the UNC in Seoul was uncomfortable because the delegation’s success posed a threat to its continuing management of the MIA issue. Thereafter, DPMO and State would play the lead role in handling the issue.

6 UNC-KPA TALKS RESUME

The UNC and KPA signed a new Agreement on Remains-related Matters on 24 August 1993. It supplemented and expanded upon the more general terms of the Korean War armistice regarding this issue. Both sides affirmed their willingness to co-operate in locating, exhuming, repatriating and identifying remains of UNC personnel north of the MDL [Military Demarcation Line].’ For the first time the US military agreed to ‘render support’ to the North Korean army’s efforts and to form a working group of technical specialists and observers to settle the specifics of recovery and identification procedures.

No sooner had the agreement been signed than progress ceased. The KPA interpreted ‘render support’ to mean that the UNC owed it
US$3 million to compensate for costs associated with the remains repatriated between 1990 and 1993. This impasse persisted until the spring of 1996. In September 1994, CILHI sought to break it by inviting a KPA delegation to Hawaii for talks, but the invitation was declined.

6.1 Return to the Pyongyang War Museum

Meanwhile, the Agreed Framework had been signed in October 1994 and its implementation initiated. My stint as the State Department liaison between the US spent fuel team and the North Korean General Bureau of Atomic Energy required my living several months at Yŏngbyŏn during 1995. Thus in October 1995 I again visited the Korean War museum in Pyongyang, where I photographed the military identification cards of five American airmen whose B-29 bomber had been shot down near Pyongyang.

Back in Washington, the photographs of the ID cards confirmed that they belonged to five previously unaccounted for military personnel. DPMO then asked me to contact the DPRK mission to the UN. With State’s approval, I informed Han Song Ryol, minister at the DPRK’s New York mission, of the US government’s interest in obtaining more information about the five airmen. Shortly thereafter Kim Byong Hong, director of the North Korean Institute for Disarmament and Peace, hinted during a New York visit that the impasse over compensation might end if it was discussed through a civilian rather than a military channel. Han contacted David Brown, director of the State Department’s Office of Korea Affairs, to tell him that ‘Kim Byong Hong is the person in the MFA responsible for the remains issue.’ Han inquired if the September 1994 CILHI invitation was still available. Brown asked DPMO about this and a new invitation was promptly issued for seven DPRK officials to visit CILHI to resume talks.

6.2 Aloha Hawaii

US and North Korean authorities agreed to convene talks in Honolulu from 10 to 12 January 1996, but stormy weather delayed the start until 12 January. The US Army did its best to impress the DPRK delega-
tion, the first time KPA members had visited the US. On 12 January the two delegations headed to Hickam Air Force Base near Pearl Harbor. The chief delegates were General James W. Wold (retired) of the US Army, who was assistant secretary of defense for POW/MIA affairs, and Senior Colonel Pak Rim Su of the KPA’s P’anmunjŏm mission. The KPA gave me a copy of their talking points to ensure that their position was clearly understood. Pak declared that the DPRK had already fulfilled its requirements under the Korean War armistice regarding the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action. But since North Korea considered the issue a humanitarian one, it had continued discussions with the UNC. He concluded that the negotiations at P’anmunjŏm had become ‘a spinning wheel talk only to come to a deadlock.’

In classic KPA negotiating style, Pak declared that the US position remained unacceptable. He claimed that ‘our soldiers are strongly protesting against the US remains recovery, enraged by the continuous hostile policy of the US against our country. Since the US is making a preparation for a military adventure against us, we cannot but take counter-measures to cope with it’ (a reference to the annual spring US-South Korea joint military exercise Team Spirit.) Pak continued that ‘… if the remains issue can be solved smoothly, the hostility and belligerence should be removed’ between our two countries and added ‘… and the hostile policy of the US against us should be removed.’ To drive his point home, Pak reiterated: ‘Only when the US promise to remove hostile policy and take practical measures complying with the spirit of the [1994] DPRK-US framework agreement, can our people and army men believe it.’ His comments continue to echo twelve years later at all US-North Korea talks.

Senior Colonel Pak then raised compensation. He asserted that ‘… priority should be given to the discussion of the issue of compensation for the labour [sic] work, material, equipment and facilities used up and damaged in searching for, disinterring and identifying the US remains.’ (It may be noted that none of the remains returned up to that point could be identified because no information had been supplied about where they had been found or any other details. Furthermore, some of the remains had been mixed together, making it impossible to separate them by individual.)

The US delegation had come prepared to reach quick agreement on the compensation issue in the hope of moving to an agreement on joint recovery operations. According to DPMO’s draft agreement dated 14
January 1996, the UNC would agree to reimburse the DPRK US $2 million, and 1 February 1996 in P’anmunjom had been selected as the date and place for payment. But the KPA demanded US$3 million, a sum which DPMO rejected. Clearly the KPA was in control of the North Korean delegation, and MFA officials were primarily observers. The talks quickly came to resemble the verbal dueling that characterized MAC meetings at P’anmunjom rather than the diplomatic negotiations that had produced the Agreed Framework. By the afternoon of the first day, the talks reached an impasse when Pak rejected the idea of joint recovery operations pending agreement on compensation.

That evening I sat with Ja Song Nam, head of the MFA politico-military affairs section. I had met him at the time of Senator Bob Smith’s visit to Pyongyang. At the Honolulu talks, Ja sought to find common ground so that the talks might end on a positive note. He intended to formulate a joint statement that would list areas of agreement and disagreement to be addressed at future talks, but its discussion was deferred until after both delegations had toured CILHI. When the talks resumed, the atmosphere quickly turned sour. Pak pressed for more compensation. For him and his KPA colleagues, the goal was victory, not compromise and co-operation. This exhausted the patience of the Defense Department delegates. Early the next morning the KPA delegation was sent to the airport for an early return to Pyongyang. Clearly the KPA had mistakenly assumed that the US was so eager to resume the repatriation effort that it would accommodate all of the North Korean wishes. Later Defense released a neutrally worded press release that concluded: ‘The talks failed to resolve any of the problems that have blocked progress on this important humanitarian issue.’ On 20 January, once the DPRK delegation had reached Pyongyang, the MFA released a rather harshly worded statement that read in part, ‘DPRK-US talks on the remains of GIs were held in Hawaii at the proposal of the US from 11-14 January. … a

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1 In December 1994, Ja had almost died when an army car rushing him to P’anmunjom crashed near Kaesong. The MFA had dispatched him to P’anmunjom to confirm that the helicopter incident (see Section 4) had been resolved and that the KPA should release the detained US pilot and his dead companion’s remains. Along the way, an elderly Korean woman abruptly appeared on the highway in front of the speeding car, causing the car to crash. Two army officers died and Ja and the driver were seriously injured. Despite several broken bones and serious cuts, Ja continued his journey in another car to deliver the North Korean orders. Only then did he go to the hospital. In 2006, after service in New York, Ja became the DPRK ambassador to the United Kingdom.
complete agreement could not be reached owing to the unreasonable stand of the US side.'

6.3 Return to the negotiating table

At first glance the MFA statement was disheartening. It suggested that the impasse would persist, but there was a subtle reason for optimism. Until then the KPA had played the lead role on the remains issue but the MFA had issued the statement. This suggested that the MFA might take over from the army. Confirmation of this came three weeks later when Han Song Ryol on 13 February 1996 in an oral message to the State Department’s Korea desk explained his government was prepared to resume the remains negotiations in late February or early March in P’anjöng. Han also expressed confidence that major outstanding issues, i.e. compensation and recovery operations, could be resolved.

At the time the MFA had Kim Jong Il’s confidence. Distanced from its long-time allies China and Russia, North Korea in 1996 appeared on the brink of economic and even political collapse. Its economy was bankrupt, its foreign trade had evaporated and its people were suffering famine.

Kim Jong Il, it could be argued, saw successful implementation of the Agreed Framework as imperative for his regime’s survival and thus was eager to project a co-operative attitude toward the US. This was indicated when he personally hosted a dinner to honor the DPRK negotiating team and promoted its members. Subsequently they complained about but demonstrated patience with the erratic deliveries of heavy fuel oil, the stymied opening of liaison offices, and tardy US initiation of the spent nuclear fuel project. The KPA, however, had persisted in its traditional belligerent attitude toward the US government. Possibly to soften the North’s image and to project a more co-operative face to the US Congress and Department of Defense, the MFA assumed primary responsibility for the MIA negotiations. This suggests that Kim Jong Il decided to relieve the KPA of this task, a decision neither the ministry nor the army had the authority to make.
On 1 March 1996, the State Department responded positively to the North’s overture to resume the remains talks. Instead of meeting in P’anmunjom, the Korea desk at State and the DPMO concurred on reconvening in New York in late April. The MFA agreed in principle, but Senior Colonel Pak insisted on meeting his UNC counterpart Colonel Ormes on 20 March in P’anmunjom. Again, Pak’s foremost concern was compensation. Ormes deflected Pak’s repeated demands that the compensation issue be resolved before the proposed April talks. Pak finally accepted the fact that the KPA could not get any money until formal talks reconvened in New York.

Pak’s efforts convinced US officials that the MFA and the KPA were pursuing separate goals. The army’s objective was to get US dollars, but the MFA was more interested in building positive relations and political capital with the US. Sensitivity to these divergent goals helped ensure success for the US at the New York talks. Nevertheless, some in the US government remained convinced that the North Koreans were trying to manipulate US negotiators by playing a game of ‘good cop, bad cop’. All the while, Defense and State kept the ROK government informed about the negotiations on the remains of missing personnel. They emphasized that the issue was a humanitarian, not a bilateral political matter. While the US was glad to keep the ROK fully informed, it emphasized that South Korean involvement was unnecessary and undesired.

On 24 April, I contacted a senior DPRK diplomat in New York about his country’s response to the US invitation to reconvene MIA talks in New York, then scheduled for early May. My contact told me that the KPA was reluctant to accept the US invitation and suggested that the US propose new dates for the talks. He said the KPA believed it was gaining nothing from its co-operation. The same official indicated that his government was ready to approve compensation worth US$2 million and suggested that the US be prepared to make the payment when the talks resumed in New York. As for the US primary concern—joint recovery operations—the diplomat said his government accepted the proposal in principle but specifics would have to be worked out in technical talks. On 29 April, Han informed State that his government would resume the MIA remains talks in New York on 4 May 1996 and provided the names of the DPRK delegates. Kim Byong Hong, not Senior Colonel Pak would head the delegation.
The talks convened on 4 May. From the start they did not go well. Compensation immediately emerged as the problem. Kim Byong Hong repeated the North Korean demand for US$3 million and General Wold countered with US$1 million. After several exchanges, Richard Christenson, State deputy director for Korea affairs, reiterated Wold’s position and urged the DPRK to demonstrate ‘sincerity’. This visibly displeased Kim. Toward the end of the morning session, Wold doubled the US offer to US$2 million but Kim still expressed dissatisfaction. The session ended inconclusively.

At dinner that evening, Kim Byong Hong, who was suffering from a cold and jet lag, complained that the US offer of US$2 million was unacceptable but reiterated his government’s readiness to move forward on the MIA issue. Pak Sok Gyun, deputy director of the MFA’s North American division, complained that the rhetoric had become unnecessarily heated, a reference to Christenson’s comment that discussion of the Agreed Framework was unwarranted and that the DPRK should demonstrate sincerity. Pak reiterated that the DPRK had already demonstrated its sincerity regarding the Agreed Framework and resolution of the missing in action issue. Kim followed up on Pak’s comments, saying he had come to negotiate with Wold and ‘no one else’. This too was a clear reference to Christenson’s frequent interjections during the morning session. Kim concurred with Pak’s earlier assessment that the KPA saw the US commitment to the Agreed Framework as being ‘empty since it had given nothing except the symbolic gesture of lifting of sanctions.’ He pointed out that KEDO, not the US government, was providing heavy fuel oil.

The talks resumed on Monday morning after the DPRK delegation had recovered and also had received additional instructions from Pyongyang. Christenson had returned to Washington. Although the 6 May discussions again proved inconclusive, the DPRK appeared to be probing the US side’s resolve regarding its US$2 million offer. Once convinced that the US would not give more, the DPRK accepted the offer. Kim then agreed in principle to the holding of joint recovery operations by the US Army and the KPA. That evening the UNC/MAC representatives expressed displeasure with DPMO’s handling of the negotiations. Wold, however, had the support of the White House and the Defense and State departments and overruled UNC’s objections.

On the morning of 9 May 1996, Wold and Kim signed the New York Agreement on USA-DPRK Remains Talks. It reads as follows:
1. The US side expresses appreciation to the DPRK side for its past sincere efforts in recovering and returning 162 sets of US servicemen’s remains. The US side will pay the DPRK side two million US dollars during the week of 20 May at Panmunjom for the costs associated with labor, materials, equipment and facilities used by the DPRK.

2. Both sides agreed to a working level meeting during the first half of June at a place to be determined. At this meeting, they will discuss the specific timing, sites, personnel and all other necessary requirements, including any reimbursement for expenses in support of these joint recovery operations. Both sides expect this technical meeting will result in joint recovery operations this year.

3. Both sides express their belief that this agreement in New York City will contribute to the improvement of US-DPRK relations.

   James W. Wold  
   (signed)  
   Head of the US delegation

   Kim Byong Hong  
   (signed)  
   Head of the DPRK delegation

   Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs

   Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(Written note: Both sides agreed this compensation would not serve as a precedent for any future compensation.)

6.5 Paying compensation

Payment of the US$2 million was set for 20 May in P’anmunjom, but the transaction proved far more complex than anyone could have imagined. Furthermore, the amount excited claims among the program’s critics that the US government had ‘bought’ the remains of missing personnel from the KPA to the benefit of Kim Jong Il’s regime. Actually the principle of compensation followed the precedent set by the US MIA recovery effort in Vietnam. That program provided the Vietnamese government agreed-upon reimbursement for specific expenses such as a laborer’s daily salary, compensation for farmland or forest disturbed during excavation, the cost of transporting personnel, food, and supporting equipment to and from recovery sites, and other expenses.

In the case of North Korea, it was impossible to specify compensation for expenses connected to the remains returned during 1990-93. Instead, DPMO preferred to settle the matter with a single, lump-sum payment. The Vietnam JRO schedule of reimbursement would be applied to all future operations in North Korea, a matter to be deter-
mined at future technical talks. Although groundless, critics’ claims that the KPA was paid for remains persisted and gradually eroded public support for the US Army-KPA joint operations.

6.6 Congressman Richardson’s visit

One of the more bizarre incidents involving the MIA recovery effort occurred during US Congressman Bill Richardson’s second visit to North Korea. Richardson, a Democrat and personal friend of President Clinton, had first visited Pyongyang in December 1994 during the US-KPA helicopter incident (see Section 4 above). He attempted unsuccessfully to obtain the release of the surviving American pilot and his deceased companion. He next visited Pyongyang in May 1996 shortly after the New York MIA agreement had been signed. Alan Liotta, deputy head of DPMO, and Richard Christenson, deputy head at the State Department’s Korea desk, accompanied him. Again the Congressman’s assertive tendencies, already apparent on his first visit, almost sparked a bilateral incident.

Liotta had briefed the congressman about the New York accord before the visit and while in Pyongyang settled with the MFA the dates and place for technical talks on the US Army-KPA joint recovery operations. At some point, while Liotta was resting, Richardson proposed to MFA officials that the DPRK accept food aid as compensation for the repatriation of future MIA remains. When Liotta learned this, he pointed out that this would be inconsistent with the 9 May New York Agreement and established DPMO policy. Christenson sought the view of the National Security Council (NSC) via telephone about the congressman’s offer, but the NSC rejected it and apparently reminded the congressman that US law bars members of Congress from negotiating on behalf of the US government.

Richardson withdrew his offer, but not without consequences. His departure from Pyongyang was delayed for several hours while the KPA tried to convince him to win US approval of his food aid offer. The KPA finally relented and Richardson belatedly departed. DPMO did not again seek the advice or assistance of Congressman Richardson and Richard Christenson.

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2 Richardson later served in Clinton’s cabinet as secretary of energy and ambassador to the UN.
7 JOINT US ARMY-KPA RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Technical talks to establish procedures for the first operation commenced near Pyongyang on 8 June 1996. North Korean army experts accompanied by MFA officials met their American counterparts Colonel Bill Jordan, Captain Mario Garcia, Sergeant Frank Tauanuu (all of CILHI), together with Lieutenant Colonel Martin Wisda of DPMO and the author from the State Department.

When Senior Colonel Pak joined the talks, progress slowed. His aim was to squeeze the US for as much money as possible for each category of compensation. Patience soon dissipated. At 3am the MFA intervened and an agreement was hammered out. Discussion of specific compensation amounts was deferred until the operation had commenced.

Ten US personnel were authorized to enter North Korea to conduct JRO #1. Eight CILHI experts would live and work at the JRO work site near Unsan, about 150 miles north of Pyongyang near the DPRK-China border. Two US personnel, Wisda and the author, would provide liaison between the JRO field team, the North Korean MFA and the US government while residing at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang. Upwards of 90 KPA soldiers would provide security and labor while the US side would supply sufficient food, equipment and vehicles to support all JRO members living in the field for 20 days.

7.1 Logistical problems

Two developments complicated logistical support. The schedule for the joint recovery operation required that all US personnel, equipment and food arrive in North Korea by 9 July, just three weeks after the agreement had been reached. In addition, the Defense Attaché at the US Beijing Embassy disallowed any support from his office to the operation.

DPMO turned to me for assistance. Only one US company then had legal permission to do business with the DPRK. Daniel Murphy, a retired US Navy admiral and former CIA deputy director, had established Nikko of New Jersey in 1989 to export up to one billion US dollars’ worth of goods to meet ‘basic human needs’ to North Korea using a US government license issued by the Department of Commerce. He teamed up with a Korean-American rice dealer and together
they exported several millions of dollars’ worth of grain to North Korea between 1990 and 1993. When North Korea defaulted on payment, Murphy sold his half of the company to his partner who formed a new company called B&B. B&B retained the license which enabled it to do business with North Korea. CILHI had no recourse but to rely on B&B, which had a branch office in Beijing, to provide logistical support for the first joint recovery operation.

B&B purchased eight Jeep Cherokees, three cargo trucks, a micro bus, tents and other camping equipment and food. Air Koryo was contracted to transport the equipment and food from Beijing to Pyongyang. Each of three flights cost the standard international fee of US $30,000, paid in advance.

7.2 JRO advance team

The JRO advance team consisted of Major Cohen of DPMO, Sergeant Tauanuu of CILHI and myself. We reached Pyongyang on 4 July. There a KPA officer accosted us in the airport parking lot, where he labeled us representatives of a ‘hostile military force’, which required that we be placed in detention. Instead of being sent to the Koryo Hotel, we were temporarily housed in Kobongsan Guest House outside Pyongyang. We then endured three days of harassment at the hands of this intensely anti-American official. He denied all our requests, including permission to make telephone calls. After repeated confrontations, I told him that unless he allowed me to visit the MFA, North Korea’s Olympic Team would not be able to obtain visas to attend the 1996 Olympiad in Atlanta in Georgia. When I showed him the letter I had from the US Embassy in Beijing that invited North Korea’s Olympic contestants to apply for visas, he directed that I be driven to the MFA. No sooner had I told my diplomatic counterpart of our plight than he arranged for us to be moved to the Koryo Hotel and thereafter we met daily with Mr. Ja from the MFA.

The first cargo flight arrived at 1:30am on 8 July. Our KPA hosts guided us to the Soviet-built IL-76 jet as it parked. The opening of the large rear doors revealed much more than the JRO cargo. Two Isuzu cargo trucks (each filled with bottled water purchased in China) and a Jeep Cherokee were slowly backed out of the airplane. A cargo pallet filled with CILHI equipment followed. Then emerged four huge tires, a US-made Hewlett-Packard computer server and other communica-
tion equipment, all addressed to the DPRK Ministry of Telecommunication, plus cases of European wine and liquor. We had been told that taking pictures was permitted, but when Tauanuu photographed the cargo, a KPA officer seized his camera. A few minutes later, however, it was returned, the offending KPA officer disappeared and another officer commended the sergeant’s restraint. The cargo was stored in nearby warehouses pending customs clearance. Two KPA officers spent the night with the cargo in the mosquito-infested and sweltering warehouses.

Two more cargo flights arrived early on 9 July with seven Jeep Cherokees, tents, small generators, propane gas stoves and related equipment plus a ton of rice and a variety of condiments and fresh vegetables. The sight of the Jeeps angered Senior Colonel Pak, and a KPA officer tried to pry the Jeep symbol from one vehicle. Pak claimed the KPA would be embarrassed to drive Jeeps while the UN World Food Program used much more expensive Toyota Land Cruisers. His grumbling ended after it was explained that the US-designed jeeps had been purchased to minimize possible criticism from the US Congress.

The absence of US Army ‘meals ready to eat’ became a much more contentious issue. Colonel Jordan had promised at the technical talks to supply sufficient such meals for 90 persons for 20 days, but then CILHI decided against this. Colonel Pak accused CILHI of ‘insincerity’ and of failing to keep its promises. Resolution finally came after DPMO authorized the provision of sufficient money to the KPA to purchase beef and other fresh food for the operation’s North Korean army members.

As soon as customs officials had cleared the JRO team’s gear, it was loaded in the trucks and driven north to the JRO site by KPA drivers. The trip took nearly six hours over first an expressway and then very rough, unpaved roads. Upon arrival, Major Joyner, team leader of the US JRO, received the following written statement:

Warning Notes for the Personnel of the US Side

1. Recovery works of the remains shall be stopped immediately and all the personnel of the US side be withdrawn from recovery site in case that they make or take disgraceful remarks and acts against the Great Leader [Kim Il Sung] and our respected Supreme Commander [Kim Jong Il], or make statements slandering our socialist system and that they take pictures and make video tapes recording the ob-
jects which has nothing to do with the recovery work of the remains without our permission.

2. The personnel of the U.S. side is not allowed to go out of this area [camp and working site] or go to a village in the vicinity and meet soldiers and people.

3. The personnel of the U.S. side shall use telephone in Hyangsan Hotel [Comment: more than a two-hour trip over rough dirt roads] when they need to have telephone communication with their personnel staying in Pyongyang and use of any communication instrument is not allowed.

4. Those who violate these rules shall be punished according to the law of our country.

Only once during the nine years of the joint recovery operations was a US JRO member expelled from the DPRK for verbally confronting a KPA officer in front of KPA enlisted men. Armed KPA guards, rain, heat and humidity together with isolation made for miserable living conditions at the JRO camp. A small amount of water was provided each day for washing, but no bathing facilities were available. The KPA soldiers ate freshly cooked meals twice a day but the Americans survived on ‘meals ready to eat’ and canned food that they had brought with them from Hawaii. Everyone drank bottled water brought from China.

7.3 JRO liaison team

Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Wisda and I lived at the Koryo Hotel. Every other day we traveled to the JRO site because there was no other means of communication. We took with us what fresh food we could purchase. At the site, we reviewed the situation with the JRO team leader. If an issue could not be resolved quickly at the site, I would visit the MFA the next day in Pyongyang to discuss the matter with an MFA counterpart. This proved mutually beneficial because it minimized the risk of confrontation at the site while facilitating smooth co-operation for both sides.

In Pyongyang, the liaison team worked with the MFA to establish a medical evacuation plan from the JRO site to Pyongyang, surveyed medical facilities in Pyongyang, and negotiated successfully an air evacuation route by US Air Force aircraft from Pyongyang to Japan. We also traveled to P’anmunjŏm to arrange for the repatriation of Corporal LeBoeuf’s remains to the UNC on 29 July.
Unfortunately, the first joint recovery operation ended on a negative note. Senior Colonel Pak continued to press for maximum compensation despite having agreed to accept fixed sums for specific expenses. The last day of the JRO’s stay in Pyongyang ended with the KPA officers demanding enormous sums of money, which the US side rejected. When the KPA persisted in its claims the following morning, the entire US group boarded their vehicles and headed for the airport and their flight to Beijing. Stunned, the KPA assumed that the MFA would bar our departure. When this failed to happen, a North Korean army colonel rushed to the airport and demanded payment. Since all of the Americans had processed through immigration when he arrived, he could not reach them. I was directed to tell the KPA officer that he could either accept payment as determined according to the agreed guidelines, or get nothing. When he reluctantly agreed to the offered amount, I paid him and had him sign a receipt confirming that he had received full payment. The US team then departed. Colonel Pak was furious but helpless. The MFA must have facilitated our departure.

8 THE JRO ENDEAVOR IN ITS POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Relatively speaking, the first joint recovery operation went fairly smoothly. There were numerous minor confrontations, disagreements and misunderstandings, but each was resolved through patient dialogue, several with the MFA’s help. After all, this was the first time in history that members of the two still hostile armies had worked together. It had taken years for politicians, private veterans organizations, soldiers and diplomats from the US, North Korea and South Korea to overcome a half-century of intense hatred, distrust and superpower rivalry to initiate the US Army-KPA joint recovery operations. Inaugurated in July 1996, the JROs continued until May 2005.

The JROs proved more successful in terms of their duration and the extent of US-North Korea co-operation than anyone could have foreseen. Literally hundreds of soldiers from two hostile armies experienced working together. Thousands of ordinary North Korean citizens in Pyongyang and the countryside saw American soldiers riding with and working with members of the KPA. Hundreds of North Korean
THE US ARMY’S RETURN TO NORTH KOREA

airline stewardesses, customs officials, drivers, hotel clerks, waiters and waitresses, cleaning personnel, museum guides and farmers witnessed the peaceful return of the American army to North Korea.

During the near decade of co-operation, no American soldier in North Korea experienced any willful harm at the hands of North Koreans or committed any serious offense against a North Korean or the government. Despite tense, difficult and highly regulated living conditions, all American soldiers in the JRO program conducted themselves in a manner that belied the highly distorted image of American soldiers and citizens that the DPRK government had projected to the North Korean people for almost half a century.

The operations ultimately located and returned to the US the remains of nearly 500 American soldiers missing in North Korea since the Korean War and which now await identification at the US Army’s Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii.

Another largely ignored benefit was the ability of the US Army to survey what was happening in much of North Korea. During the subsequent spring, summer and fall operations, American military personnel were permitted to travel far beyond Pyongyang and pass through most of North Korea’s provinces, including areas closed to UN and foreign humanitarian organizations. During these trips it was possible to determine normal and abnormal patterns of activity. The KPA actually assisted in this regard by allowing the American soldiers increasing access to wider areas for their travel to former battle fields. Never before had the US military been able to assess so accurately conditions in North Korea, evaluate its political intentions, and witness the levels of economic and military activity.

The North Korean MFA considered the presence of American soldiers an informal but effective guarantee that the US would not attack while recovery teams were present. This acquired increasing importance after President Bush declared in 2002 his strategy of pre-emptive strike against any nation he felt threatened US security and after he pronounced North Korea to be a member of the ‘axis of evil’.

A decade of joint effort is too brief to erase a half-century of animosity between two nations, two governments and two armies. Sadly, the greater the JROs’ success, the more resolute became their opponents in the US administration to end them. From the very beginning, ranking US officers in the UNC saw the operations as undermining their authority and that of the MAC in its oversight of the Korean War armistice. Some South Korean politicians and political pundits
claimed that the program’s compensation of expenses sustained the North Korean dictatorship at a time when it appeared near collapse. Even some members of American humanitarian organizations shared such views.

Overlooked was the reality that the US Army had peacefully returned to North Korea and had worked without incident with its arch-enemy. This accomplishment came when the US government was wrestling diplomatically with North Korea to end its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and South-North Korean hostility often flared to the brink of war. Indirectly, the joint recovery operations gave cooler heads in each government reason to resolve differences through dialogue rather than confrontation.

The JRO success began in 1996 and 1997 just as official North Korean confidence in the US government’s ability to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework was waning. Many in the US administration sought to separate the JRO effort from the Agreed Framework, insisting it was ‘humanitarian’ and unrelated to the politically oriented Agreed Framework. But the DPRK never accepted this. It insisted that the two elements were ‘simultaneous steps’ linked to the primary goal of achieving normal bilateral US-DPRK relations. After all, this interpretation was consistent with the preconditions that the US government had set forth at the January 1992 bilateral talks.

North Korea insisted that its co-operation with the recovery operations obliged the US to respond in kind by intensifying efforts to more effectively implement the Agreed Framework. Specifically this meant, between 1996 and 1998, regular deliveries of heavy fuel oil and intensified efforts to begin building the two nuclear light water reactors promised in the Agreed Framework. In fact, effective implementation of both elements began in 1998 only after the South Korean government took over responsibility for funding and managing KEDO. By then North Korean critics of the Agreed Framework formed a potent chorus that challenged US credibility regarding implementation of the accord. As evidence, they pointed to the growing number of congressmen who attacked the Agreed Framework as an example of ‘appeasement’ and as supporting a totalitarian regime insensitive to human rights. Congress gradually approved measures that restricted the US government’s ability to effectively implement the agreement. When the Bush administration entered the White House in 2001, it moved to either re-negotiate or to discard the Agreed Framework.
Ultimately critics of both the Agreed Framework and the joint recovery operations achieved their goal. In 2002, the Bush administration discarded the Agreed Framework, claiming that the DPRK had failed to fulfill its commitments. At the end of May 2005, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, citing unspecified threats to US military personnel involved with the JROs in North Korea, ordered a unilateral halt to them. US Secretary of State Rice promptly proclaimed that she, not Rumsfeld, oversaw US policy toward North Korea; but the damage had been done. The KPA immediately declared that co-operation had ended and was unlikely to resume. Ever since, not a single member of the US military has been able to work in North Korea or to engage their North Korean counterparts in rational dialogue. And the US military is once again blind to what is happening inside North Korea.

Meanwhile, the memories of co-operation are fading, while the remains of Corporal LeBoeuf’s fellow soldiers await recovery and return to their homeland.
### List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>CILHI</td>
<td>Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (US Army)</td>
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<td>Codel</td>
<td>Congressional delegation</td>
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<td>DPMO</td>
<td>Department of Defense Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Office</td>
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<td>EAP/K</td>
<td>State Department Bureau of East Asia and Pacific affairs, Office of Korea Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>JRO</td>
<td>Joint recovery operation</td>
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<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army (DPRK)</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Armistice Commission</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DPRK)</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in action</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (USA)</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of war</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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</table>
THE US ARMY’S RETURN TO NORTH KOREA

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